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Introductory note 
This paper contains the results of the research work conducted by 
the Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit concerning the activities of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in the bauxite industry of Caribbean countries. -
Parts I and II review selected aspects of the international bauxite 
industry and give profiles of the main TiCs operating In the Caribbean. 
Part III summarizes the evolUtidrt Of the U.S. and'Canadian aluminium 
industry from its beginnings.yntil the 1970s. Finally* in Part IV the 
new bargaining situation and Caribbean.government policies in the 1970s 
are analysed in terms of "the region a's a whole and,' in more detail, with 
regard to the particular policy approaches to TNCs in Jamaica and Guyana. 
In'"the last two parts of the paper, an attempt has been made to 
underline some important, aspects of .the common research framework of 
1 / 
the Interregional C E F A L / E C A / E S C A P Project — , such as inter-company 
competition and collusion, typical characteristics of the agreements 
signed under, colonial administrations and, particularly, the policies as 
regards taxation arid increasing national participation in the industry 
followed' by independent governments in the 1970s and the corresponding 
TInCs* counter-strategies, with some of their short-term effects on 
Caribbean economies. For various reasons, however—particularly lack 
of more detailed information and shortage of resources in the Unit—it 
has not been possible to analyse the new aspects of the Caribbean countries* 
bargaining capacity and resulting distribution of gains in a more coherent 
j/ See B. Widyono, Transnational Corporations in Export-oriented Primary 
Commodities; A Study, of. Relative Bargaining Positions and Gains, 
Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, Working Paper N°S, August, 1977, and the new 
version prepared by the Joint ESCAP/CTC Unit in September 1973. 
/and systematic 
and systematic way, as would have been desirable according to the 
above-mentioned common research framework. An exercise seeking to 
make a synthetic evaluation of the experience of some Latin American 
countries with the TNCs in the bauxite, tin and banana industries is 
currently being undertaken. 
Part I and II of this paper correspond to an earlier study by the 
Unit's consultants, Professors I.A. Litvak and C.J. Maule published by 
the Unit in 1977; Part III and chapters 3 and 4 of Part IV are based 
on the research work undertaken by a former staff member of the Unit, 
D. Hoelscher, and chapters 1 and 2 of Part IV correspond to a preliminary 
report by the Unit's consultant Prof. K. Levitt. Support in the form of 
valuable comments and new information has been kindly given by the 
CEPAL Divisions of Economic Development, Natural Resources and Industrial 
Development (particularly Messrs. A. Pinto, R. Devlin, R. Sanz-Guerrerq, 
S. Moya and L. Willmore). Any errors and omissions in this paper, 
however, are the responsibility of the Regional Adviser of the Unit, 
J. Knakal, who was in charge of its editing. 
Finally, while this paper was prepared solely for use by the 
Interregional Expert Group Meeting on Bargaining Capacity and Distribution 
of Gains in Export-Oriented Primary Commodities (Bangkok, 8-13 October 1979), 
critical comments and complementary information would be particularly 
welcomed from government officials, experts and academic circles of 
Caribbean and other Latin American countries in order to assist in the 
preparation of a definitive CEPAL study for the forthcoming Interregional 




SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAUXITE - ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 
1» Production Process 
The International Aluminum Industry (IAI) consists of five 
stages involving the production of bauxite, alumina, primary 
aluminum ingot, fabricated aluminum products (semi and final 
fabrications), and end products containing aluminum (see figure 1). 
It is with the first three stages that we are mainly concerned, 
since the history of the industry is one in which a small number 
of large companies have been vertically integrated and have 
controlled these three stages. Consequently, there is very little 
arms-length trading in bauxite and aluminum, and for all practical 
purposes there does not exist anything approaching a free market for 
either bauxite or alumina. The same companies have also been 
involved in the fourth stage, fabricated aluminum products, but in 
addition there have existed a number of independent fabricators and 
suppliers of scrap metal so that there does exist some market for 
primary aluminum ingot» However, independent fabricators often find 
themselves dependent on the large ingot producers for ingot, and in 
competition with the same large producers in selling fabricated 
products. The Flow chart - figure 2 - for the United States aluminum 
industry illustrates three important aspects of the industry. First, 
scrap metal is recycled as secondary aluminum from the production of 
new mill products and new final products as new scrap, and from old 
final products as old scrap. The ease of recycling varies with the 
type of scrap. In the case of new scrap, it is relatively easy as 
the scrap is concentrated in certain locations: in the case- of old 
scrap, there tend to be much higher costs of collection involved. 
In general, however, as the price of the metal rises, the more, old 
scrap will be collected. 
/Figure 1 
FIGURE 1 
THE PRODUCTION -PROCESSES IN THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 
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Second, in the case of the United States Government, 
stockpile of primary ingot is held which can be used in times of 
emergency for strategic or economic reasons. And third, the competition 
with aluminum from other materials will vary with the ease of 
substituting other materials in the final products in which aluminum 
is used. 
There is an important exception to the foregoing. The bauxite 
referred to above is metal grade bauxite, which, as the name implies, 
is used for producing aluminum ingot. A second type of bauxite is 
known as calcined bauxite and is used largely for abrasives and for 
producing refactory bricks and linings. The technology used for 
processing calcined bauxite varies according to the end product 
required, and does not involve the processes controlled by the major 
aluminum ingot producing companies. In the remainder of the paper 
reference to 'bauxite' will mean 'metal grade bauxite1, unless 
otherwise noted. 
The production process at.the first stage involves the mining, 
crushing, washing and calcining of the crude bauxite near the site 
of the deposits; the production of alumina, the second stage, 
involves a chemical process and further calcining and takes place 
both at the site of the deposits and at the location of the smelter 
where the third stage, the production of primary aluminum ingot is 
undertaken; smelting requires the extensive use of energy for the 
conversion of alumina into metal and is usually located near 
a source of cheap energy supplies (see figure 3). 
"The technologies of the first three- stages - bauxite mining, 
alumina manufacture, and aluminum reduction - are unique to the 
aluminum industry... In contrast, the technologies in 
fabrication are similar to those for other metals. The 
vertically integrated facilities of the primary producers 
account for three quarters of the fabricated output. Independent 
fabricators, who buy their ingot from the primary producers, 
account for the remainder. 
/Figure 3 
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"There are three further complications. First, sheet, rod, 
and bar require two distinct substages of production; hot 
rolling to produce reroll stock and cold rolling to produce 
the finished fabrication. Independent fabricators often buy 
semifabrications from the primary producers for final fabrication. 
Extrusions and castings have but one clearly defined stage in 
fabrication and consequently the independent fabricators buy 
aluminum ingot. 
"Second, foil and aluminum cable are customarily classified 
as fabricated products, even though they require no further 
manufacturing before their final use. In contrast, the other 
fabrications are bought by a diverse group of manufacturers 
for incorporation into almost every type of durable product ... 
The primary aluminum producers manufacture end-products, but 
only 15 per cent of the primary aluminum output is so consumed. 
"Third, secondary or scrap aluminum is produced by approximately 
fifty smelters who buy both new scrap (the clippings, chips, 
and borings generated in em^product manufacture and in 
fabrication) and old scrap (discarded aluminum aircraft 
components, pots and paps, and so forth) for smelting. In the 
postwar period, secondary aluminum output was approximately 
one-quarter of the aluminum output made from bauxite (that is, 
primary aluminum). Secondary aluminum is the near technical 
equivalent of primary aluminum for many applications, so that 
it is a close but inferior substitute for primary aluminum."1/ 
One further stage of the production process which is not 
mentioned in most reports of the industry, and without which the. 
industry could not survive, is the exploration and development which 
leads to the discovery of aluminum-bearing qres.- Exploration and 
development raises two important issues, the availability of additional 
sources of aluminum ores, and the way in which the financing is 
undertaken. 
On the first issue, it is repeatedly stated that aluminum is 
one of the most frequently occurring minerals in the earth's crust. 
While this is true, the commercial supply of aluminum is a relative 
term referring to those deposits of aluminum which are commercially 
attractive, given the prevailing price of the metal. Thus the deposits 
1/ M.J. Peck, Competition in the Aluminum Industry (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 7-8° 
/of aluminum 
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of aluminum that are of commercial' interest are 'those' in which - ^ ? 
aluminum is highly concentrated and where the codts of extraction are 
feasible given the prevailing price. .<;• 
The second isg.ue, .ithe,financing-of tha. exploration and 
development stage is crucial pa understanding the conflict between 
foreign investors and host governments,,!/ operations typically 
go through.three stages, (1) exploration and feasibility, (2) mine 
development;and construction, and (3) operations» .At the first two 
stages the.̂ i'l̂ ni is making heavy, expenditures and receiving no revenue, 
while at the operations stage revenues will exceed expenditures. When 
positive profits-do begin to be earned,, they will be substantial and 
considered.often exorbitant by the host country,^but in fact profits 
are-high.to-make up for the period of fosses.during the first two 
stages. The. average r§te of profit, over the three stages, which is 
what the company is. interested in, ,.will be lower .than the positive 
rate.; of prof it shown at the third stage. 
The companies^in fact,,estimate, an internal pat§ of return over 
; the total life of the- mining project* The internal rate of return is 
the,-.: rate/of interest'which^. when.used to discount the receipt stream 
of earnings andf, compound, the expenditure stream of payments^ yields 
the same present value for-,th,e. two streams. ,  In order to obtain a 
given internal rate of return,-for the total project,.. the accounting 
rate of profit (after-tax income as a per cent of net book value of 
assets)- will have to be. higher. than; the, internal rate, of return during 
the, period in which positive profits â e. earned?. 
An.understanding of. conflicts between foreign investors and 
bauxite producing countries requires a re^lizatipn that the rate of 
return concept used by each side may differ, thus accounting for 
the different perceptions of the profitability of both new and 
existing foreign investments in bauxite operations. At least, with 
1/ See R.F. Mikesell, "Financial Considerations in Negotiating 
Mine Development Agreements", Mining Magazine, Vol. 130, 
NQ k, April 197**. 
/respect to 
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respect to any new foreign investments, discussion can be undertaken 
attd-agreement reached on the appropriate rate of return concept to 
be used. • • •. . • 
2. Geographic Distribution of Production " 
- ., The. distribution of bauxite, alumina and primary aluminum 
ingot,.production by country in the market economies is shown in 
table .1. -.. The socialist. countries are producers of the three products 
as well as. the market economies, and while the interaction between 
the two has important implications which will be discussed below, the 
following discussion.relates to the market economies only. 
In,bauxite production, developing countries play an important 
role, with four countries, Jamaica, Surinam,Guyana and Guinea 
providing per cent of the bauxite produced. Amongst developed 
countries, Australia is by far the largest bauxite producer followed 
by France, Greece and the United States. The bauxite producing 
countries of the Caribbean area, Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic account for kk per cent of the total. 
In alumina capacity, the developed countries of the OECD account 
for approximately per cent of the total, with Jamaica being the 
most important developing country. The developed countries of the 
OECD have.90 per cent of the primary aluminum capacity with the 
United States, Canada, Norway and Japan having 66 per cent of the 
total. 
This distribution of the three stages of production shows that 
the developing countries are an important source of bauxite, while 
the later stages of production are concentrated in the developed 
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3» Tir an sna t i 0 na 1 Corporations 
In the Western countries, six large international companies 
with vertically integrated operations controlled 75°7 per cent of 
the total- primary aluminum capacity in 1972 (table 2)« These six 
producers, three American, one Canadian, one French and one Swiss, 
either- wholly-owned or partly-owned primary aluminum capacity in 
25 countries» In 15 of these countries only one of the six producers 
could be found, and in only four countries (United States, Norway,! 
United kingdom, and Australia) were three or more of the producers 
present.1/ There has thus been a tendency to avoid locating competing 
smelting facilities in individual countries. About-70 per cent of the 
countries in which these six producers had smelters were industrialized 
countries. The proportion of their total capacity in industrialized 
countries would be approximately 90 per cent. As noted above and will 
be shown in more detail below, these large firms have a heavy dependence 
on bauxite from developing countries. 
The big six operate on their own but also frequently have equity 
partners in ventures (see table 3)° It is interesting to note that 
a number of governments are partners with-these firms, and that the 
firms have a number of partnerships with each other. Thèse six firms 
are also associated in other ways which will be described below. 
Those countries in the world (excluding socialist countries) which 
have primary aluminum and alumina capacity are shown in table k. This 
table includes all producers in the world except socialist countries 
not just the big six. A total of 33 countries have primary aluminum 
smelters; 18 have alumina plants and 15 have both. Again there is a 
preponderance of industrialized countries, by number and by capacity in 
table..However, it is noticeable that in alumina production, there 
are a number of important producers, among developing, countries, namely, 
Jamaica, Guinea and Guyana. These, are the only countries that have, 
alumina plants and no smelter capacity. 
1/ Problems and Prospects of the Primary Aluminum Industry, (Paris, 





1972 PRIMARY ÀLUMHiUK .INGOT CAPACITY 'OF SIX 
/LEADING PHODUCE^§, ^OOO METRIC TONS 
ALCAN 2 107 'I:', J , ' 
ALCOA ' ' " • ' 7 0 5 •rfx,. 
Reynolds t ' . 1 222 
Kaiser 1 134 
Pechiney 1 095 
ALUSUISSE . 6 7 9 . i.i : 
Total of six ''' ';, 7 942 
Western World Capacity 10 490, 
Six as % of Total " . 75*7% 
- ' > , ; ' ' •• _ • - , 
Source: OECD, Probiems^and Prospects oif the PAmaroy Aluminum Industry, 
Paris, 1973« 
1 h • C'\ 
' /Table 3 
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Table 3 
SOME PARTNERS OF THE SIX LEADING PRODUCERS IN ALUMINA PRODUCTION 
AND PRIMARY ALUMINUM PRODUCTION. (PARTNERS 






Reynolds through BACO (United Kingdom) 
Granges (Sweden) 
2. ALCOA 
' Elkem (Norway) 
Hanna Mining (United States) 






VAW (Vereinigte Aluminium'Werte - German government) 
Hamburg :,.•••. 
Anaconda (United States) 





Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ - United Kingdom) 
Sumitomo (Japan) 
Preussag (Germany) 







Reynolds through BACO (United Kingdom) 
ALUSUISSE 
VAW (German government) 
.Comalco (associated with RTZ) 
"AMAX (United States) 
Hunter-Douglas (United States) 
ENDOSA (Spain) 
Olin-Mathieson (United States) 
/Table 3 (cont.) 
Table 3 (concl.) 
6. ALUSUISSE 
Norwegian government • • 
South African government 
Pechiney 
- -:'Reynolds -through -BAGO- (Unit ed Kingdom.) 
.\01in-Mathie.son (United States) 
---Fhelps-BcM&ge (-United-States)' • 
VAW (German government;)-
EFIM (Italian government) 
Source; From a Transportation Study of,; Aluminum by United Kingdom 
Shipping Firm.,. Lambert Bros», London, 1973> Appendix. H,. , 
Problems and .Prospects of the ̂ Primary Aluminum Industry, 
(Paris, OECD, 1973) Statistical Annex, pp.. 27-29 = 
Note: In 1976, a new smelter will start production in Argentina-





COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALUMINA AND SMELTER CAPACITY, 1972 
Smelter Alumina Smelter Alumina 
Europe Africa 
France X X Cameroun X 
Germany X X Ghana X -
Italy . X X •Guinea X 
Netherlands X : S.. Africa X 
United Kingdom X X Egypt (1977) X 
Greece X X 
Turkey X X Asia -
Austria X Bahrain X • ' 
Iceland X India X X 
Norway X Iran ' X 
Sweden X , Japan X X 
Switzerland X ; So Korea X 
Spain X 
Yugoslavia X X 
Australia 
North America Australia X X 
Canada X X No Zealand X 
United States X X 
18 
Central & South 
America 




Surinam X X 
Venezuela X 
Argentina (1976) X 
Source: From a Transportation Study 
Shipping Firm, Lambert Bros. 
of Aluminum by 
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The capacity of alumina plants ranges from 20,000 metric tons 
to 2,^0,00d metric tons. Within Australia, there is an alumina plant 
kO times the capacity of • the smallest' plant; in India, 8 times; ,.and in 
Brazil, twice. The firms with large alumina plant capacity tend to 
consist of consortia of firms. 
""Smelt§r capacity "sisse ranges from Vj000-metric tons to -
^16,000 metric .tens,. .Large and small smelters are found in the same 
country. For example, in France there is a smelter 30 times the 
capacity of the smallest smelter; in Italy, 25 times; in United Kingdom, 
10 times; and in Switzerland, 5 times.2/ 
A strategy of the iarge firms in the IAI has been to become 
vertically integrated from raw material through to fabrication. The 
six major firms have tended to provide almost all their alumina capacity 
and all their primary aluminum capacity (table 5)« In 1968, there was 
an excess of alumina capacity relative to aluminum capacity for .ALCAN, 
ALCOA,,Kaiser and Reynolds. At that time, the estimate for 1973. was. for 
excess alumina capacity for ALCAN, ALCOA, Kaiser and ALUSUISSE. 
In periods when these companies have excess alumina capacity, 
they either have to operate at less than full capacity or they become 
sellers of alumina to other firms. Preference is shown for long term 
contracts in order to. av'cid such problems. The desire by the large 
companies for. s.elf-sufficiency in alumina production and their 
experience of periods, of excess capacity do not make it .easy for firms* 
which are independent of these companies, to enter the market with 
alumina production. 
1/ From a Transportation Study of Aluminum by United Kingdom 
Shipping Firm, Lambert Bros., London, 1973, Appendix H. 
2/ Ibid., Appendix H. The size differential is in part explained 
by differences in the type of smelter, i.e., those which use 
alumina.and those which use scrap metal. 
/Table 5 
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.,-•>•' — .. . • •• . Table- 5- r , -
SURPLUS ( + ) OR DEFICIT ;(r) OF ALUMINA CAPACITY RELATIVE TO ALUMINUM 
SMELTING CAPACITY 1968 AND 1973 FOR 6 MAJOR PRODUCERS 
1968 1973 
Company ' 
ALCAN " +311 +121 
ALCOA ,.,+1,292 +1 574 
Kaiser +654 .+380 
Reynolds . +97 -164 
Pechiney-JUgine.. . ; -86.. .. . . -193 
" ALUisuiSSE ' : ' • •'"'•- -537 '; ' +-58 
Smaller private companies -I36 ' -1 304 
Non-socialist government . . .«. .' 
enterprises -¿46 +226* 
Total .. ; +.1 349 . . , . +698 
Source: L. A. Harvey, "World Aluminum Picture", in Integration in 
Aluminum (Metal Bulletin Ltd, 46 Wigmore Street, London, 
Winter 1969). 
/Some companies 
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Somé companies such as Pechiney-Ugine and ALUSUISSE have been 
purchasers of alumina, but they are expected to become self-sufficient. 
Ardal og Sunndal Verk, a Norwegian Company, at one time made a practice 
of relying on purchased'alumina, but it did so by. trading metal for 
alumina with ALCAN and ALCOA. However, it now has a joint venture;with 
ALCAN which provides it with its alumina. The Austrian fir'm of •< ; .. .  
Vereinigte Metallwerke Ranshofen traded métal for alumina*with . 
Giulini Brothers of West Germany and purchased some alumina from other 
firms, and the Government of Spain operated its smelters with alumina 
from ALCAN and Pechiney-Ugine. It is clear, that, while there has 
been and is a market in the world for alumina, this market' is limited, 
and most of the alumina is traded internally' by the large companies 
with smelter capacity. Any new firm intending to break into this 
market would be well advised to have a definite marketing strategy or 
commitments for long term sales before entering. The same is true for 
any independent firm intending to sell bauxité ón the open market. Most 
of the bauxite traded is done on an intra-company basis or via swap 
agreements between the large firms and "on the basis of long term 
contracts. An "open market for bauxite and alumina is thus almost 
non-existent. i . 
Two characteristics of the aluminum industry in.North America 
are worth nó'ting. First, the United States at-present prices relies 
on imported-bauxite and alumina, for over 80 per cent of its requirements; 
with 59 per cent of total bauxite imports1 coming from Jamaica,' 23 per 
cent from Surinam, 8 per cent from the pominican Republic and mo'ót of 
the remainder from Venezuela and Guyana. Australia Supplies 69'per cent 
of total alumina imports, and Surinam and Jamaica, 31 Ver cental/ 
y Bureau of Mines, United States Department of the Interior, Minerals Yearbook,. 1969 (Washington, United States Government 
Printing Office, 19?1), Vols. I-II, pp. 199 and 205-
/Canada relies 
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Canada relies entirely on imported bauxite, which in 1972 came 
from Guyana and Jamaica. Alumina v̂ as imported as well as produced 
loQally.l/ Primary aluminum capacity in 1969 in Canada was 
960,000 tons, and about 80 per cent.of the output was exported, mainly 
£0 the United States and. Western Europe. The main,, but not sole, 
reason for the existence of a Canadian Aluminum industry is the 
existence of cheap hydro-electric power. 
ko Role- of Home, Governments 
In the United States and in many countries in Western Europe, 
aluminum is considered to be a strategic material necessary for the 
national civilian and military purposes. Consequently, governments 
in these countries have been concerned over and involved in the supply 
of aluminum.2/ This concern is reinforced because the substantial 
reserves of bauxite are located in developing countries, and because 
of the limited number of large integrated firms involved in the 
production of aluminum. 
A recent study of the aluminum industry in Western Europe 
identifies a variety of special concerns which have prompted 
government action: 
"For example, the governments of the Fifth Republic in France 
have, on balance,- favoured the development of national 
champions, and more recently the protection of 'security of 
supplies' for raw materials. The balance-of-payments factor 
loomed large with the British Government since the late 1950s 
and especially the Labour Government of the latter half of the 
1960s, which favoured the establishment in Britain of aluminum 
smelting capacity at least partly owned by national interests. 
Norway's major concern in its aluminum policy has been the 
protection of employment and wage income'in depressed areas, in 
1/ Imports by Commodities, Statistics Canada, Cat. 65-00?, 
(Ottawa, Information Canada), December 1973» P° 60; and 
World Metal Statistics, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, 
May 1974, p. 16 
2/ In the United States,aluminum has been one of the commodities 
stockpiled by the United States government. See Stockpile 
Report to the Congress, July-December 1973. General Services 
Administration, Washington. . : . ' . 
/preference to 
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•;••'"-•• preference to aggressively seeking growth in profits and markets» 
• Other countries, notably Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 
.. have generally favoured an open-door competitive policy with 
' relatively little governmental interference. Spain.and Italy .; 
have been largely concerned with government-supported industrial 
and regional development".!/ • 
These.objectives have been achieved in a variety of ways. The 
'.'Norwegian government has used a state-owned enterprise" to combine with 
foreign privately-oyned companies. Norway provides the hydro-electric 
power and the, smelting operation, while the foreign firms provide the 
bauxite-alumina and assist in.marketing the output. The French 
government has promoted Pechiney as the major producer in France 
through direct, involvement in deciding merger partners for Pechiney 
through financial assistance from government institutions, and through 
. • ..... • • V, -
government purchasing policies and sale of energy from state-owned 
enterprises. Large subsidies have been provided by the United Kingdom 
government for the construction of three smelters. Germany has a. 
• ; ¿tate-owhed. produce'r,VAW,vand.rthe .Italian,, government has ̂ use^ state 
.„,.• .enterprises, to obtain an'interefet in''a majfor aluminum prod&'eery 
' • • •' • .'•"•••'•i • 1 • '• 'sr. ••' •• ••> -j M • .;., •> 
Montedison. ,.>.'• . ; ; . . •  • Hi, „."'.•••!';•• y, In'Western Europe:,, the...commitment, of governments to .the aluminum 
industry: !s. clear; and thus, it lis- .hard to .envision-a situation whereby, 
the industry would be allowed to.decline or.suffer* In the United States, 
the industry also, has considerable influence with the government because 
its output is recognized t;.6 be4 a. strategic7 material, and because the 
'few large producers have been successful lobbyists in obtaining support 
domestically and with respect to their overseas operations. ALCOA has 
h!ad an exceptionally close relationship with the United States government 
because; it was the sole United States producer during the first.. World War 
and at the start, of the Second World War. Moreover it assisted the 
government in setting up new smelters during'the Second World War, 
smelters whichwere later sold to Reynolds and Kaiser. .The historic 
dependence of the United States government on.the industry is clear. 
1/ Z. Mikdashi, "Aluminum in West Europe; A Regional Analysis" of ' 
Business-Government Relations", paper presented to the Conference 
on Business-Government Relations in Western Europe, 
Harvard University, January 1973, P« 9» 
/In Europe, 
In Europe., the large United States firms (ALCOA, Kaiser and 
Reynolds) are heavily involved in. production operations,,- as is ALCAN. 
The. concern of the United States government is not only the current 
economic and strategic impact which the foreign operations of ALCOA, 
Kaiser and Reynolds may have on the United States, but also the 
flexibility and incentives which these companies have to undertake 
future investment outside the United States, which has implications-for 
output and employment in the United States» Because Western European 
governments provide incentives and are also protectionist with respect 
to favouring local producers, e.g.; Pechiney in France, there are 
grounds to expect that governments communicate with each other 
concerning the control of this industry. Thè situatiòh of an 
international oligopoly alongside local government policies 'aimed at 
promoting the industry locally provide almost ideal circumstances for 
the manipulation of market forces sanctioned by governments« Such ' 
actions have been taken. 
"In their quest" for profits and stability7, aluminum enterprises 
have not only resorted to the strategy o;f mergers, joint .ventures, 
consortia, partnerships, swaps, reciprocal trading, etc.; they 
have also resorted to other forms of co-operation with governments 
supporting or condoning such actions»"1/ 
The involvement of governments in the IAI is commented on in a. 
recent OECD report, which was undertaken because of certain problems 
that had arisen in the industry in the early 1970s. 
"In mid-1970 ..... several factors combined to disturb this 
stability. New primary aluminum producers were beginning to 
make their appearance in both developing and industrialized 
countries andrwere selling the tonnage they had left oyer, after 
supplying subsidiaries or fulfilling supply contracts, on the 
open market. Vhat is more,' the stagnant demand since mid-1970 ' 
left most producers with substantial spare capacity. Some felt 
that increase, in their unit costs of production caused by lower 
utilization of capacity might be offset to some extent by the 
prices obtained if less metal were available, and cut back 
production accordingly. Others possibly encountered various 
technical, economic and social obstacles preventing any prompt 
measures to -adjust output, and yet others preferred to maintain 
production to a certain extent and build up the large stocks ... 
1/ Mikdashi, op. cit„, p. 29. 
/Lastly, some 
Lastly, some tonnages from'the state-trading countries," where 
the aluminum industry ià growing.fast, are sold at much lower 
prices than those usually obtained."!/ 
• Adjustment to. these problems were made by the companies, 
individually and collectively, and by governments, individually and 
collectively. The companies.took.measures individually to space out 
s ' ' ' 
investment programmes; to. postpone investment projects and close older 
plants; and to adjust, utilization rates of production capacities. ... 
Collectively,,the companies arranged to finance the holding of 
increased stocks of aluminum,. through the' agency of Alufinance and. 
Trade Ltd.; to purchase aluminum held in government stockpiles; and 
to purchase aluminum sold in,the„Vest from Eastern Europe (see section 
on Gentleman's Agreement below). .At the same time an .international 
trade association.was. formed, the International Primary ..Aluminum 
Institute .(IPAI),: to assist the industry. 
Individual 'action ¡taken by governments isv a.ss.oçiatçd with the 
meagures.idi^cugsed-in connexion with, the ̂ .pprpaç.h. takgn. to the IÀI .by 
countries in-Wfstern Europe .and Nor(th America. ,, Collective action' is 
not explicit, but is implicit in governments' recognition of the 
Gentleman's' Agreement. Further details of the company and government 
response will follow an outline of the previous Gartel arrangements. 
5«- Prewar Cartels 2/ 
The ;IAI developed in North America through .the control and 
operation of patents by the Pittsburgh Reduction Co., which later became 
ALCOA, and the operations.of -its Canadian subsidiary, ALCAN which was 
split organizationally from ALCOA in' 1928, and split in terms of" 
ownership from ALCOA by-a United States court decision in.1950. In 
Europe, the aluminum industry developed around th'e activities of four 
major firms, Aluminium Industrie A.G. in Switzerland (Syiiss and German 
owned), Société Froges and Compagnie Alais in France, (the latter to 
1/ "Problems and Prospects", op. .cit., p.. / • 
2/'"' This section is based on D.H., Wallace, Market Control in 'the' 
Aluminum Industry:i; Cambridge, • Harvard'Un. Press, '1937, ' and 
.. G.W. Stocking and M.W. Watkins, Cartels in Action, (New York; 
2§th Century Fund, 19^6). ,, „ , . . /become Pechmey; 
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become Pechiney),' and the British Aluminum Co., in the United Kingdom. 
In 1914, the world's to.tal smelter capacity was-located approximately 
60 per cent in Europe and kO per cent in North America, with all the 
latter owned by ALCOA. 
Import competition, from European aluminum producers in the 
United States, and from ALCOA and its Canadian subsidiary in Europe, 
together with alternating periods of boom and recession, propelled 
the major aluminum companies into cartel agreements, aimed at protecting 
their own markets and sharing third country markets in an orderly 
fashion. Seven cartel agreements of this nature were made between 
1896 and 1926. Except for the first agreement of 1896, ALCOA did.not 
belong to the agreements directly, but indirectly through the cartel 
membership of its Canadian subsidiary, the Northern Aluminum Co., 
(which later became ALCAN). This was due to ALCOA's fear of 
prosecution under the Sherman Act. In fact, it might be argued that 
there are two reasons for the existence of a Canadilh aluminum, 
industry, both of rçhich are attributable to ALCOA. The first is 
ALCOA's need for cheap hydro-electric power, and the second is its. 
need for a convenient vehicle for belonging to international cartel, 
agreements. 
In 1912, ALCOA signed a consent decree which, amongst other 
things, stated that ALCOA 
".00 is further enjoined from either directly or indirectly 
entering into, through'said Northern Aluminum Co., or any 
other person or corporation, and from making or aiding in 
making' any agreement containing provisions of the nature of 
those hereinbefore set out, insofar as they relate to the sale 
of aluminum in the United States, or its importation or 
exportation from the United States ... which would be to 
restrain the-..Importât ion into the United States,, from any part 
of the world, of aluminum, or alumina, or bauxite, or any other 
material from which aluminum can be'manufactured, or to fix or 
illegally affect the, prices of such aluminum., alumina, bauxite, 
or other material, when imported". 1/ 
1/ D.Ho. Wallace, op. cit., p?; 548; underlining added. 
/Five days 
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Five days after signing'this decree,' the Northern Aluminum Coi'', 
signed another cartel agreement with the major European producers. 
This cártel'agreement- did not contain provisions relating to control 
of the United States Market and' this permitted membership by the • 
Northern Aluminum Co., since, 
"At the request of the Álumi'h'úm Cô., thé cotisent decree of 1912 
; vas'-''framed, in such a way as tp,!ea.y.e the Northern Aluminum Co. 
free to enter into agreements of.} that sort which contained no 
provisions for control of the United States market.'1!/ 
In subsequent years, a more.conv'èhient arrangement' for'ALCOA's-
membership in international cartels was devised. In 1928, ALCOA 
incorporated in Canada a new company, 1 Aluminium Ltd'., tó'whxch it' 
transferred almost "all its foreign'properties, 'including its baükite 
deposits in Guyana, but excluding Its deposits in Surinam. ' 
The creation of two/.legally, separate companies, ALCOA and 
Aluminium Lt,cU, to.o.k. place by the shares of Aluminium Ltd., being 
distributed-. E£â_£ata. to sharehplderè of. ALCOA. The legal fiction of 
indepe.nde$ce_.w.as, supposed to. imply commercial independence as well. 
However, there, is evjLdepce on the relationship between the two 
companies ter 1928. .to suggest, that, „commercial independence did not 
exist.2/ 
, The final major, pre-war cartel agreement took place as a result 
of the Foundation Agreement signed, by Aluminium Ltd., and the 
European producers, which !{ed to the incorporation of the Alliance 
Aluminium .pompagniq in Switzerland. , The proportion of shares in the 
Alliance held by each member determined its quota of total production 
in certain markets. The distribution of shares was as follows: 
Aluminium Ltd., 28.58 per cent, French 21.35 per cent, German 19.65 per 
cent, Swiss 15».̂ 2 per cex̂ t. and British .15 = 00 per centT" Although "ALCOA 
was not a direct partner in the Alliance, it has been.suggested that 
it was a sleeping partner because the-success of >the"Alliance depended 
1/ ' Ibid., B-.H. Wallace,, op. cit.-> p. 126. , • •• V. . r: • r -i 
2/ Stocking and Watkins, op. cit., pp. ' 257-261.i¡ " ", '', 
' - • • : r - . s • .- ' •• - v 
•'•••.'.' ;v -.;•.,•• r/ón the;,;-
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on the European producers respecting ALCOA's United States market, and 
ALCOA respecting-the Europeans' interests» It was not until.1950 that 
a United States court decision ordered the separation of ALCOA from 
Aluminium Ltd., by the eleven major Shareholders in both companies 
divesting themselves of their shares in one or other company.]/ 
The history of cartel arrangements provides evidence to show that 
the international aluminum companies have co-operated closely with each 
other in the past* Even with formal cartels no longer in existence, 
past relationships might reasonably be expected to make these, companies 
close ranks in the face of a common threat, such as the nationalization 
of their bauxite properties in developing countries, or in the face of 
the commercial problems described in the OECD -Report. In recent years, 
the following forms of "cartel-like" behaviour have evolved in the I A I . 
6. Gentleman's Agreement 
Since 1963, reference has. been -made to measures taken by the 
western producers to prevent the export of aluminum from the east, 
mainly the USSR, Hungary, East Germany and Rumania, which upset market 
conditions in the west. A "Gentleman's Agreement" is the term coined 
by the British magazine, Metal Bulletin,2/ to the arrangement made 
between eastern and western producers of aluminum. Usually the 
agreement has been associated with conditions of oversupply in the 
west, which has attempted to control aluminum imports from the east. 
However, it has also been noted that at times the United States has 
exported aluminum to the USSR under especially favourable terms, which 
suggests that the -agreement involves more than just the control of 
supply from the east.J/ 
1/ United States v. .Aluminium Co. of America, 91F Supp» 333 
(S.D.N.Y., 1950). 
2/ Metal Bulletin, London, August 2,:1963, p. 14} January 4, 1966, 
p. 17; March 18, 1966, p. 17; July 15, 1966, p. 9; July 11, 1967, 
p. 26; August 18, 1967., p. 235 February 16, 1968, p. 24; 
February 14, 1969» P* 19; June 6, 1969, p." 21; January 12, 1971. 
p. 15; March 12, 1971, P» 20; ..March 30, 1971, p. 12; and 
April 2, 1971, p. 17. 
3/ Ibid., June 6, 1969, p. 21. 
/The "Gentleman's 
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. The "Gentleman's Agreement" appears .to consist of an arrangement 
whereby the western producers agree to absorb a quantity of metal each 
year originating from the east. The quantity is renegotiated from time 
to time. British firm, Brandeis Goldschmidt (a subsidiary of the 
merchant bankers S.G. Warburg), has acted as agent in handling these 
sales. Problems with the agreement have been experienced, one being 
that for a while Rumania was not a party to the agreement and its 
action tended to upset the marketing arrangement. 1/ 
It is interesting to note that the British Government is clearly 
aware, .of the "Gentleman's Agreement" and by their silence have shown 
that they condone it. The same is probably true for the governments 
of other western countries. In the pre-war period, the IAI would not 
have involved governments in their attempts to stabilize the market. 
This has now changed in that governments are used to apply ahti-dumping 
duties (as'well as tariffs) and to support cartel-iike agreements which - • < . .  . . ... .-. . . . tend to promoté stabilization.2/ This approach is consistent with the 
•••••' « ....... ... : J V „ \ . ; - . . . . ; 
earlier discussion of government policies aimed at promoting local 
aluminum Industries. " " ' 
The "Gentleman's Agreement" has bëeri reinforced 'in' Western Europe 
through the establishment in June 1971 àï Alufinance arid Trade Ltd., 
by ALUSUISiSE, Pechineyr VAW, British Aluminum, Montedison', '' 
Ranshofen Berndorf, Holland Aluminum and Guilini. :ALUFINANCE, organized 
with the assistance of S.G. Warburg, the parent of Brandeis Goldschmidt, 
finances the stockpiling of metal on behalf of the participating 
producers. The object of this procedure is to hold metal outside the 
market,-when a surplus exists, :in order to prevent the depression of 
prices. Buyers are supposed either not to know about the size of the 
stockpile at any time, or to treat the stockpile as being insulated 
from the market. Secrecy is attempted by the stockpile not being 
reported in the balance sheets of the individual companies. It should 
be noted that only one United States producer is. associated with this 
arrangement, namely Reynolds through'British Aluminum Co. 
i/ Ibid., March 12, 1971, P» 20. '.'. 
2/ Ibid., August 2, 1963, p. 13« 
/Similar co-operative 
- .26 -
Similar co-operative arrangements were made between seven of the 
largest aluminum producers in the United States and Canada in 1965, 
when, "under a long term contract, (they) undertook to purchase all 
excess (United States) government stocks at list price". At this time, 
the United States government, with stocks of,1.7 mmt, declared 1.3 mmt 
surplus to.government requirements.1/ , 
A further measure of co-operative action on the part of aluminum 
producers has been the formation in 1971 of tha European Producers 
Aluminum Association (EPAA) representing all the West European producers. 
"Its objective is to exchange information on subjects of mutual 
concern, notably plant capacity, and balance between production 
and consumption on a world basis.J'2/ 
In addition, the Aluminum Association exists as an industry-wide 
trade organization representing over 70 companies including primary 
producers of aluminum in the United States, leading manufacturers of 
semi-fabricated aluminum products and principal foundries and smelters. 
Failure to achieve results through agreements between the major 
firms still leaves the firms the option of persuading their governments 
to impose anti-dumping duties. As noted by an ALUSUISSE executive, 
" ... leave it to the Europeans to defend their market, after all, there 
are such things as anti-dumping actions".^/ 
Similar moves have been made on an international as opposed to 
a regional scale through the formation of the International Primary 
Aluminum Institute. 
The Memorandum of Association states that the objectives of the 
Institute include the following: 
(a) To promote and assist the development of new uses of primary 
aluminum and the expansion of existing applications and the 
usefulness of the primary aluminum industry to the general public. 
(b) To provide a forum for the exchange of information and the 
discussion of problems relating to the production of primary 
aluminum. 
1/ "Problems and Prospects", op. cit., p. 27» 
2/ Mikdashi, op. cit., p. 39« 
J5/ Metal Bulletin, August 24, 1971, p. 15. 
/(c) To 
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(c) To 'undertake, sponsor or in any other Jmatter assist research 
, in and the study of. or matters concerning the production of 
primary aluminum including without limitation matters in the 
Yields of science, technology, ecology,, economics and statistics. 
Cd) To publish Or procure the publication of information relating: 
.,. to primary aluminum. , • . . 
(eX ,., To., represent ,the interests of the primary aluminum industry^ in 
' dealings with any government, trade Organization or association 
of - any kind whatso-ever. . ' v 
A proviso is also written in: 
"PROVIDED THAT- the activities of the Institute shall not 
such as will result in. any agreement, understanding,, combination 
or any other form of concerted action to limit production,"fix 
prices, suppress competition or in any other manner .restrain 
, trade or cpmmer.ce, or to monopolize or attempt to monopolize 
trade or commerce." ; 
To date, published information circulated by the Institute has 
indicated the monthly figures on production and'-semi-aiihual figures 
of capacity, re: primary ingot, with estimates of' capacity for the 
following two years, tfkese da'ta relate to the members of the 
Institute which include almost all the producers outside the 'socialist 
countries. 
Co-operative action by governments is implicit in the approval 
for.publication of. the OECD report which comments favourably on the 
agreements on investment decisions, by the.JLarge companies. 
"A consequence, of this situation has been that markets and 
prices in the aluminum industry have remained stable, a 
necessary condition for. consumption to expand and for the 
increasingly heavy investment .to develop on a continuous basis. 
A certain centralization of investment decisions, together with 
the "world-strategy on which they were based, has...helped to .-: 
.prevent prolonged imbalance and its dangers for long-term 
'stability.""!/" ' ' ' 
The same report points to the undesirable degree of competition 
resulting from the investment decisions made by a number of new 
producers, which were operating by the beginning of the 1970s. It 
suggests that investment controls should be engaged in collectively 
by all producers, large and small, old and new, and possibly with the 
assistance of governments.2/ 
1/' 
2/ 
"Problems and Prospects", op. cit., p. 42. 
Ibid., pp. 71 and 74. 
/Another form 
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Another tform of government co-operation are the meetings 
arranged bet-ween the bauxite ¡ producing countries. The ¡March 1974 
meeting held in Conakry, Guinea Involved as participants, Guinea, 
Jamaica, Guyana, Surinam, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia, and as observers, 
Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana and Mali. The interest of these countries, 
is to explore: ways in which greater economic advantages can be obtained 
from their bauxite deposits. It is interesting to note the range of 
operating firm interests in each of these countries: in Surinam, one 
company is ,10.0 per cent owned by ALCOA and the other 100 per cent owned 
by Shell; in Guyana, production is divided between Guybau, a state-
owned corporation (since 1971) which has about 80 per cent of the 
production, and Reynolds which has the remainder .(nationalized as of 
January 1st, 1975); in Jamaica, all the North American companies are 
represented'and thé government 'obtained1'partial 'equity interests in 
1974-1975; in Guinea, a consortia of Olin Mathieson, Pechiney, BAÇ0, 
ALUSUISSE and VAW operate the deposits; and in'Australia, almost all 
the major producers are represented plus some Japanese and Dutch 
interests, but no direct government interest. 
7« Bauxite and Aluminum Pricing 
The integrated nature of the IAI results in there being no open 
market for bauxite and alumina. .Only the price of aluminum ingot is 
widely quoted.due to the number of arms-length transactions. From 
time-to-time, some bauxite and alumina is sold on an arms-length basis 
but these markets are too thin for there to exist a regularly quoted 
price. In addition some of the arms-length transactions are of a long 
term contractual nature.-which further mitigates against frequently 
quoted prices. The large transnational corporations do trade with 
each other and while these are arms-length transactions they are often 
barter type transactiohsV'not involving explicit prices. For example, 
bauxite and alumina may be traded betw'éen two transnational Corporations 
in order to minimize transportation costs or to adjust to some mutually 
beneficial seasonal requirements. A similar practice prevails at the 
fabricated aluminum product stage where one company will 'toll' metal 
/for another 
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for another company» For example, ALCAN discouraged Reynolds from 
establishing an aluminum cable plant in Canada by agreeing to 'toll* 
Reynolds' aluminum ingot into cable for sale to Reynolds' customers 
ill Canada. A further practice is for the transnational corporations 
i 
to allocate particular markets to each other through the transfer of 
information. For example, ALCAN may make a sale in France and Pechiney 
a sale in Canada; ALCAN will fill Pechiney's order in Canada and 
Pechiney will fill ALCAN's order in France, thus saving on 
transportation costs and assisting the companies in maintaining 
geographical spheres of sales influence. 
Quoted prices for aluminum ingot are available from a number.of 
sources. Since these prices are important in an absolute sense, and 
because some host-country tax policies have been tied to the level of 
the price ingot, e.g.: Jamaica, it is critical that an appreciation is 
made of the significance of quoted ingot prices. In particular, it 
should be noted that quoted prices need not and often are not the same 
as transaction prices for ingot. 
There are several quoted prices for primary aluminum ingot. Seven 
of these prices are discussed below. 
(a) The United States list price is the price published by the : 
three major United States producers of primary ingot: ALCOA, Kaiser and 
Reynolds. The list price is set by a price leader - usually ALCOA, but 
Kaiser has also attempted to act as price leader on occasion. It is 
customary for the other two firms to follow after a very brief period. 
Changes in the list price occur infrequently - seldom more,"than twice 
a year and sometimes a given price may remain in effect for two years 
or more. The trend of the United States list price from 1961-1974 
is shown on Chart 1. 
(b) The Canadian list price is the domestic price of ...aluminum 
ingot quoted by ALCAN for Canadian fabricators. It is quoted in 
Canadian currency and has usually been at a slight discount relative 
to the United States list price. In May 1972, Kaiser announced a 
reduction of the United States list price from 29/̂ /lb. to 25/i/lb. and, 
rather than follow this behaviour (as ALCOA and Reynolds did),. ̂LCAN 
ceased quoting a Canadian list price. The trend of the Canadian list 
price from 1961-1972 is shown on Chart 1. , 
/Chart 1 
Chart 1 
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(c) The Canadian export price is the delivered price of ingot 
at European markets quoted by ALCAN. It is the ALCAN price for ingot 
not sold in Canada, United States, or any country where price is 
government controlledo 
(d) The London Metal Exchange published price is equal to the 
Canadian export price. The trend of this price is shown in Chart 2 
for 1966-1974. 
The above prices are the list prices of aluminum ingot sold by 
the major primary producers to non-integrated fabricators. For United 
States producers, this applies to approximately 1/3 of primary ingot 
production. The remaining 2/3 is used internally in the fabricating 
operations of ALCOA, Kaiser and Reynolds. These list prices are not 
the prices which apply to actual transactions to non-integrated 
fabricating. In periods of surplus, it is common for the primary 
producers to offer discounts to fabricators. Discounts of 10 per cent -
have been customary in the 1960s but in the 1970-1972 period of 
oversupply and excess capacity the discounts ran as high as 28 per cent 
off the United States list price of 29^, as metal was actually selling; 
in substantial volume at 21//lb. in the United States market. 
Therefore it appears that under "normal" conditions the actual 
transactions price has been at a small discount relative to the major 
producers' quoted list price. In periods of surplus, the discount has; 
increased to almost 30 per cent. In the opposite situation, as the 
market tightens, discounting is reduced and the actual price approaches 
•the list price. If demand continues strong, the list price will be 
increased to allow the actual transactions price to increase. The 
market then reaches an equilibrium when the actual transactions price -
clears the market and the list price is set about 5-15 per cent higher 
so that discounting continues at a "manageable" level. 
It is clear, therefore, that the list prices quoted above do not 
reflect adequately the state of the market at any given time. As a 
result, Metal Bulletin, an English trade publication and Metals Week, 
an American trade publication quote prices which they believe 
approximate more closely the actual transactions price in the London 
and United States markets respectively. Metal Bulletin states : 
- . : • . . /Chart 2 
Chart 2 
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''When the price which "forms the frame of reference for the 
actual value of so overwhelming a proportion of aluminum 
is so unsatisfactory, it is little wonder that its analysts 
- both inside and outside the industry are groping around for 
some other means of measurement»"1/ 
(e) Metal Bulletin - Certain Other Transactions price is'the 
price which is the so-called "free" market price of aluminum in Europe» 
It applies tp'"contracts involving metal which typically formed.the 
base for that market - that is to say metal from non-integrated 
producers including those in the socialist countries"»2/ The price is 
heavily dependent on special exigencies, for example, whether or not 
the socialist countries sell aluminum. It has been suggested that the 
actUiH.1 transactions price in contracts between the major European 
ptfijmari'y pro'ducers and fabricators lies between the London Metal Exchange 
published p!rice and the Metal Bulletin "certain other transactions" 
:price "but .cannot be ascertained precisely for lack of data"»J5/. The 
"certain other transactions" price for 1966-1974 is shown on Chart 2« 
(f) Metals VJeek United States market price is similar to the .„ 
Metal Bulletin price but refers to the United States aluminum market1. 
? t 
This price is not published by any of the. major primary producers, but 
is based on current information on the actual' selling price of -aluminum 
and seems to reflec't the degree of discounting whidh primary producers 
are offering to fabricators.; Although there is no evidence that all 
aluminum is selling at the Metals Week United States market price, i i» this publication takes the position that it is the price at which 
aluminum is selling "in substantial volume" in the .United StateS.4/ 
The 'certain other transactions' price of Metal Bulletin and the 
United States market price according to Metals Week are quite similar 
and seem to reflect the free international market price.of primary 
ingot. Both these prices exceeded the quoted list prices in early 1973® 
if Metal Bullet ill, April 13, 1973, p. 15» 
¿/ > Ibid., p. 1. 
Metal Statistics 1960-1970, Metallgesellschaft Akliengesellschaft, 
f p» V. 
Metals Week, May 8, 1972, p. 1. 
/Figure 3 
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This coincided with the Cost of Living Council's price controls in the 
United States which controlled the price of ingot in United States 
domestic transactions while' ingot >èa.Ì'eh-±n foreign markets were'- made 
at higher pria.es reflecting underlying market conditions. In fact, 
because of shortages, some foreign metal was sold back to the United 
States market, at /the-higher, prices thus..undermining tĥ ; controls. 
. •' (?) Price of Secondary ijago.t, is the price of ingot, made, from; : 
recycled aluminum scrap. The. major, primary producers also,.have .... 
secondary smelters which are in. competition with, numerous,., independent 
secondary shelters.. As. a result, the price of secondary ingot is much 
more flexible than the list.price of primary.ingot. ... , ; 
The price of No. 380. secondary, alî ipinum. ipgot in. the,. United States 
lies between the LME published price, and, the. 'certain other 
transactions' price for the period 1966-1971« Since secondary ingot 
is a very close substitute fô pritrçary ..ingot, one might . expect the 
price of secondary to be.a good .proxy for the actual transactions./ 
price of primary,ingot. . . . .. , 
The implications.,of ^auxite and alumina pricing are ,as .follows; . 
(i) Arms-length world prices for bauxite and alumina.;,are not 
published on a regular basis so that the comparison of transfer prices 
to market prices for bauxite and aluminê  cannot be made in order to 
assess the fairness of transfer prices. 
(ii) Some arms-length transactions of bauxite and alumina are 
made on an infrequent basis, butr'oftVfl'lnvolvV the transnational 
• corporations which do' not publish-" the •"̂ îSièi5.,'';"Ôir*OTic'Ĥ énêage*'i,C 
-bar-ter' transactions not' requiring pridè's. Other'arms-length'*''"" 
transactions'are'made for long-term contracté. : •••' • 
(iii) -Qubted (list) prices of aluminum ingot differ from 
transaction (market) prices-', which have usually been at a discount '" 
from-quoted prices, with the size of the discount varying with market' , 
conditions. • When pricV dontrols were applied in the United States'̂  ' the 
quoted prices were at à discount1 "to the transaction pricés. .Any •policy 
that links taxeìtìón to. quoted prices as a prbxyfor the prof it ability' 
of ingot producers penalizes the.producers,more heavily when transaction 
v. • ». t- •' » V -« • v. 1 prices are less than quoted prices, and,.p,enalî jes».tliê .gover4ment .'(«tax-
collectors) when transaction ¿ricës exceed' quotlé^jjrices. W. 
.:. .̂¡--i I.:5 ;<«. .-/Partali 
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- -<• . : ! :•  •;. •• Part II ' " • '• 
PROFILES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS OPERATING IN THE CARIBBEAN 
INTRODUCTION; CARIBBEAN BAUXITE-ALUMINA INDUSTRY 
This section sets out the relationship of the Caribbean Bauxite-
Alumina Industry to the same industry in the' Western world," On the 
basis of bauxite and alumina production in 1972, the Caribbean's share 
of world output was Mt.O per cent for bauxite and 18.5 per cent for 
alumina.' See tables 6 and 7=" Its share of bauxite production has 
declined from 57=3 per cent in I960, and its share of alumina production 
has risen from 17«^ per cent in 1970 to 18.5 per cent in 1972. Within 
the Caribbean area, Jamaica and Surinam are the largest producers both 
in terms of bauxite ¿nd alumina. '" 
The foreign firms operating in eacli of the countries are shown in1 
table 8, together with their production of bauxite and alumina. ALCOA 
operates in three of the four countries. It should also be noted that 
ALCAN operated in Guyana up to 1971 and that Reynolds' Guyana was 
nationalized as of January 1st, 1975» 
Table 6 
CARIBBEAN BAUXITE PRODUCTION ....... 
(000 long dry tons) ,. . . ; 
Country I960 1965 1970 .. 1973 197** 
Dominican Republic 678 . 927 1 050 1 127 1 1,86 
Haiti .. 268 . 377 . 621 ̂  690 ' N.A. 
Jamaica 5 7^5 . 8 5kl\: 11820 13 385 15 086 
Guyapa . 2 • 2 873 • 4 3^7 3 22k : 3 '556. .• 
Surinam .. - ...3 ̂ 00 • - k 281 5 927 " 6-580 N.A.. 
Total Caribbean . . .12 562,? 1,6 999 "23 765. 25 006 '"•.• 
Total World, a/ -. - 21 923 -30 335 ' *t9 89^ ' 60 '90*t 
Caribbean as % of . , > • 
world a/ 57,3 56.0 , 47.6, kU5 
Source: Minerals. Yearbook, ;U.j5<> .Bureau of Mines • • '•".' . ' -v 
a/ . Excluding Socialist countries. 
/Table 12 
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Täfele 7" 
CARIBBEAN. ALUMINA. PRODUCTION 
•-,- (OOP longrtons-) 





Total World a/ N.A. 








1971 1972 I973: I974 
1 689 1 783 ^ 2' 102 
312 3O5 . 
. 893 \ 169 , 1..270 
"2 894 ... 3 257. , 3 616 
16 675 19 269 "l9 567 
l6o9 
Source : Minerals Yearbook, U.S. Bureau of Mines 
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-.-Reynolds Haitian Mines 
-A'LGAN Jamaica .Ltd. 
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-Reynolds Jamaica Mines 
-Alumina Partners, of 
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-Revere'' Jamaica Alumina 
Ltd.'"" .• « »1. 
-ALCOA Minerals of 
Jamaica 












Royal Dutch Shell 
Source ; Company reports. 
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1. The Aluminum Company of America 
The Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) is the world's largest 
producer of aluminum measured,.in. terms bf total sales, aluminum sales 
or total, assets (see table 9)» ALC.QA and. .its subsidiaries constitute 
an integrated producer and fabricator of aluminum. Principal operations 
include mining and processing of bauxite in seven countries; 
transportation of bauxite and alumina to the United States and in 
connexion therewith, operation of a general shipping business; 
production of alumina in five countries; production of aluminum fluoride 
and synthetic cryolite, primarily for use in smelting of aluminum; 
smelting of aluminum from alumina in six countries and, in connexion 
therewith, generation of electric energy and production of carbon 
electrodes; and making of aluminum and aluminum alloys into semi-
finished and finished products in ten countries. 
Table 9 
MEASURES OF SIZE OF LEADING ALUMINUM COMPANIES. 








000 So Tons.' 
ALCOA 2 727 2 183 3 198 1 815 
ALCAN • 2 427 1 9^7 2 958 1 691 
Reynolds . • .1 993 . :• • 1 789 , 2 Obk 1 bOO 
Kaiser- 1 768 1 151 2 057 1 167 
Source; Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K reports for 
ALCOA, ALCAN, Reynolds, Kaisery. for the period ending 
December 31, 197^. 
/The company, 
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Thfe company, its sut)6idiari,Sg\!aniii''affiliates operate 62 plants 
around the world, 29 of which are /located, in. ,17 foreign countries» 
ALCOA products are sold in"the 'ttnited 'States through sales offices in 
60. clt.ies ..in̂ .33 states, .plus the.'District of Columbia and" through • 
43'. subsidiary and affiliate offices in 19 other countries« Products 
are also sold through 31 independent mill products distributors in' 'v': 
87 cities in the United States.1/ 
. At the end of 1974, ,.;tptal net assets of the parent company and 
all wholly-owned subsidiaries amounted to 1*3 billion dollars of which 
536 million dollars was in foreign locations. ALCOA held"additional 
foreign investments in subsidiaries and other companies owned 20 per 
cent, or more worth 285 million dollars to bring 'ALCOA• s t&tal foreign 
investments to 821 million dollarB.2/ 
(a) , Diversification , 
Table 10 shows revenue by major product line for ALCOA and 
consolidated subsidiaries. Primary and fabricated aluminum sales 
S&coUiited for reve.npe|, O^rating 
revenues (shipping, engineering, construction „services, :etc,.)- account 
for 3«0 per cent of revenues. Pther sales ,(chemicals,, „alumina,, 
copper-magnet wire, scrap,,; ̂ bau^ite, etc.) acc;ou&t-Sa*,foir'tt&;9 'cent 
of total revenuê .';AiOOA'.,valsa'has-two important unc'onsOlidated 
subsidiaries: ALCOA Properties, Inc." CAPt) any AlCCA or'Xustrklia1 
Ltd. (AA). Revenue for these two companies in 1974 was 4-3.3 million 
dollars and 241.6 million dollars respectively. API's revenues were 
derived from rental and sale of real estate properties. AA's revenues 
were obtained from sales of alumina (59 per cent), primary aluminum 
(7»5 per cent), fabricated aluminum products (19 per cent) and other 
revenues including scrap sales tolling revenues and other sales 
(14 per cent).3/ 
1/ ALCCA Annual Report 1973, PP° 18-19. 
2/ Securities and exchange Commission, Form 10-K for ALCOA, for the 
period ending December 31, 1974, p. 24 (hereinafter cited as 
SEC- 10-K-ALCOA). 
¿/ SEC 10-K-ALCOA, pp. 5, 36, 43. 
/Table 10 
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T*bU 10 
ALUMINUM .COMPANY OF AMERICA AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES 
REVENUE BY PRODUCT 
(Millions: 63 fiQj.Iai-3) 
• ' 1970 1974' 
Primary Aluminum a/ 204 245 
% r. ' 13„4 8.9 
Fabricated Aluminum 'l 055 1 9?8 
-• •• • • % " 69,3: ; ' : 71.0 
Other Sales b/ • ' 20'Z ' •••••' 46l _ 
fo • • " ' : ; ' 13.2 1S.9 
-Operating' Revenues c/"- '"' '"iS2"" 83 
% 4.0 ' ' ' 3.0 
Total Sales and 
Operating Revenues 1 522 •. i 7?7 
# " 100,0 100.0 
Source; Securities and Exchange Commission, Foriji 10"-K, J>° 4.. 
a/ Metal in ingot and molten form« 
b/ Includes^ chemicals, alumina in various-form^' i?qpj>$i* magnet, 
wire, scrap, bauxite, and Qther product's. ' 
c/ Includes revenues from engineering and .construction services, 
shipping and other, operatipns. 
/Based on 
- 41 „-, 
Based op this d&ta-,; it -is ̂ apparent that-ALCOA is, heayily ., ;» 
dependent..on bauxite-aluraina-aluminum»: . ALCOA has widely diversified 
operations based on aluminum;;. 
.Table 11 .shows, ALOCA's-prioe realization .on primary-and 
fabricated, aluminum products. •, The difference, between, the .realized 
price for primary and for fabricated aluminum provides an indication 
of the; value-added derived from fabricating,. Price realizations for 
fabricated aluminum have been, approximately double the price.; 
realizations for primary aluminum during the 1970-19.74 period. The 
tonnage, of primary aluminum sold by ALCOA during-this-p.er,ipd has: been 
relatively .stable while the tonnage of fabricated products-increased 
byf about 45 per cent. > Expanding the production of. .fabricated aluminum 
relative to primary aluminum has been an;important source of revenue 
growth .f.oi;. ALCOA in. the, 1970s. Revenue^ from fabricated products have 
increased by almost 85 .per. cent between 1970 and 1974.. , .. 
Table 11 ... -
• - • ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA 
(Price Realization on Primary and Fabricated Aluminum) 
• s' Sales Quantities - Sale^ Revenues Realized Price/Ton 
: -• "(000 short- tons) * ': • ($000,000) • •  • ($/Ton) * 
: :(P) " .. •• '(F) -(P) ••••• • (F) " (P): " ' (F) 
— ' 1 ' . '-f •. - • •-••••• " 
1970,. . .381 1 027 , .. 204 , . .. 1 055. ;: 535 . • 1 027 
1971 ..." . . ' ,313,, .. .... ,.946 ,,l6l . ..950 . 514 , 1 004 
1972 v 388 ( . 1 :178 .178 . .1,170 459 . 993 
1973 4^2 1 495 220" 1 507 498 .1 008 
1974.: ' • - '.;343 1-486 i- 245.;': \.; 1:938 •71*' .. ' ! 1304 
(P) - Primary (F) - Fabricated 
• -if.' 
Source? Securities a«d Exchangê Ĉommi.ssi0n,,.:Tb'rm 1Q-K for the 
period ending December 31» 1974. 
/(b). ALCOA's 
- hz -
(b) ALCOA's Bauxite Exploration and Development History 
ALCOA has expanded its raw materials' sourcés 'continuously 
throughout the twentieth century. From 1888 to 19Ó2, ALCOA's 
predecessor,- The'Pittsburgh Reduction Company, purchased alumina 
from companies tfhich were making it "for various uses such as 
abrasives.- Most of the purchafees'were from the Pennsylvania Salt 
Manufacturing Company.!/ The Pittsburgh Reduction Company was the 
only entity which used alumina to make aluminum. 
•• A& the company grew,- it 'required a growing quantity of 
alumina. In 1903, ALCOA began refining'alumina at East St. Louis.2/ 
In: 190'4, the-company entered -bauxite mining through the purchase 
'of th:e General Bauxite Company, a subsidiary of thè General Chemical 
Company which operated in Arkansas. In 1909,:ALC0A purchased a 
sebond property' in Arkansas, this time "from the Norton Company. 
In 1913, another deposit was acquired bringing ALCOA •'s 'United States 
reserves to approximately seven or eight million tons.3/ In 1912, 
ALCOA sent an engineer to British Guiana and acquisition of ore 
deposits began almost immediately... In 1916, the Demerara Bauxite 
Company Ltd. was formed to hold and mine the deposits and in,:1917, 
2,000 tons of bauxite were shipped to the United States. 
.. "In spite of ..belated efforts of others to obtain dep'ositS'Y 
:• it appears that. the Aluminum Company of America, through 
.'. persistent negotiation, litigation, and compromise, had 
acquired a very large proportion of the suitable bauxite 
.. . of British Gudana -by-1923-."V • "••' 
Discovery and exploitation of depòsits in Dutch Guiana occurred 
at the same time* Mining began in 1913 under the direction of a 
subsidiary, the Surihaamsche Bauxite Maàtschappi.j.5/ 
1/ C.C. Carr, ALCOA; An American- Enterprise, Reinhart and Co. Inc. ,-
New York, 1952, p. ¿1 
2/' Ibid., p. 68. 
3/ D.H. Wallace,. Market Control and the ALuainum Iridùétryy •..''•* .',.': 
Harvard' Press,"~1937, "p- Ì05>.. ' "•. 
V Ibid., p. 70. 
5/ .Ibid., p. 71. 
/ALCOA's aggressive 
ALCOA aggressive programmé in'+Sbùth America resulted "in a 
worldwide'scrattible for bauxite properties'in which, ALCOA ;dontinued': 
to "seek further reserves. In 1912, some1 Dalmatian and French lands 
were bought. • In 192Ï, ALCOÀ purchased 50 per cent interest in a 
Norwegian firm which was renamed Norsk Aluminium Co. Norsk possessed 
bauxite deposit's in France and Dutch Guiana.1/ 
In 1919, an engineer representing the Uihlein group from 
Milwaukee managed td obtain bauxite deposits in British Guiana 
which would have provided the Uihïèins with sufficient "bauxite 
to enter the aluminum industry and thereby "end ALCOA's monopoly. 
ALC-CA brought suit against the company alleging that the deposits 
had liât been' obtained in a legai'mà'nnér. After iitigation in the 
West Indian Court of Appeal and finally before the Privy Council 
in London in 1923, the deposit was judged to belong legally to' 
the Uihlein's.-"In the meantime, the latter giroup had managed' to 
secure additional deposits in Dutch Guiana* and' 'had":an option to 
further deposits in'British GiiiaiM. 
On̂ 'New Year's i)ay of'1925, all of the Uihlein's' bauxite ' 
deposits were'-sold to-'an equal 'partnership of AÏiCÔÀ, the Carborundum 
C ompahy and '-the • Aches on ̂ rk'phi te- Company. ' The • Uihi e ins state d 
that4 they, had decided1" not to enter the ai'bmihùm' industry because^ 
it would' be ' too mùch work"¿2/ ;c 'v"; '"' 
The search for bauxite in Europe by ALCOA continued and resulted 
in the acquisition ofhigh-grade'ore in Istria, a'province of Italy, 
in 1924. ' Also'j ih 1925, ore' bodies Sr'ere obtained in ' Yugoslavia" 
by acquisition of' majority stock holdings" in" two companies which were 
'Subsequently' mèr'ged.'3/ " " - -
1 / » PP°> 71r?2. 
1/ Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
3/ Ibid., p. 139. 
/In 1927, 
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In 192?, ,L.T., .Emory .stated that,.he knew of no available 
bauxite deposits which would justify a new aluminum venture in' 
the United States. An ALCOA official denied this assertion saying 
that many such deposits existed. Wallace writing in 1937» 
ventured the opinion that while large, high-grade deposits were 
known to exist and to be available, these deposits were mainly 
located in remote areas which were either inaccessible or lacked 
adequate transport facilities or both. 1/ While the quantity and 
grade of bauxite were adequate, the cost of ,the necessary 
infrastructure to extract and ship the bauxite made, such projects, 
unfeasible. 
The next major change in ALCOA's bauxite situation occurred 
when Aluminium, Ltd., the. predecessor of ALCAN, was formed as a 
Canadian corporation in 1.928. All foreign holdings of bauxite 
with the exception of.,,Surinaamsche Bauxite -M.aatscha.ppij : were . , 
transferred to Aluminium Ltd.- . -
As ALCOA continued to expand, an increasing proportion of 
its bauxite was imported from Surinam. Surinam-'s c-.cpce.its were 
drawn on heavily during the war having produced :5«2 jnillion 
metric tons.2/ The Minerals Yearbook of 1951 reported that 53. per 
cent of United States bauxite was imported during the war, -mostly 
from Surinam.3/ ALCOA's reserves of bauxite, in .Surinam have neyer 
been disclosed. 
After the war, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,; a, 
government enterprise, assisted Reynolds and Kaiser in purchasing 
alumina and aluminum, capacity ovraed and built by the United States 
government during the war. ALCOA had supplied the requisite technology 
1/ Ibid., p. 141. ; -
2/ Minerals,.. Yearbook 1945, United States Bureau of Mines p. 686. 
3/ Minerals Yearbook 1951, p. 196. 
/and operated 
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and .operated the aluminum facilities during the war. However,, 
ALCOA agreed to-allow Kaiser and Reynolds to use the patented, 
technology royalty-free 1/ and also provided the two companies 
with bauxite during the initial- period of operation.2/ 
In 1944, . ALCOA, sent geologists to explore in the. Barahona 
province of the Dominican Republic. The government passed a law. 
stating that , a tax of 10/ per hectare annually and a royalty of ,, 
10/ per ton of ore would be levied and that, contracts would be 
valid for not more, than thirty years but would, be renewable.?/ 
In 1945, ALCOA v;as, granted a mining concession.^/ But development . 
of the concession did not occur immediatelyi In 1952, it was -, 
reported that ALCOA was constructing - facilities- to mine bauxite 
in the Barahona province. Upon completion of a 14 mile road, : 
shipments were expected to begin late in 1953° 5/. But, for some 
reason, they. did. not.. Then, in 1957, it was reported that ALCOA 
had negotiated a 50-year contract with the Dominican Republic. 
The contract-also called for a possible 20 year extension, at 
ALCOA's option.o/. . Development work continued and. ,the first shipment 
of p^e came. in. 1959fo.urte.en year? after ALCOA was first .granted 
mining privileges.7/- . .,,. . 
... : , ,In 1952, - the International: Bink.'for- Reconstruction and .:. 
Development (IBRD) performed-a study on•Surinam?s bauxite- resources 
and the possibility of establishing an aluminum..industry. The study 
recommended that over a ten year period an aluminum smelter should 
1/ Minerals_ Yearbook „1945, p. 690. 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1946, p. 115. ' 
3/ Minerals Yearbook 1944, p. 692-J. 
it/ Minerals Yearbook 1945, p. 684. 
5/ Minerals Yearbook JL952, P-. 199. 
y Minerals Yearbook 1957, p. 248. 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1959, p. 235. 
/be constructed 
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be constructed based on-power which was to be developed from- the • 
Brokopondo River.- IBRD estimated the cost at 53..million dollars.1/ 
Negotiations with ALCOA followed. ALCOA agreed to undertake the 
project and in. return the government of Surinam granted ALCOA ; 
exploration rights in the northeast section, of Surinam.2/ The 
rights- allowed ALCOA exclusive privilege to explore an area.,of 
500,000 hectares and -to exploit or mine 20,000 hectares if 
exploration, was successful.3/ 
In 1958,. .it .was announced that ALCOA was granted sole 
ownership of the Brokopondo- project for a 75-year-.period. Upon 
the expiration of this time, ownership would revert to the government 
of Surinam.4/ .Negotiations with Billiton, the-only other Surinam 
bauxite producer resulted in an agreement whereby, some of the 
bauxite for the Brokopondo project would be supplied by Billiton.5/ 
The hydro development was financed by the government of Surinam. 
Production.began in 1966. 
Exploration for bauxite began in Costa Rica in 1956 -when 
^permits were granted to Kaiser, ALCOA.., Reynolds and the American 
Metal Co.6/ By 1958, several of the companies had announced bauxite 
discoveries but no mining development projects were announced.?/. 
In 1964, the government of Costa Rica imposed a royalty of -25̂ /ton 
an export duty of 25^/ton and compensation of 5/ per ton, plus, 
property damage to owners of property upon which bauxite was found.8/ 
1/ Mnerals Yearbook 1952, p. 202. 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1956, p. 248. 
2/ i'iinerr.ls Yearbook 1957, p. 252. 
bJ Minerals Yearbook 1958, p.- '222.' 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1963, p. 292.: ' 
6/ Minerals Yearb_o_ok 195_6, p. 246.-
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1958, p.' 220. 
8/ Minerals Yearbook 1964, p. 262-. - :•;..'! 
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In 1967, ALCOA announced that it was investigating a bauxite deposit 
under a 25-year lease.!/ In 1968, an agreement was reached between 
the government of Costa Rica and ALCOA whereby the latter agreed 
to build a 440,000 ton per year alumina plant. It4was agreed 
that ALCOA's 25-year lease would, be automatically renevrable if 
ALCOA invested 150 million dollars during the first -25 years* ALCOA 
was guaranteed 165 million tons of bauxite from the deposit 
and any excess was to be split equally between ALCOA and the 
government „_2/ In 1971, infrastructure work began and total project 
costs were estimated at 119 million dollars. The mine-refinery' 
complex was scheduled to be completed by 1977.3/ 
ALCOA explored for bauxite in Panama during the period, from 
1958 to I960 but announced no discoveries.4/ 
In 1958, a subsidiary of American Metal Climax called Caribex, 
Ltd. was granted exploration rights in Jamaica.5/ In 1959, it was 
reported that ALCOA acquired a joint interest in Caribex and that 
prospecting was continuing in Clarendon Parish.6/ In i960, it 
was reported that"a new company, AL0OA Minerals of Jamaica, Inc., 
had completed prospecting and exercised its option on a lease of 
over 50 square miles formerly held by Caribex, Ltd. ALCOA announced 
pia'nd to spend 15" million-dollars- on construction and development.¿/ 
A scant three years later, ALCOA'shipped"its initial cargo',of bau?;it 
from Jaraaica.8/ The swiftness of the Jamaican development was 
a sharp contrast with, the 15-year lag from,discovery to first 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1967, p. 226. "' ' • : 
i/ Minerals .Yearbook '1968,' p. 202. 
3/ Minerals Yearbook. '1971, p.. 210 
4/ Minerals Yearbook 1958, p.' 211; and I960, p. 246.' 
5/ Minerals Yearbook 1958, p. 220.- - . .V " ' 
§/ Minerals Yearbook 1959, p. 236. ••. 
1/ Minerals Yearbook I960, p. 246. , , 
8/ Minerals Yearbook 1963, p. 290. 
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shipment in- the Dominican Republic, the 10-year lag"between the 
initial agreement and production startup of the Brokopondo project 
in Surinam and the probable 21 yéar-lag in Costa Rica. 
In 1962, ALCOA signed a 25~yeàr agreement with the government 
of Jamaica which set the royalty rate on bauxite. In the same year, 
negotiations between the United States and Jamaican governments 
resulted in a Jamaican agreement to exempt foreign investors from 
income tax for the first seven years of operation and to permit 
duty free imports of machinery, equipment, raw materials which 
were to be used to manufacture products for export.1/ 
In 1968, ALCOA agreed to build an alumina plant in Jamaica 
in return for additional bauxite mining cencessions. The plant 
was to be 440,000 tons per year capacity initially and eventually 
880,000 tpy.2/ The alumina plant came on line in'"1972 but ALCOA 
continued to ship unprocessed "bauxite to the United States as v/ell 
as alumina. In 1969, ALCOA àgreed to a'limit set by the government 
on the amount of bauxite which can be exported.3/ In 1971, ALCOA, 
Reynolds and Kaiser agreed to increase the assumed profit per long 
ton of bauxite to £>5,00 for income tax calculation. The change 
increased total income tax payments by $11.3 million dollars.4/ In 
1972, Jamaica formed a National Bauxite C'dmaission to insure that 
bauxite was being developed so as to achieve maximum passible benefit 
for Jamaic'a = 5/ Most of ALCOA's exploration activity during thé 1930s 
appears to'"have been centered in the Caribbean and South America. 
In 1956, the Commonwealth Aluminum Corp. (Pty.) disclosed that 
a huge discovery had been made in Queensland.6/ This discovery 
stirred the North American companies and the Australian bauxite rush 
began. ALCAN secured a concession west of C0MALC0 in 1956.7/ 
1/ Minerals Yearbooh _1962, p. 300. 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1968, p. 204. 
y Minerals Yearbook 1969, p. 210. 
y Minerals Yearbook 1971, p. 210. 
.5/ Minerals Yearbook 1972, p. 202. 
§/ Minerals Yearbook 1956, pp. 250-251. 
7/ Minerals Yearbook 1956, pp. 250-251. 
/Reynolds announced 
Reynolds announced that it was exploring in Queensland in 1957;and -
announced .a discovery on an island ;off the. coast of the Northern 
Territory, in 1958.1/ -Western Aluminum, IJ..L. was incorporated to 
perform exploration in. the D?,rling Ranges o.f . Western Australia in • > 
the .same year.2/. • -,-,..•: . •• - .'.-,.•-.,; 
In ,19.6.1,.;.the ..year .after ALCOA, took over the Caribex ,find 
in, Jemaica.,,.-the • company'purchased 51 per cent of the Wester»-. . 
Aluminum discovery in the Darling Ranges., ALCOA-also agree.d with . . 
the Australian government to-establish an integrated mine'to 
smelter--operation.?/-In- 1962., ALCOA closed a deal to sell-alumina . 
to Mitsubishi -in Japan.b/ The Australian development was, even- . •' 
'more rapid „than that. in Jamaica. By late- 1963, ALCOA's entire, 
integrated complex-was-on line«5/ The alumina..refinery, at-.-Kwinana, 
V/.A. had been expanded to-a capacity ,of 1.37 million, tons pe.r year-
by 1970 and, a second refinery was planned for Pinjarra; with-initial: 
capacity- of- 5.50,000 tpy.6/, . 
The- government of Indonesia was- looking - in. I960 for foreign 
capital to develop the- bauxite • discovered .in Kalimantan in- 1955-2/ ' 
But it was not until 1967,. that, ALCOA applied for and was granted-
exclusive bauxite exploration rights to all of Indonesia except the. 
island of Bintan.8/ Two years expired before an acceptable contract 
was signed by ALCOA and the government.9/ In 1970,.ALCOA announced 
1/ Minerals —" r TTTii1;: rarwri. • j&aos Yearbook 1958, T*~iTirrrvn • 11 • i n n • ' ' p. 225. 
It Minera:! s Yearbook 1958, p. 225. 
2/ Minerals^ p. 328. 
y Minerals Yearbook 1962, p. 305. 
5/ Minerals Yearbook 1963, p. 296. 
6/ Minerals Yearbook 1969, p. 218. 
7/ Minerals Yearbook I960, p. 248. 
8/ Minerals Yearbook^1962, p. 228. 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 19&9, p. 209. 
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that large reserves of bauxite had been discovered in Kalimantan*!/ 
The:company had agreed with thè-Indonesian government-to build 
an alumina refinery and the initial planned capacity was-800,000 • •' 
metric 'tons per year. During 1974,• a consortium of ALCOA., Kaiser 
and five Japanese companies were planning to build a 250,000 tpy. 
smelter in Northern Sumatra, Indonesia. The estimated cost'of the 
entire project was 500 million dollars» "At the end of AugustKaiser 
dropped out and'ALCOA was undecided about participating. 2/ 
Another'"'major source of bauxite which materialized in "th'e ' 
1960s' was in the Boké region of Guinea, formerly French Wèst 
Africa. Aluminium Ltd., through its French.subsidiary, Bauxites-
du Midi, was granted bauxite rights in the Boké area in the 1920s.V 
Companie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) was formed' in 1964 
to develop the Soke project. Harvey Aluminum Company owned 
51 per: cent of CBG and the government owned the remaining 49 per '. 
cent. In 1967, negotiations were underway-.to divide Harvey's 
51 per cént interest in order to"leave equity shares in CBG as 
shown in column (1>.4/ However, the final result of the negotiations 
ended .with equity shares as shown in column (2).5/ 
Group (1) (?) 
1 1967 1968 
Government of Guinea./ '49-% 
Harvey 26 10.2 
ALCOA 8.8 1̂ .8' 
ALCAN " 8.8 ... 13.8 
Pechiney (France) 3.1 5.1 
YAW (Germany) 2.6 5.1 
Montecatini-Edison (Italy) 1.5 ' 3.1 
99.8 ". • 100.1 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1970, p. 221. 
2j American Ketal Market, August 31, 1974, p. 1. 
3/ Mj-neralŝ  Yearbook 19.61,, p. 328. 
4/ Minerals Yearbook 196?, p. 22?. 
5/ Minegals_ Yearbook 1968, p. 203« 
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¿Financing- of .thq-zproject was als;o underway,,in 1968.,.-.IBRD •: 
agreed to loan CBG 64.<5; million dollars "to develop the deposit. "The 
United-States Export-Import 'Bank-lent GBC "25 million dollars to .finance 
purchases from the United. States: of bauxite minting, transporting, 
crushingdrying, calcining and h a n d l i n g equipment.. The Unites States 
Agency for International Development also advanced a loan of 21 million 
dollars in local currency„1/ In 1971, IBRD lent CB.G an -additional 
9 million dollars.-2/ Total investment in the Boke project by the end 
of 1972 was expected to be about 320 million dollars.3/ Production " 
capacity was planned at 9 million tons, per year.-; This compares 
with total production of .12.3 million tons in Jamaica and 14.2 million 
tons in Australia in 1972.4/ First shipment oi" bauxite from Boke 
occurred in.l973»-5/ >' 
• Recently, ,• ALCOA has--shojwn.. renewed interest, in exploration in 
Surinam. In 1968, . SURALC0-, ALCOA's whoily-owned subsidiary, • 
participated in; an .„exploration consortia with Billiton*. ALCAJJ ' 
and Or met. Tlia group announced that it would build an-alumina 
refinery with capacity- between 450,000 "and 560,000 t.py.6/ ' - ' 
Another joint venture-, .this time:with/Pechineyj was.formed 
in 1969. The two- companies negotiated with the government of France 
fpr the right, to--mine bauxite, in French.. Guiana. A. proposal by the-
two companies-suggested1that the bauxite be shipped by barge to- the 
SURALCO refinery.7/ SURALCO. planned to expand., its alumina capacity -
by 500,000 tpy. to handle the bauxite.-,.from„ French Guiana.8/ The 
1/ Minerals-Year-book 1968.v p. 20?.; 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1971, p., 210. < . . . 
3/ .Minerals Yearbook 1972, p~ 202. "• -. , ' •• 
V Minerals -Yearbook 1973,-.p. 197» -
5/ .ALCOA Annual Report 1973; p. 5. • ' ' - • 
6/ Minerals^ea_rboo_k_ J. 968, p. 205. • * '" 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1069, p. 208. • • •"•' '"'• • 
8/ Minerals Yearbook 1970, p. 222. - - • • ' 
- -- -• ' •' /joint venture 
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joint- venture company,. Companies Minière ALCOA de Guyane (CMAG), 
was owned 75'per' cent by ALCOA and 25 per cent by Pechiney. • Estimated 
bauxite reserves, in French Guiana amount to about 25' million tons. 
CMAG agreed that if further' reserves were discovered up to 100 million 
tons th'en an alumina refinery would be built in French Guiana. 
Otherwise, bauxite was to be shipped to SURALCO. The total 
investment was expected to be 16 million dollars.1/ In 1975, plans to 
develop the French Guiana reserves were deferred and option's on 
the reserves were allowed to.lapse. 2/ 
( c ) ALCOA 'g Integrated Aluminum Facilities in 1974. ; ' 
Table 12 lists ALCOA's current sources of bauxite. The 
company operates wholly-owned mines in United States' of America, 
Dominican Republic, Surinam, and Jamaica and participates in 
partnerships or consortia in Australia, Brazil and. Guinea". Surinam 
Aluminum Company is ALCOA's oldest and largest source of bauxite. 
In 197^, Surinam supplied'about -32 -per cent Of ALCOA's worldwide 
bauxite requirements. Total bauxite production by-SURALCO in 1974 
was about 3«5 million tons of which 2.0 million tons (57 per cent) 
was exported, mainly to the United States. The remaining 1.5 million 
tons of bauxite was converted to alumina in Surinam.3/ In 1974,' 
Jamaica accounted for about - 20 per:cent-of ALCOA's bauxite -'requirements* 
ALCOA mined approximately.2.1 million tons of bauxite in Jamaica 
of- which 1.0 million tons was exported to the United States and 
1.1 million tons was refined to alumina in Jamaica.4/ • 
Australia has rapidly become an important bauxite source for 
ALCOA. Originally, ALCOA used Australian bauxite either to produce 
aluminum for the local market or to export in-the.form of alumina 
to Japan. More recently, ALCOA has begun to ship alumina, to. the 
United States, largely because of the rising cost of Caribbean 
bauxite. ALCOA has reported that by 1976, following completion of 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1971, p. 210. 
2/ ALCOA Annual Report 1973, p. 5« .  . . -
3/ Surinam Aluminum Company, Fact Sheet 1973, p° 4. 
4/ Economics and Statistics Division, Ministry of Mining and 
Natural Resources, Jamaica. 
/Table 12 
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Table.12 








' % of 
ALCOA'S 
Bauxite 
(SO (000 short tons) 
U.S.A. ALCOA- 1.00 650 .650 6.0 
Dominican 
Republic ALCOA Exploration 
Company • 100 1 200 1 200 11.1 
Surinam SURALCO 100 3 500 3 500 32.4 
Jamaica . ALCOA Minerals 
of Jamaica 100 
! 5 
2- 100 2. 100 .... 19.4-
Guinea HA^CO Mining 
Company 27a/ N.Ä. ' 1 000 : 9.3 
Australia ' ALCOA of 
Australia 51b/ N.A... . 2 300 - 21.3 
Brazil Cia Mineira . , -
de Aluminio 50 c/ 125 60 0.6 
,...Total . 10.810' 100._0 
Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, Form lO-'K for the 
period ending December 31, 1975- Government of Jamaica, 
Economics and Statistics Division, Ministry of Mining 
and Natural Resources. 
United States Bureau.of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1972. 
a/ See page $3 for ownership of HALCO Mining Co. 
_b/ Australian interests 49 per cent. 
c/ Hanna Mining Co., 23.5 per cent; Brazilian interests, 26.5 per cent. 
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an expansion of mining facilities and of the Pinjarra alumina plant, 
880,000 short tons of alumina will be available to the parent 
company from Australia.1/ In addition, the Australian reserves 
supply the smelter of ALCOA of Australia at Port Henryj which has 
an aluminum capacity of 100,000 tons per year and therefore 
requires approximately 500,000 tons of bauxite per year. Based 
on these two fact's, ALCOA's share of the bauxite mined by ALCOA 
of Australia is about 2.3 million tons or 21.3 per cent of ALCOA's 
worldwide bauxite supply. 
In 1974, the Dominican Republic supplied ALCOA with about 
1.2 million tons of bauxite or 11 per cent of ALCOA's supply. 
All of the bauxite was shipped in unprocessed form to the 
United States.2/ 
HALCO Mining Company in Guinea began bauxite shipments in 
1973 and in 1974, ALCOA's share was about 1.0 million tons. ALCOA's 
share will rise by 2.6 million tons by 1979-3/ In 1974, Guinea 
supplied about 9 per cent of ALCOA's bauxite. This' figure could 
rise to almost 20 per cent in 1979« 
ALCOA continues to extract bauxite from its mine at Bauxite, 
Arkansas. In 1974, this mine supplied the 375,000 tons per year 
alumina plant at Bauxite, Arkansas with approximately 650,000 tons 
of bauxite. 
Finally, ALCOA has a 50 per cent interest in Cia. Mineira de 
Aluminio (ALCOMINAS) in Brazil. In 1974, this unconsolidated 
subsidiary mined about 125,000 tons of bauxite and.ALCOA's share, 
by the equity method, was about 60,000 tons. This accounted for 
less than one per cent of ALCOA's bauxite supply. Currently, an 
expansion programme - is underway in Brazil which will double the 
mine-to-metal capacity at ALCOMINAS.4/ . < • 
1/ SEC 10-IC-ALCOA, p.2. 
2J Government of Dominican Republic, correspondence. 
3J SEC 10-K-ALC0A., p. 2. 
V ALCOA Annual Report 1973, p- 4. 
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( d) Alumina Refining ? 
ALCOA operates alumina refineries in five countries with a 
total annual alumina capacity of approximately 5 million tons 
(table 13). 
ALCOA imports bauxite to the United States from Surinam, 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Guinea in addition to the bauxite 
• .shipped at.Bauxite, Arkansas to feed its.three United States . .. 
refineries. These refineries, located at Point Comfort, Texas, 
Mobile, Alabama and Bauxite, Arkansas account for 53 per cent of 
ALCOA's worldwide refining capacity. 
. The SURALCO refinery at Par'anam, Surinam has.annual alumina 
. capacity of 1.3 million short tons. However, ALCOA uses only 
750,000 tons of this capacity to refine its own bauxite and uses 
the remaining 600,000 tons capacity to toll process bauxite for 
Billiton, the other major bauxite producer in Surinam. ALCOA's 
share of the alumina is exported to Europe' and the United States.1/ 
ALCOA of Australia operates two refineries. The refinery at. 
Kwinana has capacity of 1.38 million tons 'of alumina per year. 
The Pinjarra refinery opened in May 1972 at an initial capacity .' 
of 463,000 tons per year. By the end of 197'+, capacity had reached 
880,000 tons per year and by 1976, capacity was planned to exceed 
1.4 million tons.2/ ALCOA, the parent company,, is i to be "supplied 
with 880,000. tons of.alumina by ALCOA of Australia in 1976. In 
addition to this, about 200,000 tons of alumina is used by ALCOA ... 
of Australia in the company's Point Henry smelter. This brings 
ALCOA's share of the alumina produced by ALCOA of Autralia to 
about 1.1 million tons. Most of the remainder is sold to Mitsubishi 
of Japan under a long-term contract.3/ 
1/ Surinam- Aluminum Company., .SURA'LCO Public Relations .'Pamphlet, • 
1973,. pp. 6-7.- • , • : -": - • .... ( ""' 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1972, pp. 196-197. ' "" 
3/ Minerals Yearbook 1962, p'.:" 305. '" * ' 
/Table. 13 . " 
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Table 13 ' 
••ALUMINUM-COMPANY OF AMERICA: ALUMINA REFINING 











(000 short ton) 
U.S.A. ALCCA-Pt. 





ALCOA-Mobile 100 % . 1 025 1 025. .19.8 Guinea 
ALCOA-Bauxite 100 % 375 375 _. -, 7=2 Bauxite, 
Arkansas 
Surinam STJRALCO -
Paranam. : 100 °A 1 323 750. • • 14.5- Surinam 




51 % ' 
1 378) 
880)' 
1 100 21.2 Australia 
Jamaica .ALCOA Minerals 
of Jamaica -
Woodside 100 % - 551 ' 551 10.6 Jamaica 
Brazil Cia. Mlneira 
de Aiutili nia -
Por,es de 
CeEldas ' 50 % 55 27 0.5 Brazil 
Total 6 9?7. , 5 178. 100.0 
Source: United States Bureau of Mines, M_ineral_s_ Yearbook. 1972, 
pp. 191, 200-201. Securities and Exchange Commission-, Form 
10-K for the period, ending December 31, 197-4. 
a/ Australian interest - 49 per cent. 
b/ Hanna Mining Company 23»5 per cent, Brazilian interests 
26.5 per cent. ; 
/In Jamaica, 
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- — In Jamaica,' ALCOA operates- a 550,000 tons per year-alumina •• ' 1 
refinery at Woodside which began production in 1971« The Refinery , 
uses local bauxite and accounts for almost 11 per cent of ALCOA's 
re-fining capacity. All of- the alumina is "exported, mainly to the 
United. States and Norway. 
' In Brazil, ALCOMINAS has a 55,000 ton per year refinery. 
As mentioned earlier, ALCOMINAS has a project underway to double 
th'e capacity of all facilities by 1976. 
(e) Aluminum Smelting 
ALCOA operates eight aluminum smelters in the United States, 
two in Norway and one in each of Mexico, Brazil,. Surinam and;- -
Australia. With the exception of SURALCO in; Surinam, all of ' 
ALCOA's foreign smelting affiliates are partnerships. (See t^ble 14). 
ALCOA's smelting capacity is heavily concentrated in the 
United, States where about 85 per cent of ALCOA's capacity is located. 
.Currently, about 70 par cent of the bauxite used in ALCOA's 
United States smelters comes from the Caribbean,.about 15 per cent 
..from Guinea and' 15 per cent from Australia and United States 
combined. 
In Norway, ALCOA has. smelters-a-t Mosj^en (105,000 tons • 
per year) and Lista (62,000 tons per year) which are operated as 
'equal 'partnerships by ALCOA and Elkem of Norway. The alumina for 
these smelters probably comes from Jamaica and Surinam. 
...i In Surinam, SURALCO has a 73,000 tons per year smelter. ; Most 
of the aluminum is successfully sold to the European Common Market 
of which Surinam has been an associated member since 1962^1/ ' 
The Point Kenry smelter of ALCOA of Australia has an annual 
capacity of 101,000 tons per year and represents about 5 per cent 
of ALCOA's worldwide smelting capacity. - • 
Two small, smelters, are located, in .Mexico (44,000 tons..per year) 
and Brazil (28,000 tons per year). The former smelter is probably 
supplied with alumina by ALCOA's Point"Comfort, Texas refinery." The 
ALCOMINAS smelter in Brazil is in the process of being expanded to 
approximately 56,000 tpy. 
1/ Surinam Aluminum Company, op.cit., p.12. 
• • " ' " • '" " ' /Table 14 
Table 14 
ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA: ALUMINUM SMELTING 
ALCOA 
Country Cofnpàny 
1973 . ALCOA's % of ALCOA Alumina 
Capacity Share Aluminum Source 
(000 shòrt tons ) 
i 
270 270'" 14.5 Bauxite,Pt. 
Comfort, 
Mobile 
115 115 6.1 Mobile, Pt. 
Comfort 
275 275 14.7 Jamaica, 
Surinam 
. 160 I60 " 8.6 Mobile 
185 185 9.9 Pt. Comfort 
280 • 280 15.0 Bauxite, 
Pt. Comfort 
115 115 6.2 Jamaica, 
Surinami 
Australia 
175 : .175 . 9.4 Jamaica, 
Surinam 
1 575,., 1 575_ 84.if 
44 • 19 1.0 Pt. Comfort 
28 14 0.8 • . Brazil 
73 3.9 SURALCO 
105 { 52 2.8 (Jamaica 
62 , • 31 1.7 (Surinam 
101. .101 ;.•• 5.4 Australia 
1 988 1 865 - .. 100.0 
United ALCOA-ALCOA, 



















Norway Mosĵ e'n 
Lista 








Aluminio,S.A. • , 
-Pocos de Caldas . 50%-^ 
SURALCO-Paranam 100%. . 
' 50%£ , 
50%"/ 
,e/ 
Source: United States Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1972, pp.137, 
149-152. " • 
a/ Mexican interests 56 per cent. 
b/ Hanna. Mining ,Co. 23»5 per cent, Minas Gerais State.26.5 per cent, 
c/ Eikern - 50 per cent; - : • 
d/ Eikern - 50 per cent, 
e/ Australian .interests - 49 per cent. 
/In total, 
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In total, the smelter capacity of ALCOA and its affiliates 
was 1,988,000 tons per year -at the -end of 1974.; For several of the. 
less' than whoily-ównéd sméltérs«-iit "is' difficult-to-determine ALCOA's 
share of the output¿ -'However , ALCOA "does-provide all: of the alumina 
input to feed the smelters. Using a ratio*of 1.9 tons of alumina, 
to produce 1.0 ton of alúniihub,: AJXOAr and. its a'f filiates required 
about 3, 775,ÓOO:" tons " of álümiiaa -iñ~ 1974. From table 13 . it appears 
that ALCOA has a substantial' excess of alumina.supply relative to. . 
its smelter requirements'. - •'•' '..".-.*- • 1 . . • i. 
(f) ' Aluminum Fabricating : U-. -:• ;,-
ALCOA operates 33 fabricating' plants in 11 countries: 
United States (¿3), Australia, El'Salvador', France, Colombia. Japan, 
Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, United Kingdom, West Germany. 
(g) ' Recent Developments ' " ; " -.. . • • 
" JAMAICA ' : ; • • ••' • '":' .,'•• 'r - . • •; -
In May 1974, the government of Jamaica announced that .it would 
unilaterally increase the'royalty paid by bauxite• niining companies» 
The new' production levy is tied to 'the "réalized-.price" fpr aluminum 
ingot. In '1974, the production levy was 7«5 'per cent; of the. ingot, 
price and was scheduled to rise'in two 'stages to 8.5 per cent by . 
1976-1977.1/ At an ingot price "of 35/ lb» in the United States, 
the Jamaican royalty (7«5 per cent), yields over 11 dollars p'ér ton 
of ' braüxit:e. - ALCOA mined about-'2vl. million tons of bauxite. dn:1974 
so that a rough estimate" of the production levy paid by ALCOA is . 
23-2-4 million dollars. 
Prior to May 1974, the bauxite companies had been paying a 
royalty of approximately 2.50 dollars per ton of bauxite.2/ 
AL'COA may have been paying- a lower royalty of .1.65., dollars 
1*75 dollars per ton. ALCOA claimed that the increase tó 
over 11 dollars per.ton,constituted a 700. per cent "' 
1/ The Economist, May¿ 2g, "1974,p.ll'6 '-Bus in ess Week "Jung .22, 1974, 
p.29. "" ' ' '' ' ' - • ' -J' 
2/ Securities ¿tod Exc-hange Commission, Form 10-K, for ALCAN Aluminum 
Ltd., for the period ending December 31, 1974, p.?. 
/increase in 
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increase in the royalty rate. ALCOA had previously negotiated , 
its royalty rate v/ith the government of Jamaica in 1968 when ALCOA 
agreed to build an alumina refinery in Jamaica in return for 
expanded mining rights»1/ 
At the time of writing this study, the government of Jamaica 
is engaged in negotiations with all Jamaican bauxite mining .,-
companies with respect to land ownership, government participation 
and bauxite reserves. ALCOA expects that after conclusion of 
such negotiations it will have available to it in Jamaica reserves 
adequate to supply its needs for Jamaican bauxite at current ; 
consumption rates for a period of at least forty years.2/ 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Following the Jamaican production levy the Dominican Republic 
asked ALCOA to renegotiate its bauxite contract. Under the existing 
contract, ALCOA was paying a royalty of 2.73 dollars per ton of bauxite 
plus income taxes. ALCOA offered to double the export royalty 
to 5.59 dollars per ton but this offer was less than half of the Jamaica 
royalty. ALCOA was also negotiating with the government concerning 
the transfer price paid by ALCOA to the Dominican subsidiary, which 
forms the basis for the subsidiary's profit and income tax.3/ 
Information obtained from the government of the Dominican 
Republic indicates that both royalties and income taxes increased 
and that a supplementary royalty was added. 
If American Metal Market, July 22, 1974; p. 24. ' 
2/ SEC 10-K-ALC0A, p. 2. 
3/ Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti and Puerto Rico, Economist Intelligence.Unit, 
London, NQ 3~~1974", p. 6. 
./DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
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DOMINICAS REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT REVENUES 
FROM THE BAUXITE INDUSTRY 
Exports Rqyal-ti.es Income Other • Supplementary Total 
Year Taxes Taxes 
(000 Sot'. $0000 
1973 1 1^5 ' ¿86 "•" • 3 074 6 - 3 316 
1974 1 210 587 6 019 • 8 " 905 ' ' 7 519 
Source: Government of Dominican Republic. 
ALGOA is..the only bauxite producer in the Dominican. .Republic.' 
The agreement which determined the above taxes was reached: in' 
December 1974 and according to the Dominican Government-, the 
agreement is provisional. . • .'' : 
SURINAM . ; „ • • " . • . .. ' 
In November 1974, - agreement was , reache.d between- the Government 
of Surinam and SURALCO concerning the country's bauxite revenues. 
SURALCO agreed to pay 2? million•dollars in extra taxes in 1974 
calculated.as•6 per cent of the price of ingot derived' from Surinamese 
bauxite. SURALCO had already paidrtaxes-amounting to 18- million • 
dollars in 1974. The agreement runs until the .end of 1975 ahd then 
a new contract'will bu negotiated. 1/ •••• .. 
(h) New Bauxite. Sources j. ; tv • ' 
It is unlikely that the-increased taxes and royalties.,in 
Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Surinam will result in reduction 
of output at these locations in the shqrt run. However, ALCOA 
may .choose to reduce; .the rate qf growth of bauxite mining in the 
Caribbean in favour of developing new bauxite sources in countries 
where taxes and royalties are less severe. Several possibilities 
exist for ALCOA. . ! .. , .-..':• . - -
1/ Mining Journal, November 29, 1974, p. 465.* • ' * 
- ..-- • • /In Australia'; 
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In Australia, ALCOA's mineral rights that are presently-
being mined, supply bauxite sufficient to produce 7 per cent 
of the alumina required to operate the-company's present 
United States primary aluminum capacity. ALCOA can increase this 
supply, to 42 per cent of such requirements, in five increments, by .  
exercising options to:acquire additional mineral rights and 
developing these reserves-. Options- for -three -increments were 
exercised late in 197?« Exercise of the last two.options, after 
December 31, 1986, is subject to the approval -of the government 
of Western Australia.1/ Eauxite royalties are. set by the state 
governments in Australia. The royalty in Western Australia is 
not known but in Queensland, the other major bauxite producing 
state, the royalty in 1974 was 0.50 dollars per ton on bauxite processed 
in Australia and 1.00 dollar per ton on exported bauxite._2/ 
As mentioned earlier, the HALCO Mining Company project in 
Guinea will increase shipments of bauxite to ALCOA from about ' 
1.0 million tons in 1974 to 2.6 million tons in -19-79. This bauxite 
would be sufficient to supply over 40 per cent of ALCOA's current 
United States of America refinery requirements. ' 
Other potential; bauxite sources, tíh.ich have already been 
mentioned are located in -Indonesia and- Costa Pica1. ALCOA reports . 
that it is ̂ continuing to study-the feasibility of the Indonesia' '• 
bauxite-alumina project,3/ and that it continues to hold bauxite ' 
concessions in "Costa Rica.4/ . . - " • • 
In May 1975, ALCOA announced that it had discovered á large 
deposit of bauxite in the Amazon region of Brazil but that "some 
additional.exploration will be necessary in order tó establish the 
tonnage and.grade of the deposit". ALCOA said:that it- is not involved 
in the consortium headed by ALCAN which is•developing-a bauxite deposit 
in the Amazon-but that ALCOA's-bauxite find is in the same region.5/ 
1/ SEC 10-K-ALC0A, p.2. ' ' 
2/ ' Securities and Exchange Commission, Form Í0-K for Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corp.,for the period ending December 31, 
1974, pp. 3-4. 
3/ SEC 10-K-ALCOA, p. 2. . ...... 
V ALCOA Annual Report 1973, p. 5. 
5/ "ALCOA Asserts it has Large Bauxite Deposits in Brazil's Amazon", 
Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1975, p. 23. ^ ^LCAN 
ALCAN Aluminium Ltd. 
ALCAN Aluminium Ltd. is a Canadian company with headquarters 
in Montreal which' is -engaged * through subsidiary and related 
companies., in., all phases of aluminum, business...on an international 
scale. Its operations involve the mining and "processing of bauxite, 
the basic aluminum ore; the production of alumina, from bauxite; 
the reduction of alumina to aluminum using large amounts of 
electricity,, the major portion of which is generated by ALCAN; 
and the fabricating of aluminum alloys into semi-finished and 
finished products.- The company is also engaged in transportation 
and warehousing, power transmission and sales, research and development 
for the company's own use and for sale to third parties and the 
operation ,of trading and service companies in the Caribbean. 
Table 15, showing ALCAN's revenues by product, reveals the great 
divsrsifiaation which ALCAN has achieved based on aluminum. The 
categories shown in the table are ingot and ingot products, fabricated 
products, all other products which include alumina and aluminum 
based chemicals among other things, and-operating income which 
includes revenues from the sale of hydroelectric power and shipping 
services. Within the category of; fabricated' products an enormous 
range of products are manufactured by ALCAN subsidiaries, 
(a) ALCAN*_s Integrated Aluminum Facilities • •• . - .> 
ALCAN's bauxite mining operations are summarized in table 16. 
ALCAN has wholly-owned bauxite mines in four countries (Jamaica, 
Malaysia, France and Brazil), a majority-owned mine in India and 
participates in mining consortia in two countries (Australia and 
Guinea). Jamaica is currently ALCAN's largest source of bauxite. 
However, the major growth areas are HALCO Mining Co. in Guinea 
which will supply ALCAN with 2.6 million tons of bauxite per year 
in 1979, and a new bauxite development in the Amazon region of 





ALCAN ALUMINUM,LTD.:;REVENUES BY PRODUCT 
Sales U?million) . 1956 1970 1974 
Ingot and'Ingot Products a/ 224 321 449 
% 27 23 18 
Fabricated Products 461 723 1 498 
' % 55 53 62 ' 
All other products ' 87 268 400 
% 10 " 19 16 
Other Income 7 10 15 
% ' 1 i 1 
Operating Income '-la/ 55 " 52 75 
% 7 4 "3 
Total 834 1 374 2 437 
_ % 100 100 ' 100 
Sour£e: Annual Report 1974, p.27 
a/ Represents primary aluminum sold in the form of ingot for 
remelting, extruding, rolling, and forging plus a small 
amount of secondary aluminum.' 
b/ Includes revenues from' the sale-of hydroelectric power 
and shipping operations. ••• •. 
/Table 15 
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Table 16 . 
ALCAN ALUMINIUM -LTDv: BAUXITE MINING 
Country Company ALCAN 197^ c/
1 










To t ai 
AlJam 
• Queensland Alumina '1 
KALCO Mining Co. 




Indian Aluminum Co. 
"Aluminio Minas Gérais 
CGuy'ana, Surinam, ' '••' 
Sierra Leone)- •:.. . . 
Souz-ce: See Table l8v 
Equity Output Bauxite Supply 
iOO 2 6Ô0 a/ 
22 1 250 b/, 
"27 1 000.c/ 
100 ; 









l/: Equivalent of 1 -240,00,0 tons of alumina. 
Z/ ALCAN's Share -.500,000 tons of alumina. 
¿/ •< ALCAN's Share. -
4/ :. Sold to'third parties. 
5./ Equivalent of 200,,000 tons of alumina. 










-, /Alumina refining 
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Alumina refining capacity is shown in table 1?. All bauxite 
mined in Jamaica is reduced to alumina at ALCAN's two alumina plants 
at Ewarton and Kirkvine. The Canadian alumina plants at Arvida 
process bauxite obtained from HALCO Mining Co. in Guinea and also, 
from third party sources in Guyana, Surinam and Sierra Leone. As 
ALCAN's new 'bauxite sources come on stream, they will replace the 
;outside purchases by the Arvida plant. In Brazil and India, the 
alumina plants refine local bauxite. Nippon Light Metal Company, 
ALCAN's related company in Japan, purchases bauxite under long-term 
contract from ALCAN's mine in Malaysia and from the bauxite mines 
of Queensland Alumina. Queensland Alumina Ltd. is 22 per cent 
owned by ALCAN.and has a capacity of 2.7 million tons per year of 
which ALCAN received about 500,000 tons in 1974. ALCAN also purchased 
about 400,000 tons of alumina from third party sources in 1974. 
Early in 1974, plans for an 880,000 ton alumina plant to be 
built on the Shannon River estuary in Ireland were announced. Cost 
of the refinery is expected to exceed 350 million dollars. The plant is 
scheduled for completion in 1980 and will process bauxite from Guinea 
and other sources and will supply alumina to ALCAN smelters ,and 
related customers in Britain and Western Europe. 
As of December 1974, ALCAN's five Canadian primary aluminum; 
smelters had a rated capacity of 1,035,000 short tons per year or 
42.8 per cent of the total smelting capacity of ALCAN's consolidated 
and related fcompanies. The remainder'of ALCAN's smelting capacity was 
distributed geographically as follows: Norway - 16.7 per cent; Japan -
16.7 per cent; Spain - 5-6 per cent; United Kingdom - 5-5 per cent; 
India - 4.5 per cent; Sweden - 3«9 per cent; Australia - 2.1 per cent; 
Brazil - 2.1 per cent and Italy 0.2 per cent. Table 18 indicates 
the alumina sources of these smelters in those cases in -which it 
is known. Total smelting capacity of ALCAN's consolidated and 
related companies was 2,420,000 tons per year as of December 31, 1974. 
Production in 1974 was 2,174,000 tons. In 1972, the primary aluminum 
capacity of ALCAN's consolidated and related companies was 2,260,000 
tons per year and accounted for about 18.8 per cent of i/estern world 
aluminum capacity in that year. ALCAN has aluminum fabricating interests 
in 33 countries. /m ,G /Table 18 
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Table 17 









100 1 387 
% oí ALCAN's Bauxite 
Alumina Source(s) 
, Supply 
Jamaica AlJam-Ewarton 100' 624 
-Kirkvine 100 615 
Brazil ±/ Aluminio Minas 
Gerais, SÌA. 100 100 
India &/ Indian Aluminum 
;Co. 55 210 
Japan ft/ Nippon Light Metal •'•:> 
Co. -Shimizu 50 595 
, . , -Tomakomai ' 36,7-, 
Australia Queensland 
"Alumina 22 2 700a/ 











Total Capacity of ALCAN and 
Related Companies 
Capacity wholly-owned by ALCAN 
6 398 
2 726 
Alumina available to ALCAN frCm. ' 
wholly-owned and related 
companies 4 398 
Outside purchases 370 




Source: See Table Ü 
ALCAN received-500,000, tons_o,f: alumina from Queensland.. 
. ' Alumina'"in 1974. . ' , . , - ;_••'; 
tij Output not marketed by ALCAN. . ' 
• • . -:'..;••-..• ; / • -/Table 18 
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Table lo 
































U.K. ALCAN (U.K.) Ltd. 
India Indian Aluminum Co. 
Japan Nippon Light Metal 
Australia ALCAN-Australia 
Sweden Granges Essem AB 
Total Aluminum Capacity of 
Consolidated and Related 
Companies 
Capacity of ALCAN's Consolidated 
Companies 
1974 Aluminum Production by 
Consolidated and Related 
Companies 
Arvida, 







100 4 0.2 
25 358 14.6 Caribbean 
50 43. 1.9 Caribbean 
25 I38 5.6 Caribbean 
138 
100 132 5.5 Jamaica 
55 119 4.9 India 
50 425 17.3 Nippon 
70 50 2.0 Queensland 





Sources:!) Securities and Exchange Commission, Form, 1.0-K, 
Aluminium Ltd. For the year ended December 31, 
ALCAN Facts 1974, Public Affairs Department of 
Aluminium Ltd., April "1974. 






(b) ALCAN^-Qtganizational./Structure - ;-, . '; •:•..• • 
In 1968; ALGAN announced,® company- reorganization which was . • 
deemed necessary : because of¿increased gize, .geographical spread ;. 
and vertical integrations .Thè company,.-adopted a decentralized 
product line structures - The original-product line, breakdown ... 
included --three . Operating^ groups. T.:>Rawt Materials, Smelting, , and.. 
Fabricating and:Sales - and >a: services-.;-group.* ; In(1973, the . .; ; 
smelting and raft ̂ materials 'divisions • were'. amalgamated.. It was 
felt that the two: divisions : were.-highly : interdependent and hence^. 
close co-operation,.w^is-needed.-for both to, function,-efficiently- , • ì r 
Also, both.division's involved process technology?and therefore ./- • -
required similar styles. "'Of<. management. ;.: t ' : • , 
V/ithin the Fabricating and Sales Divisioni-, Ayea ; General ;•• 
Managers- report to. the.-Executive Vice-Presidents s ALCAtJ's consolidated 
.and-related -companies.; inyolved- in. fabricating and •> sales hay e -been.. • 
organized into eight independent geegraphipal-/areas Canada., 
United States CajFibb©^,»Latin. America; United Kingdom, - Ireland-
and Scandinavia; • Eurppe and^Hear; East; .-A fries:; Fa a?-East-;and: South Paèifìc 
-Each'bf -the cperàting; groups-has-.jf/eiLl defined responsibilities. 
The!; Raw Materials - Diyision is ..responsibly' ffcjr? supplying; the - bauxite. • 
and alumih.a- re.quire<ments;. of the; Smelting -Division, ;and also ¿ocean?" 
shipping.-.-, operations^ -sales ; of oreŝ .. alumina, and- aluminum .based;, - •••j. v 
chemicals'; -magnes.iuftv s,ales, ands the> operations--of- the fabricating-,, 
companies in the Caribbean^. n.-;:;.. . >"' • . V;' . 
!',.- The Smelting•Division's prime.-responsibility.is to.,-supply 
the bulk of the ingot requirements of the Fabricating and Sales 
Division. . Other *activities-of the Smelting -Division'.-.include : 
operation of. Canadian power- - plants; operation"-of • Arvidar alumina-' 
plant';: consul ting on•existing and potential group' smelted capacity", 
smelter- construction" ah.di. smelting- techniques . and, costs $ administration 
of ALCAN's. exportr.:me-tal póol-> (including' Scandinavian and' other :->.• . 
purchased* metal.) ; fa,brÌG.àtihg and .sales operations."in Canada (.under', 
the - .strategie1 guidance', ofthe Fabricating ; and - Sales. Division) ;' and • ; 
the sale of aluminum based chemicals inr fiànadà. ; :'.--.:-• ;i" ' - -
/The Fabricating 
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The Fabricating and Sales Division is responsible for .the 
manufacture and sale, of fabricated products and the .sale Of ingot 
products. Other activities of the division include: determining 
which geographic and end-use markets offer the greatest profit 
potential and whát products, facilities and services will be 
required to achieve the desired-share of. these markets; providing 
guidance to the Smelting- Division - for Canadian fabricating and 
sales; and responsibility- for-raw materials and smelting in 
Australia and Italy (under the'guidance of the:Smelting Division). 
The Fabricating and Sales Division is not responsible for sales 
of ingot or fabricated products of A/S Ardal og Sunndal Verk, 
Indian Aluminum Company, Nippon Light Metal-Company orrthe fabricating 
companies in the Caribbean. 
In 1975, another major company reorganization took place. • 
The company's basic organization now.consists of three geographically-
defined operating regions, two management committees, and a number 
of service (staff) units., -Each region - one comprising, Canada, 
:the United States and the Caribbean; another the Far, East (including 
Japan and India) and the South Pacific (including Australia and 
New Zealand); and the third,. Continental Europe, the United Kingdom, 
Africa, and Latin America..v is> headed by a regional executive 
vice-president. These officers are responsible from Montreal for 
the .efficient and profitable ongoing, development and growth of 
all the ALCAN operations falling within their"respective territories. 
Supporting them are ten.area general managers in various parts of 
the world. 
Also at hea.d office in Montreal are two key committees. The 
Corporate Development-. Committee, headed by ALCAN's chairman and 
chief executive officer, concentrates on strategic planning and on . 
continuing review, of Group objectives associated with longer-range 
issues. .The Executive Committee, chaired by the president, is 
responsible for operational decisions, short-range planning, and 
implementation of the.objectives and strategies established by the 
Corporate Development Committee.. 
/Completing the 
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Completing;. 0rgani.zat?ionv.Ctf • ALCAN,-,a;tj ̂ eâ -; officê , are a 
number of st^ffi unitg.;-. Their role is to pro»i$.$;; s<erv.i,ee-; and; 
co-ordination^, ;in tĥ eiiiJ*'areas of specialization, - to the management 
committees, .tp.-, regional .headquarters and to all;,-ALCAN operating 
C O I J i p a r i i e s i , V v ( j ,•" +HO.;?', v • • r. -.!*• - Jr . ; ! - ; . 
• ¿¿).->The fiitua-frioir ip- l9?Q*d In .¿-9?0y • MiQAN-.' s- consolidated /... 
companies- were. ,jnini$€;. bauxite s in; six̂ .̂ounĵ ies,:.;.Guyana, Jamaica,,-. . > 
Malaysia, •;France,,wIiid,ia and Brazil. \ A. .related-; company^wsys aiding..-
bauxite and producing ^lumin&-;in, Australia,and-two pthe-r • r£l$<ted--. , 
companies, ¿in Gu^pea- and.t Brazil, -. were£^ey^lop4.hgi .bauxitf. depositŝ ..;; 
GUYANA y 
In 1916, the Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba) was formed , ,;'.. 
• in British Guiana; a«-.a subsidiary of -the; •Alumieû .r-Company of." 
America,, .(ALCD̂ J to hp^4. ;find ? mine bauxite deposits.-}. 1/ In',1928,̂ ;-. -. . 
Aluminium Ltd* 7. the ; predecessor of, AI^ANj, .was fprmed as a Canadian,:, 
corporation. All,,, of jALGOA ls.; fpreigp holding/?,,jofj bauxitê with.,. th,e;,.-. 
exception of those.. in,.Surinam; were.. transferred; to Aluminium Ltd..,-i; 
In 1937, ,,Aluminium:; Ltd.-, cbggan.̂ productioij, p;£;-calcined, bauxite a, 
product êveloĝ d-,- t e c h n i c a l ¿ . ^ . i ^ e d the . 
production,of ..abrasives and,• -re,frajCt-ory; bricks,. Calcined bauxite-
-•became ap important .- product of .Demjba • ¿P^th? 19-50.6.¿/••-,Betwe.en-495.&c:-
?and .1961, Demba .planned . and constructed>an alumina plant., . .Sgi-ostons 
Construction Ltd., a subsidiary of the Aluminium, Company of Ĉ naida,. 
built the alumna, plant-at ̂  :cos,t -of '37.5 million dollars ^ . . . . . - • 
I/'- D.H.Wallac 
e, Market Control and the Aluminum Industry, Harvard 
~~ Urfi^rsity Press, :f93 Pff' ~70 ; ' ' * 
2/-. E.H'.-KoaehV -Bauxite',- Demba,- Alumina 'and -British' Guiana1'*' Address 
delivered to the Royal Agricultural and Commercial Society of 
British Guiana, May 29, 1957, p. 5. • , -..•• - -
2/ Ibid., p. 
...<r:y-h -r^ - . i'vr ¡ v w . ' i . « 'C- --•-¿/fn-1976̂ " ; ~ 
, V'JC J •̂ Î .'IOO , " . ».Vi-vf̂'wA if,.'Si 
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In 1970, production at Demba was as follows:!/ 
Meta! Grade Bauxite •'• : • ' 1,373;000 tons 
Alumina ' ' ' 324,000 tons 
Calcined Bauxite 626,000 tons 
Total bauxite production in 1970 was about 3.4 million ;toris, 
of which 38 per cent was shipped to ALCAN's alumina plant at Arvida, 
Quebec in the form of metal grade bauxite, 22 per cent was converted 
into Alumina at Dëmba's' alumina refinery at Mackenzie, and 40 per 
cent was processed into calcined bauxite in Guyana for sale to 
thé abrasive and refractory industries; Alumina output was sold 
oil world- markets at commercial prices^ mostly on long term 
contracts.2/ 
JAMAICA ' ••'••'• ' - :'' 
The réd earth aréás which' cover almoèt twò-thirds of Jamaica's 
surface were identified as baùicite by thè Jama'ican Department of 
Agriculture in 1942. ''Aluminium Ltd. òf Carisida began the f i r s t ' 
economic investigations of the island's bauxite deposits iñ 1942 
and, in'I943, a subsidiary company, ALCAN'Jámaica Ltd. (known at 
that time as Jamaica Bauxite ltd.) wàs incorporated in Jamaica to 
continue the investigations.¿/ ' In'1943,. the 'first shipment of 
Jamaica bauxite was seiit to plants in North America for laboratory 
examination and process investigation.' A 'relatively high' ferric oxide 
content rendered the bauxite uneconomic initially'but this technical 
'problem was soori overcome. '' 
Between I949 and 1952, ALCAN constructed an alumina 'plant, the 
Kirkvine Works, near Mandeville„ The construction of Port Esquivel 
was finished "by ALCAN in 1954. A second alumina plant was buil't 
at Ewarton between .1956 and 1959.4/ Both alumina plants, have been, 
1/ Fact Sheet, ALCAN in Guyana,. 197Ó, mimeo. 
2/ Ibid. 
3/ "ALCAN,. Alumina and Agriculture 1943-1967'', company document, 
mimeo, p.l. 
4/ ' Jamaican Achievement- , company document, 1966. 
/expanded and 
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expanded, and each currently,, has anr anftüal Capacity of; 55Q,AQ.Q. .long 
tons., ..Jt.-' .. ! / !' , . • ; i ',. ", ' ! 
, In, 1970, ALCAN Jamaica. Ltd. produced.. £351,59,9» long tons of; , 
alumina at .the Kirkvine Workä:;.and 487*537 lbng tons of alumina 
at the Ewarton Works. Bauxite requirements. to produ.ce this 
alumina Were approximately. 2.3 million tons.,, Twentyj-six per. 
cent of, t^e . alumina ..was ...shipped to, ALCAN.'s Canadian smelters.,. • < 
48 per cerit was ghipped to related smelters, in Scandinavia, 
20 per cent was sold in the United States and. 6 (J5er„ cejxt was sold 
elsewhere. , ..,. , . , ,,, 
MALAYSIA T.,f . .... - f 
Bauxite was first mined in Malaysia by., the, Ramunia Bauxite 
Mining Company in,1952._The. Minerals. Yearbook reported in that 
year that • there was a, ti.tle, dispute oyejr bauxite reserves on the 
property adjoining R.amunia *,s.-mines. . In 1955, it,was reported. . 
that Aluminium.,Ltd., was thg.„ otjier party ,in the dispute and.that.. 
Aluminium had, won ti^le to the reserves? ,Soutb-East Asia Bauxites 
Ltd. (SEABA) j/as. fprmed as, .a subsidiary., of,. Aluminium Ltd. to hold 
the r e s e r v e s , . e e t i r o a . t e d about'. IP, pillion tons!,of. bauxite, and 
to work the reserves, jointly, with.r.the ̂ ?amun.ia;Bauxite Mining 90,.. 
Production was shipped to ALCAN's related company, Nippon Light 
Metal of Japan, beginning in 1956.« 1^1960, a 25 per ce$t;interest 
in SEABA was sold, to .Nippon L^ght .Metal;. In,1961, ALCAN. announced 
pla.ns to build .a y/ashing plant treat .ore mined by SEABA. -The^ 
.pl̂ nt wa? to be completed ,.in 1962 with a capacity o,f .500,000 tons 
of bauxite per year and was to be operated by the newly formed 
subsidiary, Johore Mining and Stevedoring Ltd. '« 
In 1970, about 550,000 tons of bauxite, were ,mi.ne.d ̂ nd; shipped, 
mainly to Japan. , .¡. x, 
AUSTRALIA . • ,r"7 . , j. 
As stated earlier, the huge bauxitej discovery made, in Queensland, 
Australia by COMALCO in 1956.stirred the North American aluminum 
companies fand started an Australian bauxite rush.l/ ALCAN secured 
1/ See page 6l. 
/a concession 
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a concession west &f COMALCO in 1956 1/ However, it was not until 
1964 that ALCAN began using Australian bauxite. In that year, a 
loan of 117 million dollars was secured from 11 United States banks 
headed by Mellon National Bank and Trust as interim finance for an 
alumina plant to" be built"'by ' Queensland Alumina Ltd. (QAL). QAL was 
initially held' 52 per cent by Kaiser, 20 per cent by ALCAN, 
20 per cent by Pechiney 6f France and 8 per cent by Conzinc Rio 
Tinto of Australia Ltd.2/ The alumina plant was to be supplied 
with bauxite from the COMALCO mines. ' 
QAL came on stream in 1967 at a capacity of 600,000 tons 
per year.5/ In 1968, capacity was increased to about 1,000,000 tons 
per year and by the end of 1970, capacity was'1,428,000 tons per 
year. Ownership of QAL underwent some changes as capacity grew. 
At year-end 1970, Kaiser owned' 37»5 per cent'; ALCAN's share had 
increased to 21 per cent; Pechiney held ¿0' per cent; COMALCO '" 
had purchased 11.3 per cent and Conzinc Rib Tinto of Australia 
held 9.4 per cent;4/ In 1970, ALCAN's share of QAL was approximately 
320,000 tons per year of which abovit 80,000 tons was used in 
ALCANAS subsidiary smelter in Australia'and the remainder was 
sent to'ALCAN's Kitimat, British Columbia smelter. " 
GUINEA : - ' • - • :•-•..:••• "-•• ' 
'Aluminium Ltd;, through its French subsidiary, viaS granted 
bauxite rights in the "Soke region of Guinea in' the 1920s.5/ In 
the mid-1950s,"ALCAN decided to begin to develop the deposits which 
graded"'at 58-60 per'cent' alumina. ALCAN reached an agreement with 
1/ Ibid., pp. 250-251. • • 
2/ • ••Minerals Yearbook 1964, p. -264. ' 
3/ Minerals Yearbook 1967, p. 228. 
4/ • Minerals 'Yearbook 1972, p. 201. 
5/ Minerals Yearbook 1961, p. 328. , 
-v \, >. . • /the colonial 
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the colonial government to establish a bauxite-alumina producing 
and exporting industry at' a cost of 150 million dollars! A seventy-five 
mile railroad wand a 250,000 ton per year álumiha plant wfere planned. 
Construction was ëchéduled to begin in 1957 and be completed in 1961'.!/ 
In 1958, Guinea gained independence. ALCAN had begun construction 
on the railway anà port' f a c i l i t i e s . " However, in 1961, ALCAN, "" 
announced that work on the Boké project, scheduled to be completed 
in 1964, was hálted due to an inability*'to solve financial problems. 
The government demanded that a minimum of niillion dollar's be 
invested in the project.' A'LC'AN made a new proposal but it was rejected 
by the government and ALCAN was ordered to cease all operations and 
all assets were expropriated.2/ 
Subsequently,' ai joint venture between Harvey Aluminum Corp. 
(HALCO) 'and the' government was negotiated.'r Gompanié'des Bauxites' " 
de Guiñes (CBG) was' formed in'1964 to develop the "Boké project. At 
present', ALCAN holds 13.8 per cent interest in''CBG through its 
27 per cent holding in HALC0.3/ '" ' ' 
'Financing of the Boke project'Was'underway in 1968. The World 
Bank ( IÏ3RD) agreed t V loan trBG:'ë4:*5»' ¥ilÍioif-'cíó!Llaí*s to develop the 
deposit.' The' 'Éxport̂ .Impb'Vt Bank of'"the Uriited Stàjtés. lent CBG 
25 millioft dollars' to finance purchases from thé United States of 
bauxite mining, transporting, crushingdrying, calcining and handling 
equipment1 The United States Agency* for International Development 
also-advanced à loan' of' " 21' 'million'" dóil'árs in' local currency.4/ 
Total'investment by'the end of' 1972 was expected"' to be 320 million 
dollars and production capacity was expected'to be 9 million'tons 
of bauxite" per year.5/ In 19'70, ÀLCÀN expected that the 'first 
shipments would' begin in 1973.' "'' ; 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1956, p.250.' 
2/ ''Bauxite, Harvey's Guinea Venture", Mining Journal, October 11, 
1963, Volume 26l, Ns 6686, p.329. " ~ 
3/ See page 50 for ' Ownership-o-f- -HALCO' and CBG. ' J ' "' 
4/ Minerals Yearbook 1968, p. 203. ; : • - •' • • 
Minerals'-.Yearbo¿k 1972. p. 202. 
/FRANCE 
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TRANCE , 
Aluminum Ltd. acquired bauxite deposit,s in France in 1928 , 
when ALCOA's bauxite holdings in that country were transferred / 
to Aluminium Ltd. In 1970,. Soc.iété Anonyme des Bauxites et 
Alumines de Province, (SABAP) produced abou.t 500,000 tqns of 
bauxite all of which was sold,to third.party customers in Europe. 
INDIA ... . • , ..... 
ALCAN holds a 55, per cent, ..interest, in the Indian. Aluminum 
Company (INDALCO)., This company is fully integrated .from,„mine 
to fabricated produpts and is self-sufficient in t}auxit&r alumina,.. 
BRAZIL ......... -, -t > • •; • •. • •:., 
ALCAN's operations in Brazil began in. 1948 „with the., opening • 
of a fabricating plant» In 1950, ALCAN. acquired, a small ..company, 
Electro Quimica Brasileira, Sc A. which . .owned a bauxite mine, v 
an alumina plant and. a. small aluminum and ferro-alloy smelter located 
at Saramenha in the state pf.Minas Gérais. This smelter was expanded 
after it was acquired by ALCAN. A second smelter was built by ALCAN 
at Aratu in the northeastern state, of Bahia. T.he. location was chosen 
because .of government regional, development incentives.. The bauxite 
fér 'thé Sar&menha and Ara.tu smelters com.es .from two. bauxite mines, 
one at Saramenha,and one at Pocos.de Caldas« . All bauxite .is 
converted to. alumina at the, alumina plant at Saramenha. 1/, 
In 1969, ALCAN announced plans to 'develop a 30 million dollar.-, 
bauxite mining project capable of an annual output of one million ... 
tons. The high.grade reserves .had been under investigation for 
five years in the state of Para»,. The mine site is located close.-. • 
to the Amazon River and ALCAN ' s-, plans called for a'-drying ...plant •.•: . 
and ocean shipping facilities to be built, on the Amazon. .ALCAN.'s . 
share of the bauxite was to be shipped to the Arvida'alumina' plant 
in Canada.2/ 
1/ ALCAN Aluminium Ltd., Annual. Report 1973. pp.22.-24.• • 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1969« .' 
•/Summary of' - , 
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-ji, -fij.y -,<..Summary 'Qf ALCAN'b. Bauxite-Operations- -in- 197-0 • .. - • •. - -,, 
t••.JeAIAAN̂ s:•̂ |̂ W;tf̂ â erî ,̂::SuppXipe•• in, 197P-..,â e ,swimarized ip the .. 
following, table. „..' lo- •• •?' t:-' " . •' .. 
' AliCAN BAUXITE SOURCES'- 1970 
Country 1970 Bauxite Production Comments 
(000 tons)- • ' ' '! {%) 
'Guyana ' """ 2 00b * "" 'JO not includihg'calcined 
-Jamaica - 2 300— -« • — 
Malaysia ' _ 550 : 8 
" Australia ' 700 ;•-'•''" 11 
Guinea ' -( ..«••»• under construction 
France ' ' 500 ~ '""' ~8 sold to third parties 
India . 400 6 " ' 
Braizil 140 .,- 2-' 
Brazil-Trombetas - v . .  under construction 
TOTAL ' 6 590. 100-• -r 
(ii) Developments .since 1970° On March 1st, 1971, the Demerara 
Bauxite Company was nationalized by the government of Guyana. ALCAN 
agreed to purchase, until the end of 1971, more than 50 per cent* • :• '• 
of the full capacity production of metal grade bauxite and alumina_ 
from the government-owned Guyana Bauxite Company. The rated capacity 
of the alumina plant at the time of nationalization was 3.85,000 tons.., 
ALCAN also agreed to buy "limited tonnages'' of metal grade bauxite 
from Guyana Bauxite Company-at favourable prices in the years 
1972 and 1973- The company -reported that short falls in bauxite 
supply in 1972 and 1973 woUld be made by 1 additional shipments from 
other group and third party .-sources". , rTo make up for the. IJOSS of ; 
alumina shipments from Guyana in 1972- onwards, ALCAN announced 
plans to "reinforce the capacity of it's. Canadian alumina plants';'-, 
and a±so expected -to'Teceivealumina from-other ALCAN group sources.1/ 
During 1970-1971, the aluminum market was in a depressed state 
with world markets".'.ip' a. state of oyer'supply». "'Tĥ ŵorldioiide smelter * 
capacity utilization rate was only 83 per cent in 1971.2/ A Similar 
1/ ALCAN Aluminium Ltd«, Annual Report 1971, p° 5-
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1972, p„ 135« 
/oversupply situation 
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oversupply s i t u a t i o n 'existed .wrilt re&pe<*tViio:.bauxite. and this undoubtedly 
made ALCAN's task of' finding substitute sources b'f bauxite somewhat , 
easier«, Table 19 showing Canadian imports of bauxite and'alumina • 
indicates how ALCAN supplied its Canadian alumina plants and smelters. 
Table 19 
ALCAN ALUMINIUM LTD. , 
1970 1974 
Volume Value. . 













Bauxite Imports - Canada 
Sierra Leone • - 346 2.7 
Guinea 49 0.20 972 10.3 
P.R. China . - - 38 .. . , : 0«7 
Guyana a 281 19.34 1 253 10.4 
Surinam 174 • 3.28 " 349 7.8 
United States 6 0.23 35 1.9 
Malaysia v ' ' . 176 0.89 ̂  ' -
Australia 36 0-.54. . . -.. r . -
India 30 ''" 0.15 ... . .. 
Indonesia; 26 ' ;. .  . •. -b •••• 
.Venezuela & 0t.08 . . . " Ghana -
Total • 2 784 24.85 •ml«««««« 2 993 * ! 33.8 
Alumina Imports - Canada 
France - • -
W. Germany •• - . . - 102' 9.1 
Australia 183 12.87 . 425 37-1 
Guyana J 90 6.10 ' * '• ' 26 -•'•1.8 
Surinam . .33 2.12 . : 12 - 0.8 
Jamaica 349 24.53 133 -12i8 
United States 386 27.39 • '225- 18.6-
Guinea . - '•. . • . '.'.' ' 
Total . 1 Oifl 73.01 .. 973 • 80.2 
Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by.Commodities, Cat. 65-007° 
Note: The.Canadian Reynolds Metals Company imports alumina, from United 
States1 and Jamaica to feed its 175,000 tpy smelter at Baie Coraeau, 
• Que. - " . . • ;.' •': ' 
/Bauxite shipments',. 
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Bauxite shipments from Guysina..l>eg&n- falling in 1972 and by 
197.4 amounted to. only 55 .per cent^of .the 197l-:-volume., In 19.72 
and 1973». Malaysian ¡bauxite, .production -.was-increased and about 
100,;000 tons ,was shipped-to;rCanada :in each of-these years. ..ALCAN 
maqle outside purchases, from. Sierra/Le,one, Surinam,, Indonesia and 
Guinea. In 1974, the Boke .project .came on .stream .and ̂ LCAN • ; • 
received 97.2,000 tons -of, bauxite,. ALCAJi-<expects tp receive 
2.6 million tons per year from . Guinea by 1979 • . : . 
• The bauxite deyelpproen-̂  ¡in -the Amazon Basin, of Brazil .is 
expected;-,to come-qn strean? ..in, 1;978 arid AljCAN'.s share of annual . .,•• 
production: will bp- 1.3 million- tons.. -- In< 1973^1974*--financial backing 
for the project was obt^ined^by the-•formation of an- international • 
consortium- comprised p-f two Brazilian .-companies' ~~":.CVRB and Companhia 
Brasileira de Aluminio - which hold 51 percent:, /ALCAN which, has., 
19 per cent and ̂Sjix .-international , companies '̂.Reynolds-(U.S.')-,r 
Shell (.UiK.);,; Norsk Hydro .and -A/S- Ardal • og .Sunn-dal Verk (Norway),v 
Institutp Nacional de ..•Indus-tria (Spain), and nEip. TintP Zinc Corp.' r 
(UrK. )- — which ;hav.e the remaining '30 per ,cent,.i . The 'initial output' • 
of bauxite; i,s expected;, to ¡bie "3miilion: tpn^ p'eri yearwl/ •: \ •' ,'•;•' • , 
-,.-. ALCAN Jamaica paid.-a -production-ley;r'o& '30o4 .million dollars';,' ' 
in 1974!. unĉ -er the new- 'lavt'of.- Jamaica- .2/; ..described, earlier. • .-• •• 
ii.i);. The-.-current situation/and .outlook. ¿The .following: shows-.: 
ALCAN's sources of baujcite in,.1.974. and: projections for̂ -1978-197-9 
19.?jf' and Projep-tions' 1978-79 
• 1978^19-79 Country . 







Jamaica 2 600 34 2 600 28?. 
Guyana 1 250 17 - -
Australia 1 200 16 1 200 13 
Guinea 970 13 2 600 28 
Brazil 250 3 1 600 17 
India 400 5 400 ¿L 
Malaysia 880 12 880 8 
Total 7 - loo 280 100 
1/ E.Bo Roach, speech, University of Montreal, November"27,'1974. 
2/ See pp. 73-74 and 114. 
/3. Reynolds 
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3», Reynolds Metals Company. 
Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds)" is the world's third largest 
producer of primary aluminum and: fabricated aluminum "products-. The ; 
company's operations through subsidiary and related companies include 
the mining of bauxite in three countries',H the production of alumina 
from bauxite in three countries''," the reduction of alumina to aluminum 
in six countries and the fabrication of aluminum aild aluminum alloys 
into a variety of products in fifteen countries«"-. Reynolds also holds 
a 48 per cent interest in British Alüminuhf Company":(BACÖ'). The latter 
company has bauxite mining facilities in three countries,' alumina 
refining operations in two countries, primary aluminum smelting 
facilities in two countries, and fabricating plants in the 'United Kingdom. 
BACO is an-unconsolidated"associated company. Reynolds Shares in the 
net income of BACO on an equity basis. 
Reynolds was originally incorporated in Delaware in'1928'when it 
acquired the business and operating assets of United 'States Foil 
Companyk'l/.: In its early years, -Reynolds was primarily involved in' the 
production of metal foil.. -To expand this line of business Reynolds 
acquired Midland Metal Company of Chicago in January 1930; Lehmaier,' 
Schwartz and Company (New York manufactures of metal foils) in May 1930* 
and Embossed Metal Products Corporation of New York in'August 1930. 
Other companies/engaged in the manufactured of radiators,;thermostats, 
and thermometers were acquired during the;1930s. 
'- 'In 1940, the company incorporated Bauxite Mining Corporation 
of Delaware to conduct bauxite exploration and mining in the Un'ited; 
States. In 1941, the subsidiary's name was changed to Reynolds-Mining 
Company. 
¿/ Moodies Industrial Manual 1-974, Moodies Investors Service, Incv, 
:P- 2505. . . . . . . ....... - . } ; 
•' ' r ••"• - /Table 20.. 
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Table 20 shows that Reynolds is more dependent .on its aluminum . 
operations, 90 ¿er cent of total sales* than ALCOA, :.ALCA-N and Kaiser, 
with increasing importance being given to revehue from fabricated . 
aluminum products than from primary aluminum«, Reynolds' dependence • 
on foreign operations has increased in recent years, in that 33 P e r 
cent of.its assets are located abroad, 92 per cent of its bauxite is 
importedj • with 72 per cent of total bauxite requirements coming from 
the Caribbean. On the other hand, 75 per cent of Reynolds' alumina . . 
and 83 per cent of its smelter capacity.is located in the United States. 
{ . . Table 20 , 
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES: REVENÜE ! 
• BY PRODUCT AND NET INCOME ,. > , . 
(Millions of dollars) . .» ....... • 
• - . • .' • . • • ' ' ' 1 . . . . . 
•••••'..' • - 1970 ; . r; • -1974; . 
Primary Aluminum . . . 246. 278 
% • ' ••' ' " ' • 23o8 * • . 14.0.' 
Fabricated Aluminum ' " v ''•"••• '" ' 673 ' 1 512 „ .-
% •••.. i'-i. r ;r,, /J ¡.- .  6?°2 . 75.8 
Other" , .-9 v--;.^».• .  • 115- • •• 204 , 
% ,.. . . . , . ' „ . •,.', " I V 1 '' ' 
"Total Net Sales : ' ^ -k : x ' ' ' i. 994 
% 100.0 ••-• 100.0 
Net Income • •• no:* • i • ,,< -z+g^ ĵ:1 • - m . i 
• .•: "aw." •!;•»'«"—• y , I : 'J.j y. '• 1.. -rr.——.-n—• —rgrr 1 -K ,: •••.—;—, 
Source; Securities and Exchange .Commissionj Form10-K,'for Reynolds 
Metals Compahy^ for the'"fiseal''̂ ear̂ ^ 'inded 'Defeember 
/(a)- Bauxite 
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(a) Bauxite Mining 
HAITI 
Reynolds discovered bauxite deposits in Haiti in 1944, which 
were said to be of considerable size and only three miles from a 
seaport» The Government of Haiti granted Reynolds a sixty year 
mining concession, 1/ and Reynolds Haitian Mines Incorporated was • 
incorporated in Delaware in 1944 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Reynolds Metals Company» 
Production by Reynolds Haitian Mines did not begin until 1957.2/ 
In I960, about 340,000.tons of bauxite was shipped from Haiti to 
Reynolds' alumina refinery at 'Isa Quinta, Texas. Production capacity was 
expanded around 1968-1969 and exports rose to 620,000 tons in 1970. 
In 1973, - exports reached 700,000 tons but declined to .6.26,000 tons in .. 
1974.J/ 
Reynolds has stated that its bauxite concessions covered 
approximately 34,000 acres in 197^, and that in the same year, Haitian 
bauxite.supplied about 11 per cent of the company's requirements,4/ 
table 21. During.December 197^, an agreement was entered into between 
Reynolds Haitian Mines, Incorporated and the Government of Haiti regarding 
bauxite taxation for 1974. The agreement called for the payment of a 
severance tax amounting to 6.3 per cent of the realized price per ton of 
primary aluminum ingot .produced from Haitian bauxite less the amount of 
income and other taxes. This percentage amounts to a tax of'9?33 dollars 
per long dry ton of bauxite based on a realized price of 32 cents per 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 19^3, p. 709. 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1957, p. 248. 
2/ Production figures come from the Government of Haiti, Direction 
Generale des Contributions, Port au Prince. 
4/ Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K for Reynolds Metals 
Company for the year ending December 31, 1974, p. 6. 
/pound of 
pound of aluminum.l/ As a result of'this new agreement Reynolds' income 
tax payments increased frop 901,000 dollars in 197?. to 6,960,000 dollars 
in 1974. Royalty payment declined from 349,000 dollars in 1973 to 
"315,000 dollars in 1^74,"presumably "because of the reduced production.2/ 
' Tablé 21' 
REYNOLDS"METAL'S COMPANY: BAUXITE MINING 
! Country ' Company 
Reynolds' ''Reynolds1 ' ~ % Q f 
ec^uity . .output S h a r e t,! Reynolds' 
"'! Bauxi t é 
< 
U.S.A. "Reynolds •. . ;/ 100.0 
- Saline, Ark 
Haiti Reynolds Haitian 100.0.-
Mines 
Jamaica Reynolds Jamaica i >>100.0 . 
Mines - Lydford 
Jamaica ALPART - Nain 36.8 




5OO : , ' 5.00 ; •• 7.6 
700;- ;.', 700 10.7,; ; 
3 500 ; ; -3 ,50Q- i 53*4 
3 200 1 200 18.3 . 
650 650 9.9 " 
6 550 100.0 
Sources: 1. Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K for 
Reynolds Metals Company, for the year ending 
December 31, 1974. 
2» United States Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1972, 
Washington, D.C., PP° 137, 149-152, 192-193, 200-201. 
3« Government sources in Jamaica and Haiti. 
1/ Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
2/ Government of Haiti, Direction Générale des Contributions, 
. *• Port au Prince. 
/Table 22 
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•«? Table 22 ' ' 
; REYNOLDS METALS 'COMPANY: ALUMINA REFINING 











•• -i/o 000 •£ Ï. t O ! 
U.S.A. Reynolds " 




. gifO- 840 ' 27.3 "Arkansas 
Guyana 
U.S.A.. ;• Corpus,Christi, 
Texas 
100 . . 1.385 1 335 45.O -, Jamaica 
Haiti 
Jamaica " ALPART - Nain • 36.8 1000 - 368 12.0 Jamaica 
U.K. British Aluminum 
Co. - Burntisland 
48.0 -110 110 ' 3.6 
U.K. ' British Aluminum' 
Co. - Newport 
48.0 4 if : ' 44 1,4 ..4 . 
Germany Aluminium Oxid 
- Stade 
50.0 • '660 - 330 •10.7 
Total 2"923 ' 100.0 
Source: See table 21. 
•/Table 23 
Table 23 
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY: ALUMINUM SMELTING 
Reynolds' Reynolds' % Q 
'Equity Share • „ V,i«. 
U.S.A. Reynolds 
(7 .plants) 
Canada , Canadian Reynolds 
' Metals - Baie 
Comeau 










-'Tysseldal ' ' 
British Aluminium 
Co. (3 plants) 
Volta ¡Aluminium Cp< 
- Tema 


















. 175 9,75 • 
175 





























Source: See table 21. 
/JAMAICA 
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JAMAICA • -
Reynolds became involved in Jamaica in 1943=1/ Interest in 
Jamaican bauxite took place in the late 1930s when Billiton of 
the Netherlands, and Aluminium Limited of Canada had both been granted 
bauxite concessions by the government. All bauxite depostis were 
Crown Property in November 1942. Bauxite in Jamaica was shipped to the 
East St. Louis alumina plant of'ALCOA in February 1943 for' experimental 
testing. It Was found that both' operating' procedures and the equipment 
of the available alumina plants would have to be modified before they 
COuld ;use Jamaican bauxite satisfactorily. It was felt that an alumina • v' 
plant's effective capacity was cut by 75 per cent while processing 
Jamaican bauxite. Bauxite was not scarce in 1943, and the main interest 
in the Jamaican bauxite depostis had been due to the close proximity 
of Jamaica to the United States, and the resulti'ng-strategic- advantage 
of Jamaican bauxite over bauxite from Guyana and Surinam. Since 
Jamaican bauxite could not be used in existing alumina plants without 
cutting their effective capacity drastically, its promise .as•. a war-time 
expedient evaporated. 
Reynolds sent .geologists to Jamaica-in February 19^3. The 
geologists set preliminary estimates of reserves at more than 100 million 
tons. Reynolds then requested .from the Jamaican Government permission 
to explore on a parity with Aluminium Limited in obtaining permanent 
concessions. In February 1944, the Jamaican Government lifted its 
emergency war-time restrictions on the. exploration and acquisition of '" 
bauxite lands. By October 1944, Reynolds Metals had acquired options, 
on 15,000 acres of land. The company also announced that further 
exploration had revealed that bauxite reserves appeared to exceed 
200 million tons, and that Reynolds had spent over one million dollars 
on research in conjunction with MIT to devise a method of treating 
Jamaica's high-iron content bauxite. 
1/ This section draws extensively from a Reynolds booklet, 
Reynolds in Jamaica. 
/Development of 
Development'of fefeeives 'was also slowed by'the absence'of mining 
laws ¿rid regulations, which -were not enacted until the summer of 1974. 
In the'meantime', Reynolds had Contracted"'with-ah en'ginefering firm in 
19^5 for the 'selection' of *a site for, 'and the'design of, a wharf with 
storage and shiplcmdirig"facilities» Demand for bauxite1and aluminum 
slumped 'after the war, and in 1946, aluminum-production -was :.6l-per cent 
below the 1943-1944 levels. 
•' In 1948, Reynolds sought and sec'ured :a 10 million dollars'loan from 
the Economic Co-operation •Administration -(EGA'), which was-administering -
Marshall Plan fund's, to cortstruet facilities'td 'mine, dry'arid transport-• 
Jamaican bauxiteIn 1949,' Reynolds proposed that-it would go: ahe'ad- /•••'• 
with its project in spite of the fact that the 'techiiical problems "of 
treated Jamaican bauxite had not yet been fully resolved, if the ••'"• 
Jamaican Government would: • ' • '" '£-} •'"•'•'• ' 
"grant-Reynolds a- ¿5 year'renewable mining lease? :' 
' c- grant a'five-'year exemption itiM 'duty and tbhhage tax o'n :"v 
,"•'•"'• materials and equipment; <••"' •"•¡; "' •''"'* '- " ' ' 
- stabilize • the royalty rate on baiuxite and not impose :a'ny export 
; tax on bauxite over 'the 25 year lease period; 
' - 'reach ah agreement with- Reynolds--concerning the assumed profit" \ 
on bauxite sales for Jamaican income'tax cdmputatioh. ; The 
* ' assumed profit' could be' adjusted after the first five' y'̂ ars. 
" Reynolds proposed the'construction of a' '̂ O'OyOOQ -ton per ye&r • "• 
mining facility and promised to train Jamaican- personnel for production 
and supervisory jobs.'- Reynolds' al-s'b offered to restore'mined=out land 
for agricultural purposes. 
The Government of Jamaica responded by saying that the proposal 
was, for the most part, acceptable but that the following modifications 
were necessary: 
- while the Government stated that it had no intention of levying 
an export tax, it was unable to agree to stabilization of the-. 
!„ bauxite ...royalty, for & 2'5 year period.' Instead the royalty' 
.would be re.yis.ed everyp years; .,, ' . n , . .-, • . 
/- to 
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- to simplify calculations' and to obviate the necessity for 
determination of production costs, the Government suggested 
an assumed profit of 60/ United States currency per ton on all 
bauxite exported throughout the 25 year lease period. 
In 1950, Reynolds Jamaica'Mines Limited was incorporated in the 
State of Delaware, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Reynolds Metals 
Company. 
The Korean War caused increased demand for aluminum and Reynolds 
decided that initial capacity in Jamaica should be 750,000 tons per 
year. In April 1951» more than 1,600 people were employed in 
construction by Reynolds. Construction was completed in the spring of 
1952 and the first shipment of Jamaican bauxite left the port of Ocho 
Rios on June 5, 1952. 
Strong demand for aluminum for both civilian'and military use 
had developed by i952. In 1953» the first full year of production, 
Reynolds shipped 610,000 short tons of bauxite to its new alumina plant 
at Corpus Christi, Texas, which was especially designed to use Jamaican 
bauxite. Reynolds' bauxite exports increased to 845,000 tons In 1954 
and to 1,045,000 tons in 1955» Early in 1956, Reynolds announced a 
programme to expand its capacity to 2.25 million" short tons per year. 
Shipments continued to increase as follows: 1956 - 1,070,000 tons, 
1957 - 1,466,000 tons, 1958 - 2,170:,OOO tons. However, in 1959, the 
United States economy entered a recession and by I960', shipments had 
declined to 1,735,000 tons. " ! 
In the 1961-1974 period, Reynolds' shipments have been as 
follows:!/ 
1/ Production figures for 1961-1970 come from Reynolds in Jamaica, 
p. 52. For 1971-1974 the data come from Economics and Statistics 
Division, Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources, Government 
of Jamaica. 
/Bauxite Exports 
- 89 - • "-i 
Y m t •' , • "000 ¡Shortflops' , , Comments ...<: •« 
1961 2,027 " 
1962 ...... ,,. . 2,166 ^ 
1963 • ! 2,136 '' 
1964- ; y- ' • : •;• ••• -" 2? 121 • -
1965 ....... .... , ;2,28^ 
1966 " ->•• • ¿,780 
1967 " ' • ' • 2-,270 i ;' • 
1968 ... , f l , ,7> l . ,. ,,.v.,; .¡New conveyor belt system ï installed» Labour 
- /i: d '<" C ; difficulties in United 
.... , . States. 
1969 " ' ""'" ' ' 2,670 ' " 
1970 "' ••(••.-,"> • " ••• .2,780 • -a I ' • • • • 
1971. .... .... .2,468, . 
1972 ' " " ¿¡626' •' •'•'" ' 
1973 - ' • • '*2»998 ••/;••« 4« i • - : 
197^ r ..... , ,,-3,548.. ... .. .Capacity expanded frotn. .... 
3.0 to'4.1 million short' m. 
tons. 
In 1966, Alumina Partners of Jamaica (ALPART) was organized as" 
a consortium ôf Reynolds Jamaica*'Alumina Ltd. "(36.54' per cent), Kaiser 
Jamaica Corp. (j6.54 per cent) and'Anaconda ̂ Jamaica', Inc. .92 per 
' . ,;-:. t • ' -•»'-'.(_- f .1 * i .i ',-t"i "I '',' '••if ' • « • ». » -.r •"> . • ••' : • 
cent). Kaiser contributed bauxite'deposits i'ri Harichëstér'and 
St. Elizabeth to 
F ALPAM " 'as "well"'as rail1'facilities arid its "Port Kaiser 
shipping and bauxite drying facilities. Reynolds'also contributed 
bauxite properties in Manchester and St. Elizabeth to the consortium. 
Kaiser is the managing partner and supervises ALPART's operations. 
Bauxite mining and alumina production at ALPART began in 1969. At 
that time, ALCAN was the only other company converting'bauxite to" 
alumina in Jamaica. 
ALPART's bauxite production record is as follows:' 
Bauxite Production 
Year ' '"" " " 000 Short:Tons ;; 
• 1970 ' ' ' ; ' ' ' 1,986' 
1971 • '•• "• • " "i .••••': • 2,468.. • • • , 
1972 2,350 1973 2,-099 - ~ - -1974 .'"'•'.•' 
/Reynolds' share 
90 -
Reynolds' share in ALPART's output of bauxite is identical to 
the company's equity share, i.e., 36-5 PejT cent, or about 1,150,000 tons 
in 1974. 
The tax legislation passed by tiite Jamaican Government, which 
includes a provision for a minimum production levy based on specified 
production, and gives the Minister of Mining and Natural Resources 
the power to increase the rate of the production levy, required payments 
of the production levy and increased royalties for 1974 by Reynolds 
totalling approximately 4?.7 million dollars. This figure included its 
share of 1974 royalties and production levy imposed on Alumina Partners of 
Jamaica, based on the minimum production'specified for Reynolds and :, 
Alumina Partners of Jamaica, the 7 1/2 per cent rate, and an assumed 
"realized price" for primary aluminum of 32 cents per pound. The 
Jamaican tax legislation provides for a final determination of "realized 
price", and the final amount of the production levy, in accordance with 
regulations there-under which have not yet been issued. 
In January and February 1975» Reynolds commenced discussions with 
the Government on other proposals made by it, including land ownership, 
bauxite reserves, Government participation in operations and expansion 
of operations. These discussions have been inconclusive at the time 
of writing this report. 
GUYANA . . . . . . . . . 
In 1952, Reynolds purchased the assets of The Berbice Bauxite 
Company in Guyana (then, British Guiana). Berbice was a subsidiary 
of American Cyanamid Co. and had been mining and exporting bauxite from 
British Guiana on a small scale for several years.1/ The acquisition 
included mining, leases .and exclusive permissions covering some 490,0000 
acres, complete mining equipment, houses, washing plant, drying plant, 
service facilities, a short railroad and a barge line.2/ ' In 1953 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1?52, p. 199« 
2/ Moodies Industrial Manual 1974, p. 2505. 
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Reynolds'• purchase:ofBer-biee~ was' cantested. by, Harvey, Machine Co«- •••: 
, which" claimed prior- sales • agreement .1/ " 'In the"; meantime,. Reynolds 
started production and shipped 65,000 shortjtons of bauxite -to the.;': 
United States-during-1953./ -It was. reported in: 1953" that the Government 
n of.. British '-Guiana-, had imposed an-export .duty-of 58.3 cents per ton on 
/'calcined-ore and 26.2,ce'nts per ton on regular ¡bauxite, and also- ; 
.royalties' ranging: from 5¿8 cents per ton to 14,5 cents, per ton.2/ . 
During 1954, the litigation.brought by Harvey, against Reynolds • 
was decided in- favour of. Reynolds,^. and: the ..Company .expanded exports, 
to 160,000'short tons in'1954-and;to.240,000 tons in 1955» The export 
duty.-had. increased to 1.00 dollar'per ton for calcined ore and .-; 
O.45?dollar per ton for metal grade bauxite. There was- also a royalty of 
'.10 cents-per ton on all bauxite production - : - , \ ' i 
?0v:er the decade-1955-5-1965, Reynolds continued to expand bauxite-
production-and .in 1965, entered into an agreement•with the-Government 
of British Guiana in which Reynolds, agreed to increase.production to . 
600,000 long tons per-year immediately and to-1 $000,000 long, tons per 
year by.* 1976..4/. • • : .: " .-.. / - --r 
As mentioned earlier, on March ,!, 1971, The Demerara Bauxite :Co., 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of ALGAN Aluminium Ltd., was.nationalised 
by the Government of Guyana. ;Also . in'19?l,"Reynolds Guyana Mines Ltd., 
produced 1,155,000 long'tons (1,295,000 short-tons). In 1973, 
production had fallen to 812,000 long tons (910,000 short tdhs).5/ 
At the end of 1973» the Government..¡requested discussions, of:-, possible 
participation in Reynolds Guyana Mines Ltdv6/ . In;July 1974,'the 
1/ Minerals Yearbook. 1953, p. ..227. .,.  . 
2/ Ibid., p. 226. 
3/ . Minerals Yearbook 1954, p. 215» . "."* 
V ' Minerals.• Yearbook.-1965,' p.- 231;-American Metal Market, - ,'.-. 
August,!,..157^00 1. .. . . .. 
5/ "Burnham issues warning to Reynolds", .Caribbean Business News,. 
September 1974. ' ; • • - - :.- ...:...-
6/ •':.* Reynolds Metals Company, Annual Report 1973, p. 2. 
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Government published a white paper,stating•that Reynolds paid no 
corporate income: tax from 1952-1963 because Reynolds Guyana. Mines Ltd., 
declared no profit during those years» Up to the end- of 1973> Reynolds 
had shipped. 10»? million long, tons of bauxite. The. white paper stated 
that Guyana was only receiving 5 per cent, of the selling price of aluminum. 
Guyana^s share of"the proceeds of every ton.of Reynolds' exported bauxite 
in 1970 was 1.86 dollars. By 1973, this- figure had slumped to 1.36 dollars 
per ton.l/ Production in 1974 wasexpected to be 615,000 long tons 
of metal grade bauxite and 300,000 long'tons of. calcined bauxite.2/-
Negotiations between the company and the Government continued 
through the summer.*. On July 10, 1974, the..Government announced that 
a-large tax increase would be imposed on Reynolds•Guyana Mines Ltd. 
The Guyanese Finance Minister, Mrv Hubert,:Jack, stated that the country 
aimed to increase its revenues by 15 million dollars.by placing a new tax 
on bauxite production which would apply only5to,vertically integrated 
companies (i.e., the tax would apply to Reynolds but not to the non-
integrated Government owned Guyana.Bauxite Company). . . 
A Guyanese newspaper, the Daily Chronicle, rationalised/the tax 
increase to Reynolds in • the -following manner: . .7 
. ."The economy is now vitally ini-need of considerable injections 
of revenue and experts do .not believe that-Reynolds would make 
the maximum possible contribution to the country under the 
present tax structure.... GUYBAU has meanwhile shown a.much -
greater understanding of the real problems of the country.and 
the role which'such an important industry should play to help 
the nation ̂ over the economic hump."j5/ : 
On July Ik,, 1974, Prime .Minister Forbes Burnham announced that : 
Reynolds would be nationalized by the end of 1974. Burnham also 
attacked the United States Government for its opposition to the 
nationalization of the Demerara Bauxite Company in 1971. Burnham 
1/ American Metal Market, August 1, "1974, p. 1; "Reynolds Told of 
New Bauxite Tax", Daily Chronicle (Guyana), July 11, 1974,. p. 1. 
2/ "Caribbean Battleground" Metal Bulletin, September 27, 1974. 
1/ •Daily Chronicle, July 11, 1974, p."l. : ' -. 
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statejd « that-.thè 'talks on '••tax-increases and ' tfee^talks oh Government : 
(ownership and'control' o:f Reynolds -were .not related, indicating that 
¿thè' higher taxes were not;an alternative to nationalization. Late 
in August, Reynolds spokesmen-announced/that - if Reynolds Guyana Mines 
Ltdor, was : «at io nal i z e d, the parent-company might not purchase any 
bauxite, from the .country. 1/.. ; .if . 
* It was•suggested that-Forbes Burnham would probably prefer to 
take a partnership in the;Reynolds operation rather than nationalize 
it 100 per cent, because -he wanted to keep the'advantages of Reynolds' 
personriel and finance capital. The article wqnt on to say .that if 
Reynolds and Biirnham coiild agree on-a"partnership, :Burnham might be 
• willing to combine GTJYBAU arid thV Reynolds' facilities-and give Reynolds 
the overall1 management, and marketing authorityv Spokesmen for Reynolds 
and Guyana would neither confirm nor "deny that this was being discussed. 
However, a source close' to GUYBAU said that such an arrangement was 
under consideration.È/ " . ' - • , • 
>• On September 25, 1974, the Government announced'its new tax formula 
for Reynolds in the Bauxite Act 197-4.,- which increased to at'least 
11.16 dollars fròm 0.68 dollars' the tax on one ' ton of bauxite. Mr. :J'ac-k 
said that the levy wà's'retroactive to January 1, 1974, and was expected to 
yield 7 millidh dollars for 1974 of which'3.5 million was due within 
15 days. The production levy was computed at 5.911 per cent of the 
price of aluminum on the open market. • The. Government used a price o'-f ' 
32 cents per pound -for its initial calculation's-, but adjustments were-' ! 
to be made at the end of the: year. In announcing the new tax, Mrv Jack 
stated that the Government expected pressure from. United States aluminum 
companies and possibly the" United States Government. He states, "I 
have received information to the effect that the chairman of ALCOA is 
seeking to have the United States Government intervene.in the bauxite 
situation in the Caribbean as a whole". Mi;. Jack also told the Guyanese 
1/ American Metal Market, August 26, 1974, p. 36. 
2/ "Guyaaa levies 7 million dollars Bauxite Tax on Reynolds" Metals' • 
Week, September 30, 1974.., , '. 
- - • /parliament that 
parliament that the Government had rejected a Reynolds.offer to pay 
if million dollars on,the condition that:moves for nationalization or any 
form of State participation be frozen for five years. The-legislation set 
out the. procedure for collecting the l e v y a ' system of appeal open , to 
the company, and sanctions.for refusal to pay.1/ The sanctions included 
withdrawal of permission for Reynolds to mine or export bauxite.2/.;. • 
In addition, the law "implemented .prison ¡terms of two to four years for 
individual managme'nt employees guilty of non-payment and related • 
offenses, with fines as high as 150,000 dollars.3/ , 
'Reynolds immediately announced that it would pay only the 1973 
tax of 68 cents per ton. Industry observers felt .that since • 
; nationalization was scheduled for December . 31, 1:974, Reynolds bad-little 
to lose by refusing to pay the new tax and. incurring ..the sanctions on 
raining and exporting bauxite ..for the last three months of. the year.4/ . 
On .October','3, 1974, Reynolds ammounced that it was initiating 
legal action in Guyana, challenging the legality of the new• tax. . •<•,. , , 
Reynolds estimated that, since aluminum prices had risen:rgtbove 32; cents 
per pound, the total tax for 1974 would amount to; 8.5, million dollars-. • 
Spokesmen for the company asserted that Reynolds had always had 
excellent relations with Guyana- and added that they regretted the r-
Government's decision to impose va tax which, made continued operations, 
economically impossible. The Company advised, the Government'that it 
would continue operating its facilities as long as the Government. .: . 
permitted .it to do so. sHowever,. .four management personnel and their, 
families were withdrawn from Guyana, "for consultation" and because 
of unsettled conditions.5/ A .Reynolds' spokesman later said .that there 
were no .plans for any of .these people to return to Guyana. :v • •.!.;. 
1/ " Ottawa Citizen, September 26, 1974, p. 13» 
2/ : Metal Bulletin,' September 27, 1974. ' " 
j5/ "Reynolds begins Action against Guyana Levy", Globe and Mail, 
October 4, 1974, p. 86. 
V • Metal Bulletin, September .27, 1974. . "" 
1/ Globe and Mail, October 4, 1974, p. 86. , 
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In an interview'with Metals.- Week, • Shridath Rampha.li .at* that • tijne 
Cuyana's Foreign Minister and Minister.1 of -.Justice, said -that the., : 
possibility of -a Reynolds'victory in.: the1'.Courts struck; him a:s highly 
unlikely;1/ . ' • : ; -'•;.. . •• • • • •••«•-. . •* 
• Reynolds•described the. Guyanese levy as, expr.o.priatory <> 2/ The 
Government retorted1 in a statement released at -the United Nations, tl̂ at 
the: Reynolds court action; was' merely a manoeuvre to qualify ¡the Company 
for OPIC • (Overseas Private : Investment Corporation). ..expropriation 
insurance, and that.'Reynolds was' seeking to create the: impression;-the t 
the-iGovernment was trying to confiscate its;..property.3/:• The Chronicle 
reported that1 although the Company!.s written down n.et book, value w,as -
given as G$' 10.6 million,- Reynolds-. Guyana Min<ss>] was insured by~two foreign 
companies: for over 28'million dollars. 4/ 'Spokesmen - for the Government s 
said that it never.."intended tô 'confiscate :Reynolds' property but 
reaffirmed .the . country^ s intention:-to: nationalize the-Reynolds operation 
by year end.5/ The';. Guyana' Government' stated-that.,! it regarded the levy 
and nationalization as twoccompletely separate, issues.6/ • 
•The.J Government also charged" that. Reynolds- wa.s pursuing "a phased; 
plan,', of abandonment •' and ,r.un-down. of it ̂ operations"and -said.: that 
the withdrawal of,-.•management personnel was tin-.exairopl'e-' pf the plan.7/ . 
When Reynolds .-refused, to-pay the., initial installment'of 3.« 5™ill 
dollars,,. the .Government s.ai.d.-that it wp.uld consider publicly; auc tioning 
the ¡Reynoldsproperty to rec-over.-the tax.Other options ? available : to 
ion 
1/ : Metals Week» - October 7, 1974. ', .,.. 
2/, Globe and Mail, October 4, 1974, p. .86̂ . . : ,; -.. ' • • •-, 
2/ "Guyana Wrangle", Metal Bulletin, October l8, 1974, p. 20. 
it/ Daily Chronicle- July 11, 1974, p. 1. 
'W- •1 "Guyana-'may .Consider Publiply Auctioning Reynolds Metals- Side", 
Wall Street Journal',' October 7, 1974,. p. 12. 
6/ "Anti-sAmerican Sentiment,an. Guyana", Financial Times, (London), 
October 8, 1974, p. 33« " " '""" "" 
7/ Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1974, p. 12. 
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the Government included suing for recovery of the unpaid levy, 
restricting Reynolds from extracting or exporting bauxite, or 
appointing a Government controller to oversee Reynolds' operations«!/ 
On October 8, three days after the initial installment was due, 
the Government said that Reynolds could continue to ship metal grade 
bauxite, -but that all shipments would be subject to the levy which 
Reynolds had already refused to pay. The Government also told Reynolds 
that calcined and chemical grade bauxite could hot.be shipped and' 
authorities prevented two loadted ships from leaving port. On October 9, 
Guyana's Commissioner for Inland Revenue filed a writ in a'Guyana court' 
seeking payment of the bauxite levy and ordering Reynolds to, appear in 
•court on October 14.2/ Reynolds' lawyers appeared in court to hear • 
the'Government's Complaint and were given until October 28 to respond. 
During the week October 14-18, Reynolds laid off 428. persons.- or 
about 40 per cent of its Guyana work force. The Company said that it 
was forced into the temporary layoffs as a result of the Government's: 
restriction on shipment of calcined and chemical'grade bauxite.3/ ;A 
Guyana Government official described the layoffs as "an attempt to 
victimize innocent, workers".' Reynolds stated that the'temporary layoffs 
should not be1 regarded as any intention, of abandoning operations and 
that it' was only necessitated by the Government -embargo..4/• 
V • On October-29, Forbes Burnham addressed a mass public meeting: 
and said that the country must be ready for the possibility'that United ' 
States aid to Guyana might cease with the nationalization of Reynolds. 
He also warned that the United States might apply pressure at the ... 
World Bank to prevent Guyana from obtaining loans. According to the 
Financial Times (London), the comments reflected a stepped-up campaign . 
1/ Ibid. • . ; .• ' 
2/ "Reynolds and Guyana Still Sparring", Metals Week-, October... 14, 1974. 
J5/ "Reynolds Metals Idles 50 per cent óf Its Work Force-at•Guyana 
Mining Site", Wall Street Journal,' October 22, 1974* p. 10»' 
4/ Ibid. 
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by the -Government, -t°. gain support .for the bauxite-levy , and the ; . *, • 
nationalization plan.1/.-,.On October i.28r,.. .Reynolds' officials, had, appeared 
in court-1 and presented, their'.reasons -fp.ri no.t payi-a'g;<tbe--tax.-.- The .v-
court made. no< decision on the-cas e;.2/ ;; '". os .: : .. -,•. :•>.; -
-. •T.he-...a'ssetSi .&fs Reynolds Guyana' Mijxe-Si which, were, located, in Guyana . 
were nationalised by the.;.Government' of-Guyana;-on;, January;-l»r 19.75° jAn.- •.. 
agreement, relating.to settl.eme.ntrOf. compen.s.atioiii aia.d other. Issues ? 
was entered . into . among the OPTC (Overseas •Private;. Investment- Corporation,? 
a United--. States.̂ .Government- agenS-y) -, .-Reynolds;,Metals> Company, Reynolds-: 
Guyana^ Mines \and GiÛ ana- on December 31, 19-74-..; +r.,--<• -.,- .- ,-. j 
. Under the-, terms- .of .tlie. ag-re.p»<en$;,i-it!ayasa. î iii.̂ gjp̂ da.t© pay -. •>•; .-: 
million, dollars for the nationalised-; assets..-.Settlement of .claims 
between - Guyana-, and Reynolds; over -income tax: and. bauxite production; levies 
reduced, the net compensation to -be paid, tov10-million dollars. . .Court., 
eases relating to-these matters, were- discontinued..,. -:. Guyana issued. 
10 million dollars of its notes to OPIC, which carried the expropriation 
risk insurance on Reynolds1,investments ;follo-winf.- th,e-issuanfc£_;of 
these nOtes-s Reynolds received payment, ̂f.rpm ..OPIC .in:-the amount of 
10 million--doliars-, on February 20 , . 1.975:. »„; c , .- : i , -
(b) Sources ,pf.:Bauxite; for British-Alupjniijm Company . • . ,.,. • ? 
- ThenBritish Aluminium.. CompanyLtd. -(BACO), in.;which..Reynolds :.... 
holds a 48 per cent interest, has bauxite mijaing interests i^fhap^,,^'-; '>; 
Guinea; and. France-.: In-.-Guinea,-.-,-BACO.;owns • per pentvinterest.rin: the 
Fria. consortium. -In. the-1970stotal output,by the,,consortium.. £ a . s t >;; 
been, approximately two,million..tons of., bauxite.Alumina production,.-, 
from this^bauxite. was about 775,0PO tpns«-4 . .- ? -v.-
(c) --..New • sources;-o-f •-bauxite for -Reynolds . . - -.;; , r~-
. The-Government ;of Surinam,-;had. awarded,.Reynolds-, exploration and - ; • 
concession rightsfor bauxite .-in the Bakhuis area in-.an. agreement ¡signed 
August 31 »'-»1971, .which provided for a, joint venture; with the. Government-
1/ "GUyaiians waried United State's may^Cut Off A'id'S 'Financial 'Times' 
October 30,. 1974, ,.p»r;5.v j - - •.,-. . — ;•-, ... 
2/ i • ¡-Metals We.ek., rNovember.,;4f -1974., .p. 6«, ; . .. ; ,, • • 
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of Surinam:to exploré fór bauxite, ànd, if sufficient reservës'were 
discovered, for the - development and use of bauxite reserves'to produce 
alumina in Western Surinam. Another concession, was awarded by the 
Government of Surinam solely to Reynolds for exploration for bauxite 
in the Coppename area, and, if found in sufficient quantity, for the 
development and use of bauxite . to produce alumina in „Surinam.- - Under 
this agreement, the Government was granted optional rights to participate 
• i'ri the production of alumina from bauxite from the'.Coppename area. 
Sufficient bauxite had not been'discovered in the concession areas to1 
meet the requirements for the construction of an alumina plant.. Under' 
the terms of the agreement, Reynolds believed it was "entitled tóexport 
a portion of the bauxite:that it had discovered, but the-Government 
"•was • re luc tant to grant 'thefee rights. • 'The matter wàs rè'sOlved .in the ' 
fouf-th quarter of 1974, whereby Reynolds' agreed to rèlihquish these ' 
concession "rights' 'to the 'Government f o r 3,500,000 dollars to be paid. ; 
during 1975« '•"'• ; ..-.'. 
""' During 1974, the Company " joined a consortium with eight-'ô't'hèr 
companies including rALCAÑ Aluminium- Ltd., as the -Operating partner 
to mine bauxite in the Trombetas area of :the lower Amazon-River-Basin 
of Brazil. As a meaner-p£ 'thç. consortium»! -rècèivç :-'a ' 
minimum of 350*000 tons of bauxite a year commencing in 1977» Financing 
plans for 'this project have not yet been completed';,' - ••-'•"' 
In the United States, ' Reynold's has acquired property "containing' 
substantial tónhagé's of laterite which can be used for a limited number 
of yeafs in lieu o:f bauxite -as protection in the event of interruption-
of overseas bauxite supplies. During the year, Reynolds produced a 
trial commercial run of alumina ,in"domestic facilities from domestic 
laterite. This trial run demonstrated that the company can (although 
presently at higher costs for raw materials, transportation and- '• 
pro'ces-sing) produce alumina-!from laterite : in existing facilities.' In ' 
addition, Reynolds has acquired property containing several hundred 
million tons of clay and has accelerated its experimental wprk aimed 
at producing alumina from such domestic clay on an 'economic basis. 
Reynolds is also participating with seven other aluminum producers.in 
-'•-' /a United 
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a Uni;teá'̂ Stá€és Bureau, of Miñefe-programme for a/pilot plant, prop e ss 
for clay .and other-dòmestic.' alúmina bearing-tores.,:.-The mining.;pf 
lateriteand clay may require the èpproval of the various State, and., 
local; governmental agencies, .which?.Reynolds;:.:b£li.eyes it will- be $.ble 
to obtain» ' .As additional .protection-in .the'event- of interruption of. >-
existing'overseas^bauxite supplies, Reynolds;..has> entered into .,an • v v 
agreèmeht« ."dated December.!?, 1971 tf/rwitb'Commonwealth Aluminium • , . 
Corporation* Limited • (COMALCOà, sunder. which-.Reynolds.; has the optiqn0to 
purchasé from'COMALCD, from*T:its bauxite deposits .in-.Australia, up to .. 
50 million long tons of'bauxit.e, but: not exceeding thye? ;and one-half 
million; long tons„per.year. Under., the agreement,,, if Reynolds exercises 
its,option,1 COMALCO' Gould insist, upon'.': up; too two ¡years notice before. , 
delivery óf bauxite begins.,/Based'principally'upon;information by . 
COMALCO., Reynolds is satisfied;that these reserves are-available. -. 
..:•(d) Fabrication. ' -•>;•• ••. v. ... .y : . • - • . - : -. 
f-Reynolds ,is extensively, involved:: in .gtluminum fabricating»' aro.undy 
the: world:. . It -operates:- either., singly or... in; joint ventures,; in tbe. 
• fallowing:; countries-:.• United;.States-.(33s.plants), .'United .Kingdom; , -
(13 plants-)v Canadac (6. plants),:'. Wes.tt.-Germ&ny - (-2;.plants:) , Belgium-- ,v.» 
(k plants), Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Japan, Philippine¡5,- Venezuela,, 
"Colombia,-Mexico, India.,..Sri..Lánka.' c * ! 
4. Kaiser Álümiñuái and Chérò'ical Córftoràtlòfi ' ' u ' r " 
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) is the world's 
fourth largest producer of primary aluminum and fabricated aluminum 
products. The Company's operations through subsidiary and related 
companies include the mining of bauxite in three countries, the 
production of alumina from bauxite v i n four countries," thè recEuctTòn of 
alumina to aluminum in eight countries and*tRe fabrication: pf. aluminum 
and. aluminum-, álloysi ipto.:a variety .of. fabricated, prpduè.ts -, -in- twelve • ; 
countries. "Òf" the "major àlumìnum' prodüceVá o f the world, Kai&er is 
probably tlte -̂moeV-ài-^èsiiied- -Jwi-th' it's interests n,.agri'èui |urà| 
chemicals, refractories materiales, industrial chemicals, strontium,, 
international commodity trading, real esta'tf. ahd ̂shipping. " v . 
, ... /Kaiser was 
1Ö0, -
Kaiser-was originally incorporated in Delaware in .1940 as the 
Todd-California Shipbuilding Corp. - In 1941, the Company changed its 
nattier to Permanent© Metals Corp,-, and was engaged in shipbuilding and 
the "production of magnesium and refractory bricks.1/. During World- . 
War -Hi United States aluminum capacity was greatly expanded and. 
57 per cent of this expansion was in plants owned and financed by the 
United States Governments Following the war, ALCOA was prohibited from 
purchasing any of- the Government owned capacity. ..Other purchasers 
were sought. Attempts to induce other companies to purchase the 
Government smelters were unsuccessful until ALCOA agreed to: allow 
royalty-free use of patents and to provide new entrants with raw ','.'•• 
materials.2/ Permanente Metals Corp., then entered'the industry by . 
leasing'three smelters (total capacity 639,000 tons per year) from the 
Government which the Company later purchased.ALCOA provided 
Permanente with bauxite from Surinam.4/ Arrangements were made whereby 
Permanente was allowed to pay for the. aluminum smelters by ..shipping 
aluminum to the GiS.Ai stockpile as aluminum was considered to be a . 
strategic mineral bjr the American Government.5/. In. 1949, ..the Company 
name was changed to Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 
(a) Diversification ' 
Table 24 shows revenues by product for Kaiser. In 197.4, aluminum 
and aluminum related products accounted for 65.1 per cent of total 
revenues compared to 71.6 per cent in 1970 and 79 per cent in 1967» 
1/ Moodies industrial Manual 1§74, Moodies Investors Service Inc., 
: New Yorkj p. ,2689 " T""-••• . 
2/ • Charles River Associates\ An Economic Analysis of'.the Aluminum 
; Industry, Cambridge, Mass., March 1971, pp. 3-25,3-27. 
2/ United States^Bureau .of ..Mines,. Minerals Yearbook 1946,. 
Washington, D.C., p. 115« 
4/' Minerals Yearbook 1948/ 'P." 18?. 
5/ Minerals Yearbook"19^9, p; 117. ' 
/Table 22 
""'. ^ !'•:• f-- ' • - Table '24 , • ... ' \ > . 
KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL" COTi>SRATiONtVr'_l̂ 'VENUÊ ' Bf' PR0DUCT 
"(Millions of dollars) J ' ' 
" " - ; ' ' • - 1970 ' ' ' 1974 ' 
Primary Aluminum ,.. ' , f • »; •:. . 149 . .. , . ,vl84 :, 
% .„... .. ^ „ l6o3. .  10.4 
Fabricated Aluminum .. . 443 , 878 
% ' ' ' 48.4' • ' 49.7 
Other Aluminum-related * ' ' 63 ''' * ' ' l&9 ' 
•/ fo • .. =J ••: • •• • .,: •- 6.9 • > T- • 5 = 0 
Agricultural Ch'enti'cals .,:. . . 80 . l6l ; 
% . - . 807 . 9.1 
.Refractories 67 .139 
" % : " ' ' •••••••' ' ' ~ " • ' 7.3 1 7V9 
Industrial Chemicals ' 46 "'* ' 8l" 
% • • . . •• .••• !< .-•••.. •. 5.0 '4w:6 
Tracing •..?.. 11- ••• ̂  ti!;.: ' 195 
. . , . fr 1..2 11..0 
. Strontium . . . - . 3 
• - 0.2 
Other " "1, ^ \ •••• •»• 33 
%•: : • .7 : ,v • .'. • . ••;•." .' ,.6oO : - .2.1 
Total v :•..-.:•. r • 768-' 
% ''•' ' " •' • ''•""'' 10*6.0" 100.0 
Sources. Securities and.-Exchange Commission; Form.'lO^K, 1575, p. 1». ' 
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Agricultural chemicals accounted for 9.1 per cent of sales in 1974, 
and consisted principally of anhydrous ammonia, and derivatives which 
are used as fertilizers or in the production..of fertilizers solutions. 
Agricultural chemicals are marketed through 186 retail outlets in the 
United States, most of which are wholly-owned and through hundreds of 
"independent dealers.- Kaiser entered the agricultural chemicals 
industry through the acquisition of Southern Nitrogen Company in 1966.1/ 
Kaiser's refractories division produces heat and impact-resistant 
Refractory materials to line kilns and furnaces. Products include fire 
clay, high alumina and basic magnesia refractories. In 1974, 
refractories accounted for 7»9 per cent of Kaiser's sales. The Company 
is the fourth largest United States refractories producer. 
Kaiser's industrial chemicals division was formed in 1963, and 
manufactures and markets most of the chemicals required for alumina and 
aluminum production and also produces a number of specialty chemicals.. 
The division is the leading United States supplier of synthetic cryolite 
and the western world's second largest producer of aluminum fluoride.- ; 
These are the major chemicals used as bath materials in the aluminum 
reduction process. Caustic soda, another chemical used in the production 
of alumina and specialty aluminas, is also produced by the division. 
In 1974, sales of industrial chemicals amounted to 8l million dollars 
or4.6 per cent of,Kaiser's total revenues.2/ 
Kaiser Trading Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary formed in 
1969 which conducts worldwide commodities trading activities in a 
variety o f bulk products.withrparticular emphasis on metals,: minerals, 
and industrial and agricultural chemicals. Kaiser Trading Company is 
the worldwide seller of many of Kaiser's products but its major source 
of revenues (90 per cent in 1974) comes from initiating "third party" 
transactions, i.e., locating new markets for producers and new sources 
of supply for manufacturers. The growth of revenues of the Trading 
1/ Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, Profile, Company 
Publication, February 1974, p. 13. 
• ; 2/..; Ibid.y p. 12« ; 
/division has 
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divison has been dramatic. From 11 mjllion dollars in 1970, sales have 
expanded to 195 million dollars in 19?4,or 11.0 per cent of Kaiser's 
total revenue." " v 
" Oth'ef "sSU'rcgs of revenue include "strontium products in Nova 
Scotia^ real estate projectsin Hawaii, California, Arizona and Guam; 
ocean shipping'-through Hendy.. International Company, a shipping management 
firm which transports chemicals, petroleum and a variety of bulk-ore 
cargoes; and exploration for and mining of non-bauxite minerals, 
(b) Integrated aluminum facilities 
(i) Bauxite mining, kaiser's bauxite mining operations are listed 
in table 25. Kaiser Bauxite'"Company in Jamaica is the company's oldest 
and largest source of bauxite. In 1947, the then Permanente'Metals Corp. 
began exploring, for bauxite in Jamaica and during the same year, purchased 
large tracts of land. In 1950, the Kaiser-Bauxite Company was*formed 
and ,construction of .mining facilities..began, th.e following year. Shipment*" 
of bauxite began in 1952, reached one million tons per year inl955> 
two million tons per year' in 1"957, and . four, million tons per year in 
1962. Kaiser Bauxite's original bauxite mining site was at Port Kaiser 
on the South Coast of Jamaica. Ore from this deposit was mined, dried 
and shipped from 1953 until 1967 whe.n operations were transferred to 
the North Coast. The'facilities' at Port "'Kaiiser now form part of ' tiie ' 
bauxite-alumina complex operated'by Alumina Partners of 'Jamaica (A'LPART), 
owned by a consortium comprising Kaiser, Reynolds," arid Anaconda. In 
1963, Kaiser announced plans to establish bauxite mining, drying and 
shipping facilities in the St. Ann/Trelawny area of the North Coast. 
A deep water port was constructed at Port Rhoades on Discovery Bay. 
The first shipment of bauxite occurred in January 1967. Currently the 
capacity of the Port Rhoades complex' is 4.5 million tons of bauxite 
per year.l/ All of the bauxite is shipped to Kaiser's United States 
alumina plants at Baton Rouge and Gramercy, Louisiana. 
1/ Kaiser Bauxite Company, Public Affairs Department, "Kaiser 
Bauxite — In Partnership with Jamaica", Company Publication, 
.1970. .,. , 
/Table 25 
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' - • 'J ' " : •:> Table 25' ' ' '' 
KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION: BAUXITE MINING 
Country Company 
• Kaiser's 







Jamaica Kaiser Bauxite Co. 49.0a/ 4 50Ó 4' 500 '54.6 ' 
Jamaica. ALPART 36.5V ' 3 200" 1 -150 13»9 
Australia Ç0MALC0 45.Oc/ 10 GQO 2 500 30.3 
India Hindustan Aluminum ; 27.Od/ '375 10Ò 1.2 
:Total - 15 075. 8 250 100.0 
Sources: 1. Securities and.Exchange Commission, Form 10-K for Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corp.,'for the year ending December 31» '' 
-1974, pp. - 2-5*.- . . , ; 
2. United States Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook 1972, 
Washington,1 D.C., pp. 137f!l!149-152, 191", 200-201. 
3° Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp», Profile, Company . -
publication, February 1974. 
a/ Government of Jamaica - 51 per cent. 
b/ Reynolds Metal Company - 36.5 per cent, Anaconda Company - 27 per cent, 
c/ Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd. - 45 per cent, public - 10 per cent, 
d/ Birla and Indian interests - 73 per cent. 
/Kaiser Bauxite 
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• 'Kaiser Bauxit e: Company owns the-land'oil which it è'bauxite reserves 
are.lofcàted, but under ' Jamäican iaw the b'aùxitV iéyòfonèd by the 
Government and' cannot bé -minéd • excèp't'• under Government- leàsé'. In 
1974, Kàié'ér's leäöe still had 25 ye'kiM'to ' ruh. "'Under thè'nèw law on 
production levies -in-Janiaicà (séè pàgés-"-59, "60 and°90 för details)« 
Kaiser paid'a total levy bf 54 millioà dollars for- 1974'which included 
Kaiser Bauxite-Company''s payment" (ap^ròxifnatély ' 43-inillaòà dollars and 
Kaiser's share of ÄLPART's ¿payment 'Càf>próximàt eiy : 11 million''dollars)«» 
In the fall of 1974, preliminary,, agrèemèht was:inégotisiÌed by 
Kaiser Bauxite with the Government of Jamaica containing-thè following 
points;!/ •• .•• •;.£ • ' -••• 
(i) Kaiser Bauxite will "receive--rights'.to-à-40-£éaK''supply 
' " .. 5 c., -ba'uxit è sufficient for the Corporation's Gramercy and Baton 
Rouge' facilities'' operations, at their Resent product iòn,; '% 
v rates'. In-return--for thès-è rights, Kaiser -Bauxite will! ' " 
"<-r 'annually pay seven >per cent 'of the 'Government ' s "'purchase^' • 
price for the land under the mining lease«. " • 
, ¿ii' ) "Kaiiser Bauxite will- sell to 4he''Gové'-rnmerit for book value 
'. ' • (approximately 12,000,000-dollar's) all of its bauxite lands,': 
'. resettlement-lands, and*'other ".'property not required -for plant 
- op era-tip n.s'o Payment willing received-over a. 1-year period 
with a seven- per cent' annual interest rate. 
, ,'(i-ii) - Kaiser'Bauxit-e will sell 51- per cent- of its mining-assets • •' 
• • to the" Government of Jamaica for book" balue (approximately 
• •; *. .v . 16,000,000 dollars.). -Shis -"¿mount"- would' also be paid?-to Kaiser 
, ' Bauxite oVer -a lO-year'-period-1'at '8v5 per cent interest5.'''It ' 
-'-•'was agreed that both Kaiser 'Bauxite and''thè Government will '-" 
••"•' - form a-new" partnership',in order to f6arry.- out mining activities. 
The new partnership will have an executive committee with 
equal voting rights for Kaiser Bauxite and the Gòverhmént. 
, Kaiser Bauxite w'iî , manage . t^e ( operation under a-»m£inagement 
1/ Securities and Exchange Commission, ,Fò'rm"'rÌ0-K: fof"' Kaiser Aluminum 




agreement which will last, for seven years. Kaiser Bauxite 
.will receive baux.ite from the partnership at cost including., 
depreciation and w,ill pay, the; Jamaican Government a return, 
. of 12 per cent on its. investment«. Kaiser, Bauxite will 
; continue, to sell-bauxite to Kaiser Aluminum.. ., '..,.„., 
{iv) JThe production levy will remain at 7°5 per. cent of the 
. realizedi price for primary aluminum for, 1975, 1976 and 1977« 
.For 1978 andv1979, the production.levy will be one per cent 
less than the percentage provided under,Jamaican law at the 
, • ., time. 
As stated earlier, ALPART produced about two million tons of;. ;. .. 
bauxite in 1970 and .about 3.2 million tons in 1974.1/-. The alumina plant 
has had operating. problems ai}d has not managed , to produce ^t . its rated 
capacity and.as a result bauxite production has also been, at less than 
capacity. Kaiser's share, like Reynplds', in.ALPART's output of bauxite 
is identical to the Company's equity share, . i. e., .36.5 per cent, or 
about 1,150,000 tons in 1974. . • 
As ̂ mentioned earlier, in 1956the Commonwealth .-Aluminum Corp., 
(Pty.) (COMALCO). disclosed that a huge bauxite discovery had been made 
in Queensland, Australia. Early reports set reserves at "many hundreds 
of million tons".2/ COMALCO was opera-ted as a. joint venture, with 
British Aluminum Company and Consolidated Zinc Corporation,, originally 
each.holding a 50 per. cent interest. In I960, Consolidated Zinc. Corp., 
purchased(British Aluminum's share thereby dissolving their partnership. 
The same year, Kaiser, joined with Consolidated Zinc as: an equal partner 
to undertake the establishment.of an integrated aluminum industry in 
Australia and New Zealand. The new partnership was named COMALCO 
Industries Pty. Ltd.. 3/, In 1961, COMALCO purchased a .^mall-aluminum 
1/ Calculated from data supplied by: Economics'and Statistics 
-¡„Division, Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources, Government 
of Jamaica. 
2/ Minerals Yearbook 1956, pp. 250-251, see also pages 48-4-9. 
3/" Minerals Yearbook I960, p.' 249. . 
/smelter and 
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smelter arid alumina refinery at Beli vBayi'Tasmania fr'om táe' Government' 
of Tasmaniani/'" In 1'96¿Í mining bëgari'at the COMALCO deposit and by' * 
the middle of 196?, the Bell Bay iefi'nery was receiving all of its 
bauxite requirements from COMÎALCO." The' Company also contracted to 
ship"600,000 tons of bauxite per year to Japan for the three-year period 
1963-1966. ' ' "'"'f ' ' ' r': 
In 1963, a new company, Queensland Alumina Ltd., was:formed as" 
a consortium consisting'of Kaiser,"Conzinc Rió Tinto'òf Australia Ltd. , 
Aluminium Ltd., of Canada,'*Péchiney and COMALCO. In 1964, a loan of 
11? miïi'ioû" d'oliare was acquired from 11 United States banks headed by the 
Mellon National Bank and Trust as interim financé for an alumina plant 
to be"built fey Queensland Alumina Ltd., (QAL).'-• The-alumina-plant was 
to be supplied with alumina from the CÒMALC0 deposit.2/ QÀL came on 
stream in 1967 at a capacity of 600,000 tons per yéar. In Ï968, capacity 
was increased to ábout"1,000,000 tons ,pèr'* year and by the end of 197Ò,' 
capacity was 1,428;ÒÒÒ tons" per year. Capacity remained stable' "for two 
years'and then increased to 2,240,000 tons at the''end" óf 1973 and' ' ' 
2,688,000 tona at the end. of 197^-' Kaiser owns 32.3 per cént of QAL '" 
directly and'ê.2 per cent'indirectly ¿irice C0MÀLC& òwns 13.8 pfer cent ' 
of QAL. "In 1974, COMALCO produced about 10'milliòri tons of bauilíé. 
About 800',Ò00 tons'were' refined into" alumina arid1 ué'èd ' by Ú0MÁLC0's' 
affiliated smelters at Bell Bay and at Bluff, New Zealand.' Kaiser' 
Aluminum" bas a* call upon:$68,000 tons'per yéar of QAL's alumina capacity 
for the processing, essentially on a cost basis of bauxite purchased 
by Kaiser Aluminum from' thè COMALCO reserves.3/x 
Hindustan Aluminium Corp., Ltd., a Kaiser affiliate in'India, 
mines bauxite, refines alúmina and produces aluminum for local 
consumption. Káiser "shares'in the profits of this company but does not 
market the aluminum output through its international sales organization. 
1/ - Minerals - Yearbook 196l,;p.v3'23.; - ».' !' 
y Minerals. Yearbook 1^64, p? 264. 
¿/ Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, p. 3? 
« /In 1974, 
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In 197.4» Hindustan, Aluminium produced about 375,000 tons of bauxite. 
Kaiser's share by the.equity method was about 100,000 tons or 1.2 per 
cent of Kaiser's worldwide bauxite, supply. 
.A new. source of bauxite which is under investigation is located . 
..in.the Kibi region.of Ghana. Bauxite Alumina Study Co., Ltd., (BASCOL), 
a consortium consisting of Kaiser and Aluminum Resources Development 
Co., (ARDECO), has announced plans to build a. bauxite-alumina complex 
at a cost of 130-150 million dollar?. The planned initial capacity of 
the alumina plant is 600,000 tons per year,and is to rise eventually 
to 1,000,000 tons per year.l/ The alumina will be smelted by Kaiser's 
Volta Aluminium Company.2/ 
(ii) Alumina refining.: Alumina refining capacity is shown in 
table 26. Kaiser's United States alumina refineries located.at Gramercy, 
Louisiana and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, obtain bauxite from Kaiser 
Bauxite Co„, in Jamaica. These refineries have.capacities of 300,000 and 
1,025,000 tons of alumina per year. The alumina plant, operated by 
ALPART has an.annual capacity in excess of.1,000,000 tons per year. 
In 1970., ALPART. announced plans to expand..the refinery's capacity to 
1.3 million tons per year,, .. This expansion., has ..been deferred. due to lack 
of demand for aluminaW^/. In 1974, output was approximately 1.1 million 
tons." .When the , expansion ̂  is _ completed, Kais.er|s share of ALPART's 
output will be 475.,000 .tons...per year. . . : 
In Australia, Kaiser's affiliated/company, COMALCO, operates a '., 
small refinery at Bell Bay, Tasmania which, obtains bauxite from the • 
COMALCO "deposit. ' Kaiser'owns 32,3 per cent cf Queensland;Alumina," the 
world's largest alumina refiner^ with" a capacity of 2,688,000 ton's per 
year. Kaiser's share of this capacity is 86o,000 tons. COMALCO owns 
13.8 per cent, of Queensland Alumina and thereby has a Claim of • 
371,000 tons per year.4/ .. - ' 
1/ Minerals Yearbook 1972, Area Reports, Vol. Ill, p. 350. 
2/ • Quarterly Economic Review of Ghana, Sierra .Leone, Gambia, ̂  Liberia,. 
Annual Supplement 1973, Economist Intelligence Unit, pp. 8-9« 
j5/ Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, p. 2. • 
it/ Ibid., pp. 3-4." 
; . . . . /Table 26 
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. r ̂  ., ... ^ Table, 26 . . „ 
KAISER- ALUMINUM AND - CHEMICAL CORPORATION : .'ALUMINA • REFINING . r,:, 
t ; : 
r«„«4-v«r .Cprapçuay. Country ( l o c a t i o n) --<•--
Kais>eir -Alumina-
Equity, Capacity Kaiser's 
'• ' •' ' "'•-" '•' - • Share • -
% .. <000 :tpy), •• 




U.S.A. .„ Kaiser..- Gramercy 100.0. 800 
.'Kaiser - Baton 
Rouge „ • 
Jamaica ALPART - Na'in ' 
Australia Queensland Alumina 
COMALCO1' -" Beil"'Bay 





100.0 ' 1 025 
. •, ' ' ' . ' l. : • . : ' 
36.5a/ ; 1 30Ó 
'•32.3b/ 688 
'  4$ . Oc/' " 65 
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Source: See -taiblê  25-. •-••v:' ''-tU- -.,' 1 •••1. .' , >'••* - ? • - • ' . ; '• 
a/ Reynolds Metal Comapny - 36.5 per cent, Anaconda Company - 27 per cent 
b/ ALCAN Aluminium;: Ltd"* w. .2-2 'pè'r(-Ç'é'ntj, Pëchih'ey ̂  • 20 -i>érf cent', ' ; '. 
COMALCO - 13.8 per cent, Qonz-i.nc, Rio, Tinto. of Australia .Ltd. -.11.9-per, 
ceni;, 
c/ Conzinc Rio Tinto" of Australia Ltd. - 45 per cent, public 10 per cent. ' 
d/ Birla arid Indian interests'- 73 per cent. * "" r 
, • A. 
/In. India, 
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In India, Kaiser hodls a 27 per cent interest in the 182,000 ton 
per year alumina refinery of Hindustan Aluminium Corp. Kai.ser's share 
of Hindustan's capacity, by the equity method, is 50,000 tons per year 
or 1.4 per cent of Kaiser's alumina supply. 
(iii) Aluminum smelting. Aluminum smelting capacity of Kaiser and . 
its affiliated companies is shown in table 2?. Kaiser has interests 
in eleven smelters in eight countries. Total aluminum capacity of these 
smelters is 1,543,000 tons per year. The share of Kaiser and affiliated 
companies is 1,16?,000 tons per year. In Kaiser's 10-K Report to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Company states that its primary 
aluminum rated capacity at the end of 1974 was 937,000 tons. This 
figure includes only United States aluminum capacity plus Kaiser's 
share of the capacity of Volta Aluminium Company Ltd., Anglesey Aluminium 
Ltd., and Aluminium Bahrain. This indicates that Kaiaer-Preussag in 
Germany, COMALCO in Australia, and Hindustan Aluminium. £orp.., in India 
operate autonomously. ,. . 
Kaiser's international aluminum, capacity is distributed a&.'.', 
follows: United States -,62.1 per cent, Germany - 3«0 per cent, United 
Kingdom - 3.2 per cent, Ghana - 13-1 per cent, Bahrain - 2.0 per cent, 
India - 2.'4 per cent, Auétralia - 9.1 per cent and New Zeálañ'd - 5¿2 per;. 
Cent« '. • • •• . .',.• •'!':•< '>''.••.':•':.:."' iK 
Based on a smelter capacity of 1,-.543,000 tons per year, Kaiser's '•• 
Alumina requirements are approximately 2,930,000 tons per year. In the 
previous section, Kaiser's alumina availability was calculated to be " 
3,'650,000 tons per year* This places Kaiser in an.excess alumina supply 
situation. Some of this excéss alumina is used by the refractories 
división to manufacture "high alumina refractories, and by the industrial 
chemical division. Alumina is also sold- to "non-integrated aluminum 
producers such as Norandá which operates a 70,000 :tons per year aluminum 
smeltér 'at New Madrid, Missouri.!/ • 
1/ Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., Profile, Company document, 
..February 1974, p. 1. 
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Country Compaiiy








(location).-. ... •:• (00Ö -toils 
.. _ ;per y^ar) 
Share -, (where 
kpown) 
U.S.A. Kaiser r Chalmette, . 
Louisiana ' '1 -: ' 
100.0 ' 260 260 ' ' 22^3 Baton 
Rouge, 
Gramercy 
Kaiser - Ravenswood, -1 .1 West Virginia ---
• ! • • <* ' •• - ; 
100.0 177. 177 15.2 Baton 
Rouge, 
Gramercy 
Kaiser - Mead, 
Washington " ' 
100.0 206 206 17.7 QAL 
Kaiser - Tacoma', 
Washington- •;• . 
:loo.o 81- 81 6.9 • 
• -
QA'L- ' ' 
Germany ? .Kaiser - Preusgag .. 
Voerde ' . r 
• .-5.0.0a/ . 71. ,. 35 , • - .3.-0 . 
U.K.. Anglessy - New Wales, 
Scotland 1 




VALCfr Tema ' ' ' 
. ALBA ' -,•.,. 
• - 90.0c/ 
;'' "iti ' 
17.0d/ 
•"' ' 170; 
:>.:.rl32 
153 
• ' . v "i 
.. ,23 - , t . 
,13.1- • ALPARTy 
. U..S..A • .••*> " • •ri 
India Hindu-Stan;.--. .. - •• 
- Renjikoot 
27.OE/ • 28. . . . 2.4 Hinòustp". 
Australia COMALCO - Bell Bay 
• ! . • '.-- . . . ^«Of/ Ì06 '.« * 





Smelters Bluff g/ 
• v 123 ' 61 f- 5.2-: QAL 
Total ' - 1 543 • 1 167 lO'O.O 
Source: See table ,25° . • •.•;•, - , .. 
a/ Preussag, A.G.~, - • 5.0 per cent,;., b/.- Rio Tinto Zinc. Corp., Ltd., - 4 ? per 
ceat, British Insulated, Callender Cables, Ltd- -;l9.per cent; c/ Reynolds • 
Metals Co. - 10 per cent; d/ General Gable - 17 per cent, British Metals 
- 17 per cent, Western- •Metafls:."8.'5..per.-, cent,̂ .3re"t-t.o$ Inyestm'ents .-v.9.5 per 
cent, Electro-Kopper - 12 per cent, Bahrain Government - 19 per cent; 
e/ Birla and Indian Interests - 73 per cent; f/ Conainc Rio Tinto of 
Australia 45 per cent, Australian public - 10 per cent; «/ COMALCO 
ladustries » 5 0 per cent, Sumitomo Chemical Co. - 25 per cent, Showa Denko 
K.K. - 25 per cent. 
/The only 
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The only smelter expansion currently planned is a 50,000 ton per 
year expansion at Volt.a Aluminium Company to be completed in 1976 at 
an.estimated cost of 60 million dollars.1/ 
(iv) Aluminum fabricating. Fabricated aluminum products accounted 
for 49.7 per cent of Kaiser Aluminum's'< total revenue in 1974, compared 
to 10.4 per cent of primary aluminum ingot and 5«0 per cent for other 
aluminum related products. Kaiser operates 54 fabricating plants in 
twelve countries: United States (4l), Argentina (Ï), Australia (l), 
Belgium (1), Brazil (l), Canada (l), Germany (3), India CLJ, Switzerland 
(1), Thailand (l), Turkey (l), and United Kingdom (l). 
5« Revere Copper and 3rass Inc. 
Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated, a Maryland corporation, 
and its subsidiaries are engaged in the production and sale of non-
ferrous metal products in three classes: mill products, primary aluminum, 
and utensils and other products. The company is the largest American 
independent non-integrated producer of copper and brass mill products.. < 
It competes, with five integrated and approximately fifteen major non-
integrated fabricators. Revere is a medium sized producer and fabricator 
of aluminum., It competes with approximately ten other,full integrated 
producers of primary, aluminum and fabricated aluminum products.2/ 
. . In the early.1950s, the, Office of Défense Mobilization, fearing a '. . 
substantial shortage of aluminum, initiated an expansion programme oi 
aluminum capacity to meet the needs of the. Korean-War. Various compsni.er: 
were awarded accelerated five, year amortization certificates for 85 pVr 
cent; of the cost of expanded capacity. Total allocations, of expanded 
capacity by tjhe Office of Defense Mobilization amounted to 877,000 tine 
of which 110,000 tons were awarded.to Olin Mathieson.J/ 
1/ Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, p. 4. 
2/ Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K for Revere Copper 
and Brass inc., for. the year ended December 31, • 1974-, pp. 1-2» 
y • _ M.J. Peck, Competition in the Aluminum Industry, 1945-195^1 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, .Mass.,. 1961, pp. ,l4ïï̂ Ï50. 
/On August . 
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, ;0n August,3-935» "Revere filed an application, for {accelerated 1 
amortization certificates for an aluminum sme.ltinĝ plant.iof 60„000 ton,, 
capacity and ,for %n alumina plant of. 1,3,0,009 ton capacity» ".Revdre hä&s 
been an aluminum fabricator- for -several, years.,.Between 1950 and 1955, 
when aluminum ¡was in short supply,' Revere was forced to enter, into .large, 
long-term contracts to secure essential supplies.. These-contracts;,did • 
not involve .any; prif>e concessions to Revere.-. -At. that time, it became .'. 
clear to,,Rev-er.e',s,- management- .-that .the company,, would ultimately have tq r 
secure, .it«; .own squrc.e-of primary, aluminum.l/ . , . . . - r 
n As -shô wn in/tjable;-28.,,, ¿Revere generates roosj: of its.'revenue f.rom •. 
fabricated., products mad.%; o;f, copper, brass and aluminum» Like the other , 
four companies, Reyere/s ̂ prpfits,, in 1974 are substantially higher than . 
those of the previous few years. .•• - u • ... .-. - *:. 
Table 28 .-v..-: < • . :• 
REVERE COPPER AND' BRASS INCORPORATED: REVENUE %Y'PRODUCT 3 
(Millions' 6f dollars)' ; ' : ' 
. . • :.'" ... r 1 '••-.••: •• - . - .. . "i " • ' ' 
f' ; •  v. :: • ' : X97Ö •>'• • - •' " • iy?k 
Mill Products , . :a?8-»4. • 435.7 
% ' 84.8 84.2 
Primary Aluminum 23.7 31.9 
%• iv C-: - •. , . ii..- ' 6 - p 
Utensils-and Other : ' .-'"*•'• -v ? ' ££¿'2 '' "' " 49.9 
% „ ••;.'.- :•>:: <",:•••• .. .'- ; -.-- v . 8.0-. .. - ,, 9.>Q.v-.: 
Totals' "'•< • •'< '-•- ' •' 328.3 ; 1 517.5 
- ...". •• • • ' ' .' 1-1C1 1 'hi- ' 1 ' - " ' ' . , . • ' . ,'."..,•• I, ' ; , • „','.- 1 '-. ...i , 1 i'--,-.''-
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K for the fiscal 
year ended December 31, 1974, p. 4. 
1/ Ibid., p. 177 V" / " ' - "'"' " ' , ; ', 
/On September 
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On September 22, 1955, the Office of Defense Mobilization announced 
the closing of the expansion programme for aluminum capacity. Revere's 
application was rejected on the grounds that the current expansion 
objective had already been allotted. Shortly afterwards, Revere entered 
into a joint venture with Olih Mathieson. Ormet was formed in the fall of 
1955 and was oa'pitalized at'231 million dollars; of this sum 200 million 
dollars was a loan from•insurance companies and the remainder was 
contributed, equally-by Revere and Olin. Ormet planned to construct a 
180,000 ton smelting plant, 60,000 tons more than originally planned by 
Olin and a 345,000 ton alumina refinery at Burnsdie, La. Construction 
warS' scheduled for completion in 1958. Olin and Revere signed a 25-year 
agreement to take the ingot produced by Ormet at its'full cost of 
manufacture and these companies sold the metal in either ingot or 
fabricated form. Olin received 64 per cent of the ingot produced by 
Ormet and Revere received the remainder.1/ 
Ormet also constructed-a.rolling mill in Ohio -and¿purchased three 
bauxite cargo vessels. Bauxite was purchased under contract from the 
Dutch company, Billiton, a bauxite producer in Surinam.2/ 
In 1966, Revere negotiated a bauxite mining lease with the 
Government of Jamaica for 25 years with a guarantee of extension for a 
further 25 years, covering a 32? square mile area. In 1968* 'construction 
began on bauxite mining and drying facilities and a 220,000 ton per year 
alumina refinery in Jamaica, and also on ah aluminum smelting plant with 
capacity of 112,000 tons per year at Scottsboro, Alabama. The' combined • 
investment cost of these projects was 160 million dollars.3/ V 
The aluminum reduction plant at Scottsboro went on stream in 
December 1970,; but Used purchased alumina initially. Revere started 
1/ - Ibid., pp. 177-178. • 
2/ Revere Copper and Brass Inc., Annual'Report 1971, p« 10. 
y Ibid., p. 10. 
4/ In 1974, the net assets of Revere Jamaica Alumina Ltd., were 
valued at 97.3 million dollars of which 6l.l million was. ,covered by 
OPIC insurance against the risks of war and expropriation. . 
Securities and'Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, p. 4. 
/mining bauxite 
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mining bauxite in Jamaica in 1971 and began, producing alumina early 
in 1972o Production of bauxite and alumina at Revere Jamaica Alumina 
Ltd., has been as follows: 
Xe.ar...... ' .. ... 
. Bauxite Mined Alumina Refined 
000 short tons 
1971 41 
1972 s - -, .276 141 ' 
1973 450 187 " 
1974 507 : l86 : " • 
Source: Economics;.and Statistics Division, Ministry of 
"Mining and'Natural fregiTOrces, Jamaica. 
Table 29 shows, Revere's sources of bauxite and alumina in 1974. 
By 1974,» Ormet's alumina pfant ;-at Burnsidfe,- La.", had expanded !i'ts 
capacity to.6GQjQ.00 short tons per year 1/ and purchased approximately 
1,200,000 ShbYt "ton's" o'f"'bailXite from "BiTIitWili-•SilVili'dtfii* Reve't-e'S 
indirect share of this bauxite was 34 per cent or about 4O8,O£J0. 
Revere mined 507,000 tons of bauxite in Jamaica, accounting for: 55 per 
cent of Revere*:? bauxite-requirements. Capacity at the R̂ y-ere.. Jguiiaica 
Alumina Ltd.,- refinery is • 220,000. tons per year and..R.evê ;' s share of 
Ormet's capacity at Burnside, La., is 34 per cent or about 204,0.G.0!,itons 
per year. Thus.,..:Reveref̂ Jamaica Alumina Ltd., accounted for 52 per ceri-tl 
"of ITev¥re• s" 197^ '''"" " 
1/ Uni ted" Stat e'ë" Bti fëà'û" 0T"MÌìiès, Minerals Yearbook 1972, p? 191. 
' " •••;! '. Î; V..;'"'•/]{-:!• ".'-V . • v^bie 29 
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Table 29 










Supply ' % 000 8» t 9 
Bauxite Mining 
Jamaica Revere Jamaica 
Alumina Ltd. 
- Maggotty 100.0 507 507 55-0 
Surinam Orraet purchases 
from ..Billiton 1 200 . 4o8. . . 45.0 











% 000 S e t s Source 
Alumina.. Refining 
Jamaica. Revere Jamaica 
Alumina 
- Maggotty 10Ö.0 22Ö 220 ; 52.0 Jamaica 
U.S.A. Ormet - Burniside, 
... La. -. 
"• : 34.0 6oo '1 20 V 48.0 Surinam 








.. Share .. .. '•% of Revere's Alumina. . Source 
% 000 S o t o Aluminum 
Aluminum Smelting . 
U.S.A. Revere 
;• -v Scottsboro, Ala. 100.0 112 112 57.0 Jamaica 
U.S.A. Ormet Corp. 
- Hannibal, Ohio 34.0 : 250 8.5. 43.0 Louisiana 
Totals ¿§2 197 . 100.Q . .... .. 
Sources: 1. United States Bureau of'Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1972, pp. 137, 
' -191,- 200." - -•''• • r " ' -•'" 
2. Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K for Revere Copper 
and Brass Inc., for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1974. 
/In 1974, 
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>-. In 1974,r CONALCO.,-/ Inc. purchased- Olin's 50 'per cent , investment 
in Ormet- Corporation, Omet - Shipping,.Corporation a-pd 01 in»Revere Realty? 
Company-inow-CONALCO Revere Realty Company),,; a firjn which? squires. 
and lease.srn.few. iplknX. facilities to Ormet..- CONALCOialso exercised an . 
option-.it,acquired.'from Olin to.purchase for cash, at; cost,.;32 percent,, 
of th.e: capital stock,-.partnership interest and notes, owned by ¡Revere. ; . 
in the three corporations mentioned» Accordingly, Revere's percentage * 
ownership of capital stock, notes and its partnership interest were 
reduced to 34 per cent. An agreement between Revere, CONALCO and Ormet 
provides that Revere will continue to purchase 34 per cent and CONALCO 
66 per cent of all aluminum produced by Ormet and will pay, as the price 
of this aluminum, 34 per cent and 66 per cent respectively, of Ormet's 
annual costs.1/ 
On December 20, 1974 Revere Jamaica Alumina, Ltd., entered into 
an agreement in principle with the Government of Jamaica relating to 
bauxite mining and expansion of Revere's alumina operations in Jamaica. 
This agreement also provides for Revere Jamaica to sell its bauxite 
lands at net book value to the Government and for the Government to 
guarantee sufficient bauxite reserves for an expanded facility for an 
initial period of thirty years. 
As required by the agreement in principle, Revere has commissioned 
a feasibility study to be completed in. 1975 with respect .to expansion 
of the alumina plant. As a result of this commission, the company is 
to receive a special rebate from the production levy for 1974 of 
approximately 2,251,000 dollars which has been reflected in the 1974 
financial statements. Further rebates through 1978 are conditional 
primarily upon the expansion of the alumina plant. 
During 1974, Revere Jamaica Alumina, Ltd., also entered into a 
letter of intent with a consortium of six Japanese companies which may 
become a party to any expansion of the Jamaican alumina plant, subject 
to, among other things, the results of the feasibility study. 
1/ Securities and Exchart'ge Gommrssiott, Forin lO-K, p. 2:5» 
/Also, during 
- 1X8 
Also, during 1974 Bevere entered into a letter of intent with 
the same consortium of Japanese companies for the expansion of the 
Company's aluminum reduction plant located in Scottsboro, Alabama and 
has commissed a feasibility study for expansion to various levels of 
capacity. Thé outcome of any further agreements is subject to, among 
other things, the results Of this study which is to be completed in 
1975*1/ 
1/ Securities and Exchange Commission,. Form 10-K for ,Eevg.re...CQpp.er. and Brass Corp., for. the fiscal year ending December 31, 19?4, 
p. 24. 
Part III¡V- :"*',.- •'. - 1 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ̂ HE'IlJ. S.'AKD CANADIAN, 
ALUMINIUM. INDUSTRY. DEVELOPMENT, r 
By the early large transnational corporations controlled 
three quarters of the world's aluminium producing capacity. Among the, 
six were three. American-~basecl TNCs-—the Aluminium, Company of America 
(ALCOA), Reynolds Metals Company and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. 
The other,.three include a Canadian corporation, Aluminium Company of 
Canada (ALLAN), a. French—based TNC—Pechiney Compagnie .de Produits Chimique 
et Electrometallurgiques (PUK), and a Swiss—-based TNC—Schweizerisphes 
Aluminium ..A.G, (Alusuisse). All six. are highly integrated producers» .-, 
engaging in the bauxite.mining, production, of alumina.;and the .smelting of 
aluminium ingots., They,also.process the final ingots into aluminium . 
products. This section. i§ concerned with the evolution.of the firms . 
located in Western Hemisphere, from the early stages of the industry 
and stressing-the. .changes .which occurred. in th^ recerVt perip£! :0f sixties 
and seventies. 
In very broad:i;term3,; ;thr'efe ̂¿riod^'can;be ; ai§tin9uished in: the " 
development of •'the-ihdustryi- Frt)rii'ita bancepti6h''t(5 : the'fortiesthe-
'.'J est em Hemisphere mark et-was "mdrtopolized by two' vertically ¡integrated 
firms, O.S. ALCOA and its Gafteidian subsidiary ALCAN which were- isolated ' 
from European imports through a 'series1 of cartel arrangemehts. " i f 
The second stage of industry development ran between the outbreak-
of World War II and late 1950s. • The war requirements greatly increased 
the demand'for aluminium. Concert* of the U.S. government over its 
strategic importance, e.s well :as the monopoly power of ALCOA,, led to 
/measures which 
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measures which increased competition in the industry among the established 
and newly entering firms. This led to a scramble for mining concessions 
in the Caribbean countries, where,, inaddition, TNCs began to', consider 
the possibility of establishing processing capacities close to the 
source of bauxite. 
The third period runs from the end of 1250s to 1S?0s. During 
this recent period, a number of conditions led the Caribbean host 
countries to more active involvement in the bauxite production and 
processing. Althdugh factors' varied across different countries, several 
were of general importance, including the gaining of independence by a 
number of the countries and resulting development needs and programmes, 
the beginning of energy crisis in 1973 and the common position of 
developing countries towards a New International Economic Order. The 
foreign companies reacted to rising costs of production "and the risks 
evolving from hew host governments policies'with their own counter-strategies 
and greater cooperation amotig themselves (including joint ventures).' 
1. Beginnings of the Industry (1900 until Wortd War II) 
At the turn of the century, the North American aluminium industry 
was dominated by a single firm—the Aluminium Company of America (ALCOA). 
Founded in 1889 under the name the Pittsburgh Reduction Companyr the firm 
expanded rapidly, integrating both downstream into the manufacture of 
aluminium products and upstream towards.: the production of inputs. Such 
vertical integration-is. usually attributed to the firms attempt to 
enhance their market share, reducing the production risk and costs 
through greater productivity, technical complementarity and resource 
domination. ALCOA*s history suggests. • that such motives are complementary-
and determine the firm's behaviour. 
/initially all 
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Initially all ALCOA plants produced ̂aluminium by smelting alumina 
imported from England and Germany. In 1903, however, an alumina plant was 
established in Missouri which ;supplied mostof - the -.-aluminium smelting 
plants of the firm. Much of the initial impetus for the vertical 
. • <». ••»•. ...... - --• 
expansion resulted from the technological characteristic of the industry. 
..The .Pittsburgh Reduction .Company-(-hereon-ALCOA)~.develeped a new — -
technology for smelting aluminium, which used 1 significant amounts of 
electricity. For that reason much of the early expansion of the firm 
centered around the search for energy sources. ALCOA established a fully 
owned subsidiary in Canada, the Aluminium Company of Canada (ALCAN) and 
initiated there construction of hydroelectric plants serving the expansion 
-• -.-'.i i 
of aluminium producing capacity. In the same initial period of vertical ... *V;-. 
expansion, ALCOA entered bauxite mining, first, purchasing established 
plants in U.S. and, since 1916, acquiring bauxite deposits in. Guyana and 
Suriname (then British and Dutch Guiana) and later^ in several European 
countries. At the beginning of the forties the bauxite, production in 
each of the two Caribbean countries was higher than in U.S., the only 
producer country of Western Hemisphere during the first quarter of the, 
century (see table 30). 
By 1928 the decision was taken to split ALCOA and ALCAN (then 
Aluminium Limited), incorporating the subsidiary as an independent Canadian 
firmo The decision was based on a desire to achieve greater management 
efficiency, as well as, to solve a dispute over company control. Despite 
this separation, however, close links subsisted between the two companies; .-.'•i' i v. ' • • < 
. See,,.Paul.JC lark, . Rivers of .Aluminium-; The Story of - ALCAN. (Montreal'? 
ALCAN Limited, 1964). 
/Table 30 
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"" ' Table 30 
BAUXITE PRODUCTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
• • AND IN AUSTRALIA-(1900-1977) 
(Thousand tonsl 
USA, Jamaica Guyana Suriname Brazil -Australia 
1900 24 _ — 
1910 151 - - M» - -
1920 530 - 32 » -
1930 336 - 121 265' - 1 
1940 446 - 635 615 - 26 
1950 1 356 1 679 2 045 19 4 
1955 1 817 2 529 2 474 3 123 45 . 8 ir1 1 
1960 1 998 5 745 2 471 3 400 98 * 37 
1965 1 682 8 151 " 2 919 4 369 188 1 161 
1968 1 692 8 525 2 723 5 660 314 4 955 
1970 "S 115 12 009 •4417 6 022 510 ' 9 256 
1971 2 020 12 440 4 233 6 718 1 585 12 732 
1972 1 841 12 538 3 668 • 7 777 765 14 43?. 
1973 1 910 13 600 " 3 621 6 976 849 1? 595 
1974 1 980 15 327 3 606 6 864 "858, ' 19 994 
1975 1 800 11 570 3 829 • 4 750 - ' 969 21 003 
1976' 1 989 10 311 3 108 4 585 998 24 083 
197? 2 013 11 433 3 344 4 856 1 035 26 €70 ' - -
Source; Métal World Statistics, various issues. 
/among them 
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among;them propriety relationçhig-between the main shareholders pf the . 
two firms, and, specially, common control of bauxite mining, alumina and 
aluminium production and'ùorrèfepcìn̂ Ìĥ 'infraist3ructure in Canada ••' 
(hydroelectric -'plantât ''port f*àc'ii:ìfcies ântl ràilrriads, etcV)i" •'•''• • 
While first ALCOA, and later ÂLCAN, engaged in integration--upstpêdm •• 
into the mining stages,'flhial demdnd-5patt-erhs for aluminium led the firmò-' 
to integrate downstream into the production and divérsificeit-ìòh'; of final ' 
goods. In this initial period,'primary aluminiiim was a new prodùct1 
without a' great 'demand."' TW' lack ' -ó f 'a :si2a6i&''deSiahd'-fiSr-:alurainium- 1 ^ 
ingots led the Iridòstry into tHe fabrication df Wide rângë aluminium v 
products and'activ/e marketing to - stimulate-théir Usëi ' Since foundation . 
the companies fabricated light weight'prodijcts ('bicycle parts, reflectors, 
flashlight pàwders, bath tubs, été. ) and later"; éxpandiëd to intermediary 
...... . .. 1/ 
ones as'castings^ bars, plates,''sfteets,:'-'-tubesand•-v̂ re.' ; ' 
A' critical' factor in the growth of•ALCOA ànd :ALCAN:until World War II 
was thè isolation of'the-Wèstern Hemisphere riiàrket 'from European competition. 
This resulted from 'càrtel-'éfrangàìientà bétwèèrt AtCAf̂ '&nd -fcfte ma3or-
Eurtìpèanu'producers;: A'tótal• of siveiVcartel âf,rèngènfien't:&'Wé&é''-agreed upon 2/ 
between 1896 and-'fl926/:-/',,''Ih- addi t ion, 'Hnkàgfi'à 'tfètwtèeiv ÂLCAN'fcnerALJCQA-
allowed thé l a t e r comparé'- to}Vévfetdè' UiS* ' knti-t iHjst l l ^ i ^ l a t i o h *àîr«d- '•-..-
participate informally in the-'-fcartel- agreements.- ' '•'•' - - " •'• ¡.f " 
The outbreak of the World War II increased"substantially" the demand 
for aluminium and led to the'entry of new companies in-the industry with "'-k' 
the resulting expansion of bauxite sourcing. These changes are* examined 
in the following part of this overview.• J- . '•• 
' • • • • l i ' -s- • "i .-.J. . . i . : ; . 
1/ See, Paul Clark, quoted'above. '' <->•; -jnS in 
2/ For details see part 1.5 on p. 21 above. /2. Reduction in 
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2. Reduction in concentration and rifevT forms of competition ff94Q-1960) 
As a result of the sudden increase in denand during the World War I I 
production of primary aluminium in U.S.A. and Canada increased, between 
1940 and 1945, at an annual average growth rate of 18% meanwhile in the 
occupied Western Europe it fell by 29°/0 yearly in the same period (see table 
31). .The expansion of the strategic'aluminium industry in the Western 
Hemisphere had beerv-promoted by the-allied governments of U.S.A,, Canada 
and United Kingdom through financial contributions,, deferred taxes and 
special depreciation, allowed to new construction. Additionally, the 
U.S. goverrurient had acquired during "the war a considerable aluminium 
production'capacity. Concerned aboutthe degreeof*concentration withinj ,..•: 
the industry, the U.S. government decided after.the war to,sell its .. 
facilities to Reynolds. Metal and .Kaiser: Aluminium and Chemical Corp. who . . 
became in this way the third and fourth major primary aluminium producers 
in the region (see table 32). .In addition,, ALCOA was forced to release : 
patents and other technical assistance to,them. The support.of the 
strategically important aluminium industry by U.S; government continued;in 
the post'war period with the beginning, of. the Korean War, when the aluminium 
companies were awarded accelerated five year amortization certificates 
covering over 85% of the cost of new construction. • „ •. < 
The transnational corporations in the industry reacted in.a variety 
of ways to-these developments. From the beginning, and even after the.,;, . 
legal sejparation of the two corporations in 1928, ALCAN had beena supplier 
of primary aluminium to ALCOA. When faced with the more competitive 
conditions in the industry in the 1950s, ALCAN intended to continue 
playing the role of supplier of primary aluminium to the industry, as a 
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1900 3.2 4.1 7.3 • • » . 0 o 
1910 19.6 24.2 43.8 19. S 19.4 19.7 
1920 74.6 51.6 126.2 ' ' Ù.3 7.9 11.2 
1930 138.6 130.1 268.9 6.4 9.7 7.9 
1940 266.1 332.2 783.2 ; 7.5 11.7 11.3 
1945 645.1 112.2 869.2 17.7 -29.0 1.8 
1950 1 011.9 245. ? 1 506.9 ' 9.4 17.0 11.7 
1955 . 1 971^7 . -. 543.8 -• 3 • i04ï 7" 14.'3 - 17.2 ' 15.'6 
1960 2 518.5 659.9 4 547. 0 • • ;5. o . 9.6 8.0 
1965 3 252.2 1 278.3 6 591.7 5.2 8.3 7.7 
1970 4 569.6 2 015.1 8' 055.9 7.0 9.5 4.1 
1975 4 397. 1 3 232.9 9 898.2 -0.8 9.9 4.2 
1977 5 093.9 3 490.3 11 313.5 7.6 3.9 6.9 




WESTERN HEMISPHERE: DISTRIBUTION, OE TOTAL ALUMINIUM.PRODUCTION,.PAPACITY 
AMONG 4 MAlW ,COMPAi\l IES ( 1956-1S74) .. , / . 
(Percentage of total Western Hemisphere) 
.1956 '.<•• 1961 ' 1965 1970 1974 
ALCAN 29.1 23.4 21.9 1.8.6 .16.8 
ALCOA 29.8 25.4 25.7 24.1, 25.5 
Reynolds . 18.4 20.9 19.6 , . 20.3 18.6 
Kaiser 18.8 18.1 17.6 . 12.9 17.3 
Sources Minerals Yearbook, various issues. 
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in the industry, however, did not accept this division of labor and the 
post war period was characterized by significant competition, using the 
opportunities given by the anti-trust policies of the United. States 
government. By 1955 the ALCOA1s share in?the Wester Hemisphere aluminium 
production capacity was almost equal to that of ALCAN (29 and 30%), 
meanwhile Reynolds and Kaiser reached 18 and 19% respectively. At the 
beginning of 1960s the participation of ALCAN and ALCOA;further decreased. . 
in favor of smaller companies (see again table 32). . 
The competition among the principal firms led to efforts to control 
sources of bauxite and to reducë Operating costs. By ±he early 1950s 
Reynolds had obtainèd concessions-in Haiti, Jamaica and.Guyana; and. Kaiser 
had formed the Kaiser Bsiuxite Company in Jamaica. -In 1956 Costa -Rica 
awarded exploration permits:to ALCOA, Reynolds and Kaiser and large scale 
explorations also had begun in Australia, where, by 1960 th&bauxite 
production reached only 37 000 tons {see again table 1). ALCOA began 
to obtain bauxite producing territory worldwide and, in particular, 
in the Caribbean countries. During the decade of 1950s the mining of 
bauxite in three Caribbean countries, Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname, 
increased more than three times (from 3.7 to 11.6 millions of tons., 
see again table 1), 
Competitive pressures in the industry led also to efforts to 
reduce the costs of the production process through the establishment 
of alumina refining plants in Caribbean countries. The.-principal 
benefit of refining in the host countries came from the. reduced 
transport costs through shipping alumina rather than bauxite to aluminium 
smelters. ^ 
\j It requires between 2 and 3 tons of bauxite (depending on its quality) 
to produce 1 ton of alumina. 
/ALCOA constructed 
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ALCOA constructed an alumina plant in Jamaica -in, .1952 and . . 
completed a second one th©re/in\1956.s. ALCAN's Oemba Corporation, located . 
in Guyana, constructed an alumina.-¿plant in that country in 1951. In 
spite of this partial relocation of processing capacities their importance 
had been still 'marginal» -¡This may be illustrated by the fact that many .. . 
years later, in 1974, Jamaica accounted only for 1 T/o of ALCAN's alumina 
refining capacity (compared with .03% ¡in-the United States and ,21% in 
Australia), meanwhile her share in bauxite resources p.f. this firm -was 
almost 'double (19°/O). In the same year Guyana'S alumina production, • 
reached drily 311 000- long tons., which is one.nineth that ,of Jamaica, 
although the respective relation,in:the bauxite production of the two 
countries had beeti 1:5 (see tables 7, 12 and 13 in Part II. .above). 
Furthermore, the TNCs had been able, in that period, to extract-
considerable concessions'from.colonial administrations whose, representatives 
defended the world-wide interests of industrialized countries and their 
companies' rather than the development and. diversification needs of . the 
plantation-economies' of Caribbean region. An examination of . 
just two of the-agreements signed-in that period indicates the degree 
1/ 
of concessions obtained, —* . . •-... ..>••;-' 
The case of ALCOA's 1958 Brokopondo Project in Suriname is -
particularly interesting. The local authorities wanted not only to. refine 
the bauxite into alumina within the country, but also construct a 
hydroelectric complex with which it would be possible ,to produce 
aluminium, as it had been Suggested in a World Bank (IBRD) study in 1952. 
\J For a detailed analysis of various agreements, see N. Girvan, 
"Making the Rules of the Game: Company-Country Agreements in the 
Bauxite Industry", Social and Economic Studies, December, 1971. . 
/In-order 
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In order to determine the magnitude.of concessions obtained by ALCOA, the 
terms of the contract may be compared with previous Surinamese legislation. 
Suriname normally granted • an > exploration license for a; threer-year .period-
over a maximum area'of 20-000 hectare^; the Brokopondp agreement gave, 
ALCOA exclusive rights for'a 10 year period oyer an area up to 500,000 
hectares. Similarly, a mining license was usually granted for a period up 
to forty years and limited to.'2 000 hectares; . the Brokopondo agreement 
gives the company a 75 year operating rights and covers, a maximum of 
20 000 hectares. In addition, the company was granted a 45 years extension 
of its mining rights on existing concessiqns. ALCOA also obtained a number 
of concessions concerning' taxes.and costs of construction of the processing 
facilities. The government.had to bear all thfncosts of the infrastructure! 
development, provide land for the construction[ afr-.thje,facilities, exempt 
the company from import.and export duties: on products.related to. the 
construction and- production of the smelter and hydroelectric facilities and 
establish differentia! taxes .on the activities of- the.company; 35°/o on 
profits of the bauxite mining operations a.nd 30°/q. on alumina production. 
This latter arrangement' was'aimed at ̂shifting .the companies, towards local 
fabrication. . V1 . . 
Similar agreement^'were signed between the ALCAN company Oemba and 
1 / '• i the British governor of Guyana. ~ The terms included a 50 year lease. 
of"the land to be exploredj the option for a „25 year renewal, a 5 year 
tax-holiday and an'agreement that all special start-up: and depreciation 
allowances would begin after the end of the 5 year, tax holiday,. 
thus reducing-the taxable-profits earned by... the company.,. 
\j It will be recalled that throughout the text, cblonial names have . 
been replaced with .these .-adopted by the,new independent states. 
/3. Further diversification 
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The trend towards diversification of the industry continued, in the . 
1960s. In United Steités,' a number of mining companies began to move into 
the aluminium industry. Both Anaconda Copper and Revere Copper and 
Brass Company joined the aluminium market in the late 196Qs.i' To a large-
extent, this shift within the raw material sectors had tei do with the 
diversification in the copper industry, possibilities of substitution 
between aluminium and copper, and the desire of the copper TNCs: to gain 
a foothold in the aluminium industry. '"•' '• • 
The decreased'concentration in the industry and greater competition 
among firms tended to reduce their bargaining capacity vis-a-vis the 
host governments« Recognizing this, the TNCs, as had done in the past, 
adopted a series of policies aimed àt cooperation and joint sharing, of 
the rents and risks of the industry. Joint Ventures, by the late 1960s, 
appeared to be the dominant form of cooperation among firms. In 1966, for 
example, three of major TNCs—Reynolds, Kaiser and Anaconda—joined to 
form a new firm, ALPART, in Jamaica for the mining of bauxite. ' At that 
time, ALCAN was the only other aluminium TNC operating in Jamaica. . This 
exclusivity was also challenged by ALCOA, which established an alumina 
plant in 1968 and by Revere Copper Corporation in 1970. In Suriname, the < 
two major TNCs—ALCOA and ALCAN—joined with Billiton and Ornet (the latter 
being a joint corporation "of Revere Copper'and Brass' and Olin Corporation)., 
to build an aluminium smelter. In addition,, ALCOA joined with the largest. .. 
French producer of aluminium—-PUK—to form1 a joint venture in Suriname. 
Such joint ventures reduced competition and also the initial large 
cost of establishment of mining and processing facilities to any one 
TNC which is of particular importanefor smaller firms. In addition, 
/the joint 
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the joint ventures led .to spreading the political risk across a number 
of corporations. Threats of political pressures or nationalization were > 
born by a group of transnational corporations rather-than just one. 
By this period, a number of Caribbean countries had recently^gained independence 
and were making an effort, tci influence the behaviour of the TNCs located 
within the economies of therregion. Their political'will to extract a 
larger share of the industry quasi-rent to meet the development needs and 
increase sovereignty over théir natural resdurces induced, changes in 
host countries policies.and consequent reactions on the part of .the 
foreign firms. Becausevof the new goals of the host governments, a more ;. 
careful examination of their bargaining capacity is apprqpriate. 
The bargaining capacity of the'host countries, is related, 'among ..-
other factorsj to the interaction among, the TNCs in the industry,,aswell 
as to the vulnerability of the countries to;pressures from the foreign«, ;; 
firms. 'The first aspect has;been characterized in the first three sections. 
The latter one depends highly on the role .-.of the TfCs in the economy , of 
host countries. ., 
Some aspects of the importance of bauxite industry in the economies of 
Guyana and Jamaica at the beginning of 1S7Qs 
The foreign firms contribute to. the generation of the. host country 
GNP particularly through export-income, employment, and budget income of 
the government. The morei'important the foreign firm's; participation in 
"-eàch of those aspects of ¡economic' activity,, the greater will -be the its 
bargaining'power. " '• ' . •..-:.. : -•<'.;• 
Rather than examine all' Caribbean .bauxite producing countries, only 
two of them have been selected for analysis—Jamaica and Guyana, countries 
/engaged in 
engaged in a major conflict with the aluminium producing TfCs in the 
post-Oòlonial period. . , . 
In both, Jamaica and Guyana, after the service sector,(including 
various activities such as construction, distribution, and transport). 
the mining sector has traditionally been the next important activity 
in the countries GNP. On the Other hand, throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
the diversification of the., two- Caribbean economies was under way with 
increasing"importance of manufacturing, particularly in Jamaica (see table,33). 
Considering sources of labor absorption, the mining sector of the 
two countries plays a minor role. Oue to the high capital intensity 
of the industry; only a relatively, snail percentage of total labor force 
is employed in mining. In the middle of 1970s that level in Guyana had 
been 14% while in Jamaica only 1% that is~in both countries—much. less , 
than in other two productive sector, agriculture and manufacturing (see . 
table 34). Thé multiplier effects of. .bauxite mining seem to.be limited 
to the backward linkages with other.inputs, like water,, energy, and 
timber, construction activities, (including corresponding infrastructure 
in roads, ports and other transportation facilities) and, finally, the 
overall' impact on balance of payments, governmental budget, wage and 
1/' • ' — ' - - ' U U : - , .  . 
salaries level, — etc. 
Where thè TNCs have their greatest impact on the producing countries 
is their contribution to the foreign exchange earnings. In the middle 
of 1970sY the share of-bauxite and alumina in total exports reached 
about 70°/o in Jamaica and one third in Guyana (see table 35), The substantial 
increase of export earnings in Jamaica has been related with the coming 
on stream of new production capacities in alumina in the late 1960s. 





GUYANA AND. ßY ECONOMIE -(.1960-74): 
'.(¿1 Jiercentage] . 
1960 ' 196Ö*" 1970 1972 1974 
- , . •• 
Agriculture 26.2 21.7 19.3 19.8 30.5 
Mining^ 11.1. 17.2 > ,20.4 18.4 13.4 
Manufacturing 10.4 12.4 " 12.2 12.2 13.6 
• Services a/ 52.3 48,2 - 48.1 49.6 42.6 
JAMAICA 
Agriculture 12.0 11.0 8.1 7.4 7.1 
Mining«' 9.6 v 15.0 • 15.2 8.5 13.2 
Manufacturing 13.6 15.2 13.6 16.8 17.0 
" Servlc'es'b/ 
e a * 
63.0 • "' 48. Ì 1 Ö1.4 'SÉ.'"1? 53.3 
Construction 11.Q 10.7 11.7 10.6- 9.4 
Source: Various Economic Surveys of CEPAL. 
a/ Includes construction, distribution, transportation, financial 
services and others. 
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21.9 ; .24,2. 
13.5. . 35.7 
55.7. 
- , . 17.3 . ;23.0fr ,30*5 ,. , 46.5- , 77.Q. 49»3 
19.a , . . . 46.6 .41.;0, . 84.a ..; 54.,1 ir. '133.3 53.8 
23.2 , .. ; . 6 9 . 3 .52,1 9.1.8,, 1 3 3 . 0 « ,. 224*8 ,,6.7e7 
13.P , , 6 3 . . 4 3 . - 1 . . 1 ,64.6 ; .150, 3 234.-9 63«.S 
20.5 . .68.7 - 33. D 132.8 358.3 „ 491.1 70,8 
Source: See table 33. 
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The selected indicators3 analyzed above, exemplify the persistent 
high level of dependence of Caribbean host countries on bauxite and 
alumina production arid export and, at the same time, the importance of à 
more complex development of their natural rëëburces, including processing 
and fabricating activities» The previous overview of the Western Hemisphere 
aluminium- industry development- and its-expansion and operating conditions' * 
in Ceribbeàh countries in the colonial -period̂  demonstrated, on- the other 
hancj, the low. share of host, economies in the.-overall benefits born by the 
industry development. "It is therefore logical, that tfi'e gaining of 
' political independence (in 1962 in Jamaica, 1966' in Guyana and 1975' in 
Suriname) brought the new nation-states greater possibilities for • 
exploiting their bargaining power vis-à-vis the tNCs and a new formulation 
of their policy goals in a broader context of the development strategies. 
The subsequent renegotiations'ând lègàlly imposed changes of previous 
arrangements and contracts with, the foreign companies led,to,contradictions 
and conflicts among both parties with not always completely conclusive 
results, at least in a short term perspective. Some of the important 
issues of this new period in TNC-government interface will be overviewed 
in the last part of this paper. 
/Part IV 
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: ' Part IV ^ ' : '.--»..i •> • 
. BARGAINING SITUATION AND.GOVERNMENTS POLIE-IES IN 1970s'-' - ' 
In this part an overview will be given of .the .aluminium TIMCs .,. . ..., 
strategies in Caribbean countries, the new policy objectives of host . 
governments and companies counter. str$jtegi,es. .. .finally.,. . after. summing up . , 
the changes which occured ir̂  the bargaining .balance between transnatiorials 
and Caribbean governments throughout the 1970s, the renegotiations in 
Guyana and .Jamaica will be examined with some, more detail, ... :: 
a) Transnational corporation sin the colonial' period Vs' / : 
In the colonial period, initiatives came almost exclusively from >'' 
the side of the'foreign compani-ès seeking favourable access vtó mineral 
raw materials in Caribbean countries»^ Thè objectives of the TNCs may be-
synthetisized in a following ways ? ' ' ' 
i) To secure rights of exploration and exploitation over as large 
an area and as long a time as possible and on. exclusive, or monopoly 
terms in order to pfexempt effectively, those resource,Si that. is. to t block., 
access to rival or potentially-.riyal.compani.esy . . 
ii) To insulate such, arrangement̂ ..to the maximum degree, possible... . 
from the exercise of the existing local.. legislative power by the.device of 
long term contractual agreements and specifically providing for. arbitration 
of disputes in the courts of the homp.country or by .international bodies 
outside the reach of the host country's jurisdiction, ... .. . 
/iii) To minimize 
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iii) To minimize the likelihood of disputes, under such contractual 
arrangements, by requiring the inclusion of provisions covering as many 
details as possible,.-frequehtly including also such matters as hiring 
policies, royalties, taxes or exemption from taxes, freedom from restrictions 
concerning foreign exchange transactions, etc. 
When presséd for renegotiation" of agreements, companies were willing 
to yield on such matters as" increased local participation in middle level 
management, and also on matters of royalties and taxes to be paid to" the 
governments. Furthermore, they'have been willing to undertake higher 
level of bauxite processing, particularly when it implied a reduction of 
production and transportation costs. 
Ultimately all disputes concerned, in a minor or greater degree, the 
relative division of effective control between the two parties.' Ifjthe 
company considers the emerging.risk to loose effective control of its local 
activities in favour of the hoat.-country and, if it was, able to transfer 
its sourcing to, other locations,, it would divest its assets in the 
respective host country. 
b) New objectives and policies of host government 
In recent years, initiatives to change the established "rules of game" 
have come increasingly from the governments of host countries, particularly 
where foreign companies had an important capital investment and have 
been operating in terms considered unfavourable by the governments of " 
producer countries.' In other words, where past and current economic rents are 
at a level which permits a redressing of the unequal balance of benefits 
without subjecting the company to competitive pressure of other TNCs, the' 
host countries will demand a better deal. 
/The bargaining 
139 
The bargaining objectives and policies"of host countries include 
the following: ' ' ' 
i) the establishment of the principle'bf national sovereignty over 
natural resources and the primacy of1 this principle over all contractual 
agreements acceeded to by previous governments in their dealings wi'th 
the companies. ' ' r 
ii) The securing of a greater degree of bauxite processing within 
the host country on terms, which ensure that the country gets a larger 
share of the "value added". 
iii) The obtaining of a larger share olf the industry rents by the 
. . . . . . J . ;. . , . • ' • . 
imposition of higher royalties, taxes or levies oh'the production or 
export of the mineral, whether in raw or semi-processed, form. ' Experience 
has shown that corporate-allocstive and; .transfer-pricing practices pose 
difficulties concerning1 the collection .of income taxes from the processing 
operations. For this ,and: other reasons1-some countries are moving towards 
joint ventures'.-or-wholly owned national processing facilities. ; ' 
iv) Demand for. disclosure.; of operating and financial, information.'with 
respective legal, sanctions. . i .: • • {. >-•;.• 
v) Demand for the employment of nationals in senior as well, as 
middle level management -positions, r . . . . " 
: vi) The lowering or supression of. the companies monopoly'over shipping 
of the export products and consequent: transfer pricing, with respect'to v-
freight; removing this way also the obstacles, in marketing of minerals', . .i 
belonging to . the government (by ..virtue of. joint ventures-of wholly-owned 
public enterprises). 'v •-./.. .. . 
vii) In the case of negotiations concerning the acquisition b)/ the _ 
government-of all, or part., pf the., equity of-.-JNGs in the host country* 
the government tries'to bargain Ih terms of compensation, for declared' 
/book value 
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book value as .a base for evaluation of assets, — the longest repayment 
period possible, the lowest rate of interest on the balance owed to the 
company, the most favourable arrangements .concerning. foreign exchange : 
availability and, eventually,, future 14.nkag.es with the company in marketing, 
investment,. etc. /see point viii) below, J*.. 
viii) When negotiating with TNCs for new ventures and investment 
projects,.-particularly in bauxite processing, the host government is 
likely to negotiate with the foreign.companies technology inputs and, 
assistance contracts, including management, finance and marketing 
arrangements, trying to increase progressively (the national participation 
in senior management functions and company°-s equity. 
c) TNCs counter-strategies ' - ' 
The" response of companies to host countries which engage, or have 
been succesful in obtaining substantial concessions with respect to the 
above bargaining demands, include the following strategies': 
i) Transferring bauxite sourcing and" hew' expansion of mining capacity 1 
to locations which offer lower unit costs' of production (including the 
tax burden) and to where the TNCs feel more secure from escalating host 
country demands, once their operations are on stream. 
ii) Intensified research concerning alternate inputs to their 1 
processing facilities concerning-the cost fabtors- of non-bauxite materials 
as compared with the rising cost of bauxite. 
iii) Using geographic diversification of bauxite sourcing to diminish 
the potential bargaining power of' anyone bauxite producing country 
opposing her to rival producer countries. '-
\J This—being used by the company for -tax purposes—is usually much 
lower than .the "commercial, value" pf assets. Bee part 3. b) . and c.) 
below. 
/iv) Joint ventures 
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v. iv} Joint ventures and agreements wxttr.nther foreign companies (ifiicluGiing 
aluminium consumer's), banking, .and'insurance .consortia, etc. y and also • 
with host governments^ in .orders to strengthen the .'common interest of 
companies, and countries alike, in. protecting their oligopolistic position 
and distribute the • risk'atnong more parties. ' C -' . > 
v) Recourse to support and pressure capacity from home country 
governments and. related private and public organizations.'-
In the next section, some outstanding aspects :of the -new balance 
of bargaining ;-power between TNCs and Caribbean countries in the 1970s 
will be\Qverviewed. >,.;.- ... , •;.-.  >•* • . » .. 1 . : 
2. Changes in the bargaining balance throughout the ,1970s 
a) Thé internatioral^^tting 
From the" closing years of the 1960s, the international climate has 
been undergoing significant changes. À new constellation of voting power 
emerged within the framework of the United Nations as political colonialism 
continued to be dismantled. The frustrations arising from the slow progress 
of two decades of international development efforts to ameliorate the 
basic inequalities in the international economic order, manifested 
themselves Tn rising economic nationalism in the Third World. An indication 
of things to come was presaged in Resolution 215G (XXI) passed by the 
United Nations in 1966'calling upon foreign investors to recognize the 
right of "all countries, particularly the developing countries, to secure 
and increase their share in the administration of enterprises which are 
fully or partly operated by foreign capital and to have a greater share in 
the advantages and profits derived therefrom on an equitable basis". 
The internal and external problems of the United States and the 
devaluation, of the U.S. dollar in the early seventies signalled major 
/disequilibrium in 
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disequilibrium in. the international political~economic system. The rising 
industrial strength of Western-Europe and Japan, as also of. the socialist .. . 
countries,' accompanied by increasing import .requirements for energy and 
key industrial raw materials*., created an external economic environment 
more polycentric, more open, and somewhat less tightly.controlled by 
U.S. based - transnational. : -. 
Initiated at the Algiers summit of Non-aligrted countries and . 
resisted, by the major industrialized countries, the Special Session of 
the General Assembly of. United:Nations on Raw Materials adopted a •> 
call for a New International Economic Order in May 1974. This resolution 
called for a new deal for raw material producers and was in large measure 
directed towards transnational corporations enjoying concessions granted 
by previous colonial administrations, or, newly independent but weak host 
governments. The terms of these arrangements had been normally embodied 
in long term contractual agreements which, in effect, place the operations 
of the foreign, companies beyond the reach of the law of the host country. 
The assertion of the primacy of national sovereignty over the inalianability 
of private property marked an.important change in the international environment 
for mineral producing countries hosting foreign companies. 
The acknowledgement that the existing international economic order 
was not an equitable one, was in no small measure the result of the 
concerted and successful exercise of market power by the OPEC, countries ,. 
initiated in the autumn of J973 and the winter of 1S74 when a group, of 
developing countries had succeeded in improving substantially their terms 
of trade. 
The success of OPEC on the economic front influenced strongly the 
mineral producing countries and was generally supported by the leaders 
- ••.•.?.. ; •< . ; • - • , /of Third . 
of 'Third World nations. * Thds, the Primed Minister' of Jamaica %."-'Manley, 
in inroducing the BauxitaProduction iivy;Act of 1974 stated" On OPEC 
policies! "This move was lonĝ oveWue'artd'K®<aCtly'"ahticlpa'tecl- n$':own -1' ' "'<" 
thinking about the terms of trade*' commodity1 prices and fair returns'for •'-'• 
natural resources." n ••'•'-'"! ;•'•••• ' . 
b) Xh.e,. Caribbean governments bargaining positionŝ  in 1970s 
As shown above, the Caribbean has traditionally provided the raw 
material for U.S. and Canadian aluminium smelters. Although the Caribbean 
share of world bauxite production has fallen from 55 per cent in 194? to 2Q 
per cent in 1975, the region still supplies over three quarters of 
United States imports of bauxite and alumina. Although the terms, on 
which Caribbean non-renewable resources of bauxite have, in the past, 
been made available to the companies, had been improved in the negotiations 
during the 1960s, the situation remained inequitable continuing to favour TPCs. 
The 1970s have witnessed historic changes in this situation. From 
Guyana's claim to controlling partnership in ALCAN*s Demba operations 
in 1970 and the subsequent nationalization of these properties, to 
Jamaica's initiative in legislating a six fold increase in taxes in the 
form of the production levies of 1974; from the active role played by 
Caribbean countries in the formation of the International Bauxite Association 
in 1974, to the ongoing moves aimed at expanding aluminium reduction capacity as 
public sector ventures, utilizing the energy resources of_neighbouring 
Caribbean or other developing countries—the Caribbean has come a long 
way from its traditional role as a mere location of bauxite extraction to 
feed the refineries, smelters and fabricating plants of the transnational 
aluminium companies. The achievements of the Caribbean bauxite producer 
countries include long term social and economic gains, reaching beyond 
/the immediate 
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the immediate» increase in economic rents accruing from the/ improved terms . 
of sale of their major national resource. Ultimately, .the most - significant ; 
result of the application of national commitment and technocratic skill,L .. 
as manifested in the initiatives of the major Caribbean -bauxite producers 
vis-à-vis the TNCs, consists in an important break with traditional . 
postures of political and psychological dependence inherited from the 
colonial era. 
In the course of 1970s, the previously existing imbalance in available 
information between companies and host country governments has been partially 
redressed. Much of the désinformation previously surrounding all aspects of 
costing and pricing policies of the companies has been swept away. The 
acquisition of managerial, technical, production and marketing; knowledge on the 
part of producer country governments—particularly knowledge gained through 
direct government responsability for decisions relating to the operation of 
national industries—has largely removed the element of bluff from country-comp 
relations. Finally, and most important, fear that a harder bargaining position 
on the part of host country goverrsnents will invite direct intervention or the 
"distabilization" of the government by economic blockade, financial boycott or 
covert internal political interference, has receded in the changing internationr 
climate. , 
The bargaining situation thus approximates more closely the economic and 
political realities of the relative power of the parties involved. Nonetheless 
the companies retained oligopolistic advantages in their international control > 
the marketing of bauxite, alumina, and aluminium; in their near-monopoly on 
technology, including that required to develop alternate sources of aluminium 
from lower-grade bauxites and from non-bauxite materials; and in their 
access to large pools of consortia finance. 
/Each of 
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Each of the Caribbean countries adopted somewhat different strategies 
to ensure that their intrinsic mineral wealth be used in terms which yield 
maximal short and long term gains. The differences reflect variations 
in geological, technological and logistic factors; in socioeconomic 
structures, in international affiliation and ideological posture. 
Nevertheless, the strategies have been complementary, rather than 
rivalistic and mutually exclusive and reinforced their common bargaining 
power. The debate, for example, as to whether Jamaica's levy is more or 
less advantageous than Guyana®s nationalization is not particularly useful 
in determining whether either of these governments had, at the time and in 
the given political and economic circumstances, any option more valuable 
than the one they chose to adopt. Furthermore, experience and knowledge 
gained by each of these countries have become available to each 
of the others, and indeed to other bauxite producing countries, whether 
by explicit mutual exchange of information, or by informed observation 
of the results. 
While some observers ascribed the recent gains of the bauxite producer 
countries to the formation of the International Bauxite Association (IBA) 
as a producer-cartel, closer examination reveals that the IBA is not 
in fact a cartel. It has not, to date, been successful in setting a 
uniform price for bauxite and alumina and does not even aspire to control 
their output. This organization largely owes its existence to initiatives 
originating in the Caribbean and the cohesion of the major bauxite producers, 
which provides the key to the understanding of their successes. Here their 
common cultural heritage and common experience as colonies play an 
important role. On the other hand, the high dependence of North American 
companies on Caribbean bauxite sourcing, and the importance of the 
commodity for economic development and military purposes provided the 
necessary economic leverage, 
., /The bauxite 
145. -
The bauxite industry has now become a crucial component of Caribbean 
countries strategies to restructure and diversify their economies. For 
these reasons,.host country.policies, which reach beyond immediate revenue 
and foreign exchange considerations, are particularly significant. This 
is especially truepf Guyana .arid Jamaica, whose governments are committed 
to achieve a greater, measure of social justice through the transformation 
of their economies, and whose foreign exchange situation tend to be very 
difficult. Although Suriname has followed policies which are, in major 
respects, similar.;to, those of.Jamaica, her less' developed economy and her 
continuing close ties with the Netherlands, as manifested in the availability 
of .large .volumes of financial grants and soft'loans and heavy out-migration 
resulting from Dutch social security policies, have insulated her from 
foreign exchange pressures and problems, 
.  Burdened by the heritage of a high cost sugar industry and a series of 
minor agricultural export crops, operating in chronically unstable markets, 
by very high rates of unemployment and social inequalities (particularly in 
Jamaica), the Caribbean countries need to convert their bauxite into 
primary aluminium and aluminium products. 
Furthermore, both Suriname and Guyana have hydroelectric potential. 
ALCOA* s hydroelectric plant in Suriname produces energy at a 
very economic cost. In recent years, large quantities of natural gas have 
come on stream in Trinidad and Tobago. The convenience of combining 
. bauxite with hydroelectricity has long been considered by Suriname and 
Guyana. The project of restructuring the Caribbean bauxite industry 
from its traditional and dependent pattern of corporate integration to a 
self-assertive one,of Caribbean regional integration was powerfully 
argued by West Indian economists in the 1960s. At that time, their 
proposals appeared visionary and impractical, given the all-powerful 
/dominance of 
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dominance of the major Northamerican aluminium companies in the Western 
Hemisphere» Yet a few years later, in mid 1S74, scaled down variant 
of this proposal has been adopted by a joint meeting of the Prime 
Ministers of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago: a proposal to build 
two.aluminium smelters, one in Trinidad, to be fuelled by natural gas, 
and another one in Guyana based on hydroelectricity. Furthermore, it 
was specifically stipulated that there would be no equity participation 
by any transnational corporation in such a joint venture. Although the 
fate of the Trinidad smelter project is presently quite uncertain, it 
nevertheless has a great significance in terms of future possibilities ., c > .. • - . 
of broader Caribbean political and economic cooperation and integration. 
c) Government policies and TNCs reacting , 
Policies 'currently-bsi-ng purged, by the governments of Caribbean 
bauxite producing countries-with,Respect to.the bauxite-aluminium industry 
and the foreign companies can usefully be reviewed .under., the following 
five headings: ... < 
i) Increased;'taxation .oft companies., incomes, with or without majority 
goverhment equitylparticipation, but without operational control over 
the industry; ii) increased degree of processing without erosion of 
company control; iii) extension of host government ownership and 
effective control over bauxite reserves, mining operations, alumina refining 
and aluminium smelting; iv) cooperation among bauxite producers; 
v) cooperation among developing countries in joint ventures on a 
government to government basis. 
These polici.es are not mutually exclusive. Nor are they incompatible t . 
with the objectives and practices of TNCs, given the size and growth rate •• " i' 
of the international market for aluminium and. its products. 
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i). Increased taxation . n . . r 
Prior to the Jamaican initiatives, which'resulted in her bauxite 
levy of 1974, the companies had rarely paid more than $2 per ton of 
bauxite» The new Jamaican levy, which is tied to. the realized price of 
primary aluminium, increased government bauxite revenues five to six fold 
to a level of about $12 per ton. Although the companies initially 
resisted increased taxation,, they had no great difficulty in adjusting 
to the new arrangements, or in agreeing to maintain negotiated minimum 
production levels. In imposing stiffer taxes on the companies", it is' 
important for the host government to know the production;costs of alternate 
bauxite sources, so that the tax is set at a level at which it remains 
profitable for the companies to continue to operate their established 
facilities In the host country. Once the companies accept the new fiscal 
rules,,they in effect become tax collectors for the host government, and 
government and TNCs alike have a common interest in the smooth and 
efficient operation of companies' mines and plants. 
In addition to the levy—which was also instituted in Suriname, Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic—the Jamaican government acquired ownership 
participation in the mining operations of the aluminium companies operating 
in that country. The arrangement is one of non-controlling participation, 
in the sense that the government is essentially a "sleeping partner"., 
Management and marketing remain the exclusive responsability of the TNCs 
and the output of bauxite and alumina production is available to the 
companies to feed their aluminium smelter in the United States. The point 
here is that there are not essential modifications in the government-TNC 
relationship:'non-controlling participation, taken together with substantial 
tax,yields create a mutuality of interest between the company and -the 
government, which guarantees secure bauxite supplies to the former and 
assures increased revenues to the later. 
/ii) Increased degree 
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ii) Increased degree of prpcessing.. 
,, ..Prior...to the. mid sixties, almost all Caribbean metal grade bauxite 
was exported in raw form. Because the aluminium contained in bauxite 
increases;, its value, about three times when converted to alumina, . ¡-, 
Caribbean host countries offered strong incentives to the foreign companies 
to expand local refinery capacity. A large alumina refinery and a small 
aluminium smelter were constructed in Suriname in the mid- sixties as a 
result of., the,- above analized, Brokopondo.agreement with ALCOA«, It was.; 
in Jamaica, however,.where there, was a. very large expansion of refining 
capacity.' Over half of Jamaica's bauxite production is.now exported as 
alumina. • The, TNCs received .¡generous fiscal concession, reduced their .. r. 
transportation posts, and in cases, escaped paying any tax at all by 
operating refineries at apparent, losses. ,.... 
, . Nevertheless, both the.^NCs and the. country gained .by the location, 
of processing plants in Jamaica® New. employment.and.incpme were created, 
particularly during the construction phase. Under the,terms of the new 
bauxite production levy, the government now receives, revenue for bauxite 
locally processed, even where income taxes payable by the.refineries are 
difficult to establish pn,apequnt. of the absence of market prices either,, 
for bauxite or for alumina. . Moreover, the discretion afforded- to the 
foreign companies in terms of their choice concerning the types of ores .. 
they process locally and those.they transfer in, raw form, can adversely^ 
affect the apparent profitability of the local refineries. . , ; 
In the longer perspective-however, an important aspect .of the location 
of refining capacity in the host,.country lies in the possibilities implicit 
in arrangements such, as those embodied-in,Jamaica®s, recent agreement with 
ALCOA. Here the host country has, acquired a small -(6 per cent) equity in 
the oven-all Jamaican operation of the,company, which includes the 
./country's right 
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country's right to use or sell its resulting share of alumina production» 
. .Furthermore, Jamaica has the option of expanding its share in the joint 
; -,.-venture-by putting up the capital to construct an additional refining 
capacity on the existing site—and is planning to do so. The output of 
this capacity will be at the disposal of the government of Jamaica, for 
: export sale or as ah input to primary aluminium smelting. 
>;..  :r . iii) • Extension of host government ownership and eff^tlye^i^trol 
i -In 1970', Guyana requested controlling participation in ALCAN's 
DEfvBA operations«' -After protracted negotiations, ALLAN rejected 
Guyana's proposals and challenged the government to "take all or 
nothing". In a historic break with past company-country relations 
in the bauxite industry, Guyana took up the challenge and in 1971, DEfOA, 
the first mining operation set up in the Caribbean by ALCOA in 1916, 
was nationalized and shortly thereafter the same occurred with, Reynold1s 
, assets in this country. Guyana's national company, GUYABAU added new 
• capacity to its plant, tries to recover the plant nationalization losses, 
expanded employment and forms the nucleus of a national engineering 
construction company. • - . 
Guyana, however, was fortunate in her endowment of exceptionally 
high-grade ores suitable for the production of calcined refractory 
bauxite. The latter is a finished product with widely dispersed markets, and 
Guyana enjoys a near world monopoly. GUYABAU has thus been able to 
-v, i 
survive the reduction in its production and the squeeze with respect 
to the rather unfavourable prices, at which it has been forced to sell 
its metal' grade bauxite and alumina. Although Guyana's production of 
, metal gradé bauxite is not large, and modest amounts have been sold to 
socialist countries, there is little doubt that ALCAN has indicated its 
displeasuré'with Guyana's course of action, by exercising its economic power 
over the market for bauxite and alumina. — 
\J See part 4. a) and b) below, /Given this 
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Given this situation, and given Guyana's rich endowment of 
hydroelectric potential, it is logical that this country should 
look to a nationally controlled integrated aluminium industry, as the 
next step in the development of her natural resources,, indeed, 
this has been a Guyanese goal for many years; among the many grievances 
against ALCÂN was the persistent refusal of that company to study seriously 
the feasibility of a hydroelectric and aluminium smelting complex in 
Guyana. . 
In the other Caribbean countries, there has- been., no intention to 
displace the foreign companies from bauxite mining, although it is 
doubtful whether they will expand their capacity beyond present levels, 
especially in Jamaica. Although it is sometimes assumed that company 
decisions to shift new bauxite mining capacity to other than the Caribbean 
countries, because of the threat of nationalization or the increased 
levies, company decisions to diversify their bauxite sources and expand 
in Australia, Africa and Brazil were taken long before 1S74. 
Both in Suriname and in Jamaica, the governments have plans for 
iarge new mining development under direct government ownership and control, 
accompanied by plans for the expansion of refining and smelting capacity. 
In Suriname', these developments are taking shape in West Suriname, and 
in Jamaica they had been part of joint ventures planned with the governments 
of Mexico, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Projects for government owned and controlled aluminium smelters 
in the Caribbean do not in effect constitute a challenge to the 
international industry, because sales are likely to be confined largely 
to the markets of the Caribbean and Latin America. Although the major 
TNCs oppose the entry of new firms in the international aluminium market, 
/which might 
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which might undermine their traditional oligopolistic control, their .fears 
relate more to the markets of North America., Europe and Japan, rather than 
the incipient ones of the developing countries. 
iv) Cooperation among bauxite|producer countries 
Cooperation among bauxite producer countries is an important 
condition-for the success of host government policies vis-a-vis TNCs. 
For example, in the case of increasing taxation it is necessary to 'prevent 
the foreign companies from shifting their short-term sourcing to less 
"radical" countries or threatening to do so. An examination of the taxes 
and levies imposed by the member countries of the International Bauxite 
Association5.suggests that they result in; roughly similar landed costs ; 
at U.S. ports» Thus Jamaica's bauxite levy is higher than that imposed in 
Suriname, because production and ocean transport costs are lower in the 
first country. On the other hand, ther ¡export duty imposed by Guinea is 
approximately"half the Jamaican one corresponding to higher capital costs . 
and ocean freight- for the bauxite exported by the country. 
Furthermore, the.International Bauxite Association.has been a valuable 
instrument of contact and -information among bauxite producing countries. 
Cooperation with other countries in joint ventures • ': 
As stated above, both Guyana and Suriname have large hydroelectric 
power potential. Both countries have plans to develop integrated national 
aluminium industries. Given great investment cost, this is not feasible 
without large scale external"loans on concessional terms and participation 
by foreign companies in the;construction of.alumina refineries and 
aluminium smelters. Jamaica, however has presently no cheap energy, 
source and imports 90% of its requirements. Mexico is importing yearly 
/about 150 000 
about 150 000, tons -of aiiintiniCinii: and: is, developingvextenaive 'oil arid 
gas reserves. Venezuela is exploiting her oil reserves and plans 
to expand aluminium smelting for whifch she nieds bauxite or alumina. 
Several joint ventures had been under consideration: ari alumina plant 
in Jamaica of a capacity' from 600 000 to 900 000 tons, jointly owned 
by Jamaica, Mexico and Venezuela; an aluminium smelter in;Mexico jointly 
owned with Jamaica and construction of a'aluminium smelter in Trinidad, 
based on his natural' gas,' with alumina to be supplied by Guyana and 
Jamaica. 
These projects are small in comparison with the scale of operations 
, 1/ of TNCs in the world terms and ¿till encounter many difficulties, ™ but for 
the countries of the region they ¿igritfy a large potential capacity of 
a full use of their natural resources. 
1/ The joint Jamaica-Mexico-Venezuela bauxite/alumina project had 
been postponed indefinitely in 1978, owing to the withdrawal of 
Mexico. A'modified joint project involving the construction 
c of an alumina plant in Jamaica with minority Venezuelan. 
participation, is now under consideration (see, CEPAL, Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1978"); " ! 
/3. The „cases 
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3, The 'cases .of different policy approaches in Jamaica and Guyana 
After-evaluating the new bargaining situation, and Caribbean governments 
policies in.197Qs in more general terms, in this part, the particular cases of 
Jamaica, and Guyana will be analysed with some more detail. 
a) •''The new _ fiscal policy of Jamaica 
s The Jamaican government had traditionally depended on fiscal measures 
to extract a return on the activities of aluminium TfCs operating in the 
country. In the colonial period such moves met little success. In the 
1950®s the government received the lowest receipts from bauxite exports 
. .than any other country in the. Caribbean. This was true despite the fact 
that the Jamaican ore had a relatively low cost of mining and the island 
had a significant locational advantage over most of the other bauxite 
exporting countries, reaching this way a high level of competiveness over 
other producers in the U.S. market (see table 36). In addition, during the 
initial phase of bauxite industry development the TNCs had increased 
substantially fixed asset holdings, which provided an additional bargaining 
factor for the government. 
i) Renegotiation in the colonial period ̂ 1957) 
In 195? Jamaica renegotiated.its agreements with the aluminium 
companies operating within the country—Kaiser, Reynolds and ALCAN. That 
new agreements increased taxes on exported bauxite five-fold to an average 
of about US®1,85. per ton. They were particularly interesting, because 
one-half of the value of total royalty and income tax payments varied with 
the price of aluminium ingot in the U. S. "market. This clause reflected 
the recognization of particular characteristics of the industry in the absence 
of an arms-length price for bauxite, which makes the determination of TNCs 
subsidiaries profit levels strictly an intra-firm accounting affair. Profits 
/Table 36 
- 155 * 
n----- • . \ Table 36 
COMPETITIVENESS OF JAMAICAN ¡'BAUXITE IN THE U. S. MARKET 
(Estimated cost in U. 5, Dollars per ton of bauxite), 
'H -iff tf^-^,»-1'^"1^^ 1 r tr wi i r-lT" "it „T tXlw wi . -i-l-U 
Jamaica Guyana Guinea Brazil Australia 
Mine operating costs ,... 3o 00 3.00. 3.00, .3.00 4.00 
Mine capital costs 1.0?. a 20 30 20 3*20 . a 20 
Inland transport 2„ 00 ,2.00 2.00 2.00 . 2.00 
Infrastructure... share 
• • • -
2.50 2.50 2. 50. 2« 50 
Ocean transport. . . 3, 00, 5.60 6.00 10.00 .,13,50 
Sub-total , 9.07 . .16» 30 16.30 20.70 , 25.20 
Tons bauxite/ton alumina.. 2.5 2,0 1.8 .. • 2.2 
Cost bauxite per ton 
alumina 22.68' 32.60 31.73 "37.26 55.44 
Advantage of Jamaica 
per, too of alumina r a. 1 9.92 9o05 14.; 58 32.76 
Sources IBRD, Market Structure Of Bauxite/Alumina/Aluminum? and 
r I i r i -| m i i * t - i 'u i. ¿f.-.frsjti . • n - ^ - ^ ' ^ . - i ^ t ' r n r e B ^ c f c s a r a O ' s . r n , m • ,-rort" i r n y . d * . r - r - g j g f f a g - ^ - i . i • • gm.—mrtaars.-
. Developing Countries, Commodity Paper N° 24 (3/77). , 
/in the 
in the host countries can be essentially determined by the parent company 
by simply altering the terms of exchange within the firm. 
Taxing-the revenues, derived from the aluminium sales seemed to be an 
excellent manner of circumventing the problems resulting from the lack of 
bauxite market, prices. Unfortunately, the price of aluminium fell rather 
than rose after the 195? agreement. It was not until the early 1970's that 
' the price rose above the 1925 level. - Due to the unfavorable market trends 
the country, did not gain in this period from "the introduction of the 
"escalator clause". In addition, and equally as before.1957,. the level of 
income taxes or -royalties had no relation either with the. quality, of the., 
ore mined or with the production costs. The colonial administration lacked 
the information and political will to negotiate or impose a more significant 
redistribution of- the industry gains in favour of the host country. This 
occured only lat'ery in 1974 /as will .be seen in points iii) and iv) below 7* 
ii) Increase of alumina refining end fiscal incomes after 1962 
The TNCs capacity to conceal before the public authorities the 
real financial results of 'their operations also frustrated the possibilities 
of securing major budget income from further processing of bauxite. After 
the country gained independence, in 1962, several alumina refining plants 
had, been̂ , established. Between .1966 and 1972 alumina exports increased '  
slmPst three times (from USS54 to 150 millions, see again .table ,35). 'But 
the increased tax payments from bauxite activities did not materilize. In 
1972, for example, 3.5 millions tons of bauxite were converted into alumina 
and yielded only US$1 million in taxes. This value was only a fraction of 
the almost $9 million in taxes the same bauxite would have generated without 
refining. The companies were able to record almost no profit from the new 
alumina plants by using, as in the case of bauxite, transfer pricing, or, in 
other words, allowing the local plants to minimize their local tax costs 
through artificially low "prices" accounted for alumina. 
/As a result 
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As a result of this experience the government that emerged from the 
"gladtid"rts"in i972, eStataiahed a special Bauxite Commission to study 
thdjroughly the TNCs operations and financial practices in Jamaica in order, 
to prepare a new renegotiation with the foreign companies in more equitable 
terms, 
iii) Barqaining capacity in the 1970s 
One of the factors giving significant bargaining leverage to the : 
government was the fact that four major TNCs operating in Jamaica (ALCOA, 
ALCAN, Reynolds and Kaiser)9 depended heavily on her bauxite resources 
(11% 55% 57% and 58% respectively, see table 3?), Also Revere Copper and 
Brass and Anaconda Copper companies were operating in Jamaica by 1970, 
Owing to special characteristics of bauxite of different origin, the home count: 
p̂rocessing facilities using Jamaican inputs would have to be overhauled (which 
is a time and cost consuming process), if diversifying to other resource origin. 
Secondly., the low share of bauxite and alumina in the final price of 
: J 
¡aluminium made it possible for the bauxite producing countries to obtain 
increased revenue with only a slight impact on the global TNCs average costs. 
In 1S60s, the share of mining and drying of bauxite in the total aluminium ' 
cost had been only 7% and' that added' by alumina refining of 21% (see 
table 38), " These figtires are relatively low and suggest that the cost of 
bauxite and alumina could be increased with little Impact on demand for the 
•final aluminium product, 
A third aspect of the negotiating process which tended: to favor the. 
Jamaican government was the cost competitiveness of Jamaican bauxite 
production in the United .States market. As can be seen again in the table 35 
above, Guyana's bauxite is the closest in cost to Jamaica, but still is almost 
US®10 per ton.more expensive. After the introduction of the new increased 
«ma— Ti'rr j.rr nxrvf humj"* v m 
J/ The calculation of N. Giryan, used in the table 38, corresponds roughly 
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Source; Morris et. al, (1976), see: selepted bibliography below, 
a/ Excludes rationalized production. /Table 38 
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; . ... ,. , ^ . Jable 38 
PRODUCTION COSTS OF PRIMARY ALUMINIUM (1960s) 
; Ppr ;ton): .... . 
Stages of Production 
Mining and̂ pr̂ jjlS 
'Labor' ' '*' 



















































, 4a 5 
Soujrcjes; Norman Girvan, The. Cê ri.bbean.J3aux it e_ Industry, (1967)* see selected 
bibliography below. ..... , 
a/ , : Figures do not sum to percentage contribution of each stage due 
to rounding. 
/ levy, the 
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levy, the cost of alumina per ton in Jamaica rose from US$23 to about 33 which 
was almost equal to the cost in Guyana.and much less than in Australia (£55 
per ton, see again table 36), thus removing only part of the economic rents 
of the TNCs. 
fourth, and as mentioned previously, the Jamaica Bauxite Commission, was 
formed in 1972 in order to improve the information base.of the government. 
This spent nearly two years examining operating and financial conditions 
within the industry and differences among the various TNCs. That period of 
pre-negotiation preparation and examination of the conditions faced by the 
government greatly improved its bargaining capacity. 
A fifth important factor was the formation of the International Baukite 
Association (IBA), in 1974, by Jamaica, Suriname, Guinea, Guyana, Australia, 
Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia„ joined later by the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Ghana and Indonesia. In 1975, the IBA countries accounted for 73/o of total 
world bauxite production. One of the purposes of this association was to" 
present a united front of all bauxite exporting countries to the TNCs. 
To the extent that they were successful, the foreign firms* diversification 
of bauxite sources would be neutralized. In the 1274-1975 period, such 
neutralization appeared to have been successful, particularly owing to the 
fact that the government of an important alternative source country 
-—Australia—had recently adopted a pro-Third World attitude reflecting its 
concern about foreign control of its own natural resources. 
Sixth, Jamaica faced,.in 1970s, a more diversified world market for 
bauxite and alumina, characterized by the above described entry of several 
new U. S, firms in the late 1960s and more rapidly increasing Japanese and 
European demand, even with occasional purchases by the Soviet Union (see 
table 39). In addition, the Jamaican government was supposed to enter at 




CONSUMPTION OF PRIMARY ALUMINIUM BY MAJOR AREAS 
1 a) Thousands of metric tons ' 
' f • • • - T T . T • • Tl Til I H T II- If- 1-1—I 
« - r t r i T r « I»I |i i l . n i li 
• • 1960 ' 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 
U.SeA0 1 541 2 852 3 488 3 265 4 490 4 756 
Canada " 97 173 220 '••' 286 - 300 310 
Japan 151 286 911 1 171 1 610 . 1 422 
Europe 1 278 1 518 2 606 2 804 3 501 3 530 
World '(excluding-- > -
socialist countries) a/. 3 24? 5 195 ? 935 8 608 11 086 . 11 373 
' b) Annual growth rates " 
< ' N 
World (except 
soca countries)a/ U. SQ A0 Canada Japan Europe 
1961 6.5 ' * 1Ö.2 18.6 2a 2 • -10. 3 
1962 ! " 12.0 16. 5 10.4 ~1o 1 ̂  5, 2 
1963 :;, 11, 5 13.2 , 8,7 17.9 7.6 
1964 •10.8 7.3 1.4 20.7 ia9 
1965 ' 6.6 ' 12. 5 ' 2a-6 * 9c 1 ' • 2,6 
1966 3,7. 0. •15. 0 • 12. 1 30a 4 14.4 
1967 ' 0.2 -4.9 -13.4 3a 2 0.2 
1968 15.5 15.3 • 120 5 . 21.3 15.2 
1969 9.9 • 3.0 12.2 30o0 16.3 
1970 ' ' 2.6 -5.9 5,2 12.9 - • 8. 3 
1971 6. 3 . 12. 3 ,, ,15.9 6.8 . T4.3 
1972 11.5 9,8 9.4 25.0 12.0 
1973 18,4 ' ' 1 18, 1 '7.9 ' 32. 6 14,:9 
1974 '0.9 ' 1.0 ' 18.9 -19.2 • 5.7 
1975 -2a? ' '" ' • • • -36. 3 -20. 1 -10.1 - -17.3 
1976 28,8 ,37.5 4»9 • 37. 5 , 24.9 
1977 2.6 5.9 30 3 ' -11.^ 0.8 
Annual average' growth 
1960*» 1971 . 8.9 8.9 9.2 18. 1 6. 1 
1960-1966 11. 1 ia4 12Ì 3 16.2 5.2 
196&-1971 6,4 4.3 10.5 16.2 ? a 4 
J9Ç0-1977 7.7 6.9 7. 1 14. 1 6.2 
Source: Problems and Prospects of the Primary Aluminium Industry, OECD, 1973 
ay 
and Metal World Statistics, various issues. 
Socialist countries » Bulgaria^ People's Republic of China, Czechoslovak 
Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and USSR 
(excluding Yugoslavia). /located in 
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located in Mexico and an integrated alumina refinery planned for Jamaica, 
yjhich„would, be a joint Jamaica/Venezuela/Mexico venture (JAVEMEX), holding 
Jamaican government a majority share. For a number of reasons, that 
project has lost momentum,» but in the 1S74-1975 period, the possibility of 
such a venture emphasized to the TNCs that Jamaica could develop a number 
of alternative uses for its bauxite. 
Finally, the consequences of the 1973 oil crises resulted in a severe 
balance,of payments constraints, which had been only partially offset by 
other exports, particularly of sugar. In this difficult situation, the 
development objectives of the government made increased tax revenue 
essential, 
iv) Renegotiation and new fiscal legislation in 1974 
v * > — iiiimm i'nV ii.inwiiiii.iii 11..»jiini.11. i in T i " f > T i n r n f — ^ T T * " ' ~ -'r^ »««» 
Owing to all these factors, the early phases of the 1974 renegotiation 
centered on an increase in the tax applied to aluminium TNCs. The Jamaican 
government proposed a novel method of taxation—a production levy imposed 
on, all bauxite produced (including that refined locally in alumina) and 
fixed as a percentage of the price of primary aluminium ingots in the U. S. 
market. The government's original proposal, in January 1974, was to fix-
the levy at 8.5% for aluminium prices up to 35 cents per pound and then, to 
raise the percentage share for prices higher than that level. Thus the new 
method of taxation had to remove the difficulties faced in the previous 
agreements from 1960s (see points i) and ii) above). 
The TNCs accepted the principal of.the levy but countered with an offer 
of 3. 5% share. The negotiations broke down in toy and the government legislate! 
the new fiscal terms, setting the production levy at 7.9/? for the financial 
year 1974-1975. 
To a large extent the original opposition of TNCs to accept the higher 
taxes required by the government (and transfer the higher cost to the 
' " . /aluminium consumers, 
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aluminium qqnsumera, as,,explained above) had been caused by.the fact, that 
Tt̂ Cs-.were .faced,..-with .thft .Sjuddqi „rise in-the cost of .energy, an important 
input for the industry,.which .introduced a considerably degree of uncertainity. 
A related aspect was tĥ , TNCs natural fear, of the demonstration effects. of 
Jamaican action on other bauxit.e producing countries, which on final account 
, .proved to bejfully justified, ̂  The combination of these factors led the 
qluminium TNCs to. follow, a .relatively inflexible bargaining position. They 
filed claims against-the new Jamaican tax legislation at the.International Centr 
for Setting Investment Disputes (iCSlD at .the World Bank) for arbitration« 
Faced with the inflexible attitude of the aluminium TNCs, the Jamaican 
government felt that .it was, necessary to obtain greater control of the bauxite 
resources of the,country through participation in t^eir ownership. .This type 
of policy approach ,v|dll ,pe analysed .in continuation., . 
b) The ownership participation policy of Jamaica 
* . . . •aegajesa j . i gt J i ^ s a r ó ^ ' c ^ v m / r a ' g t T T . - v c ^ . r ^ , ^^ i V - ¡ r - " a -anaw.it-cysTT'f l»» < 
. ;, . The government initiated- the negotiations for participation in the 
ownership of the bauxite,mines and.lands with Kaiser, Revere and Reynolds and 
separate agreements were.signed, but. on,similar terms. The bauxite, land was 
bought by the government- at>book value compensation and, in turn, the government 
guaranteed a 40 year supply of bayxite.from this land. In addition, it agreed 
to lease ,t o the.:TNCs some part of .-the recovered. land, at a yearly rent . ,r . 
corresponding to 7°/o. of the purchase price. . furthermore» the government bought 
, 51°/o of .the mining operations assets and retained option, to purchase also a. 
.share of the assets in alumina refining on .the same»terms, that is at,.book, 
,. value. Operational control, hpwever, „remained in the hands of the. TNCs, through 
management contracts of ten year.duration. 
.1 / . An Important aspect of regional cooperation was, that after Jamaica 
introduced the new tax policy, it offered technical cooperation'to cither 
•. Caribbean, countries to help them implement,the same type of policies,- In 
a number of cases this offer was accepted and helped the quick followMjp 
response of other Caribbean producers. 
/These conditions 
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These.conditions were more favorable to the government, than those 
negotiated later with ALCOA and ALCAW, An .additional important part of the 
package deal was that Kaiser and Reynolds dropped .their, above mentioned, 
claims. against. the new tax poliqy at ICSIO, which put pressure on other 
protesting. TNCs obliging them finally to drop also their own suits. 
The stronger negotiating power pf the government.stemmed, in this case, from 
the fact that.Kaiser and Reynolds were relatively more dependent on Jamaica's 
bauxite (58°/o and 37% of their respective world production of bauxite, see 
again.table 37) and therefore found themselves under pressure to conceed to 
government demands. 
.. Later negotiations with ALCOA and ALCAN (which depended by 11% and 55% 
..respectively .on Jamaica's bauxite) came at a difficult period in the Jamaican 
economic situation when negotiations with the International Monetary Fund 
were being conducted and the government was unwilling to provoke further 
conflict with the TNCs. Both ALCOA and ALCAN rejected to sell the majority 
of their assets to the Jamaican government. As a result the government 
acquired only 6% of the assets of ALCOA and 7% of. those of ALCAN, including 
all activities in.mining and refining, and all.their unused mineral properties. 
The joint venture, ALJAM, formed as a consequence of the agreement, . 
will assume the operation of all of ALCAN's existing activities in the country. 
The new enterprise has a 40-year mining lease. ..The government will, receive 
7 per cent of the annual alumina production of ALJAM. The rpyalty on mined 
bauxite is set at U.S. $0.31 per ton while the production levy has been fixed 
until 1983. At the same time the aluminium companies have agreed in principal 
to prepay the production levy one-year in advance. Also, they have agreed 
to maintain the prevailing level of foreign exchange annually brought into 
the country to finance working capital requirements, despite the fact that the 
unification and devaluation of the exchange rate would have reduced these 
v, • . ... r ,,. . /needs by 
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needs by around $¡40 million. The difference will be invested in the expansion 
of production capacity. These accords will also have a favorable impact on 
the balance of payments and budgetary situations. Judging by the varied' 
agreements achieved recently, it may be concluded that the friction originally 
caused by the introduction of the production levy tax has been largely 
surmounted. —^ 
c) The nationalization policy of Guyana ' 
1 *.* 1 '- l' • ii i . r i« ' i ' ^ . ' i i « » . .»-p«' - . i n . in ! . u i i A ^ n ^ 
i) The situation before nationalization in 1971 , t^ /XMSK-B - I .-•—IS-L.-I^JL'I» I T- i . — . . w .^M. .»^» . . . . ^ - - . . . . . . I ,m I 
In the colonial period, negotiations between Guyana and the fNCs 
essentially favored the foreign firms. For example, in 1950®s, during the 
period of considerable competition among the TNCss ALCAN decided to construct 
a small alumina refining plant in the country. For this compromise ALCAN, 
through the subsidiary Demerara Bauxite Company (DEfviBA), received an outright 
tax holiday lasting five years and further concessions to keep it from paying 
any taxes at all until 1971. An example of political pressure presented the 
situation in 1952, when a new constitution was adopted and the government 
tried to alter the relationship between ALCAN and the country. Faced with the 
threat of conflict, the British Crown abrogated the new constitution and ' 
installed a care-taker government more favorable to'TNCs. 
By 1966, the political conditions had changed. The country'had 
. obtained independence and, although a.clear consensus concerning the 
direction of economic policy;had not been resolved,. an issue on #i.ich most 
interest-groups agreed,was the need to increase the nation's benefits -derived 
j/ The export tax applied to alumina ingot reached in 1978 per ton of bauxite 
U, S, $17 in comparison with 12 in 1974. The funds collected, a vital 
source of government revenues, have amounted in 1978 U.S.C193 million 
in comparison with 185'million in 1974, even if. the production 
declined by 26% in the same period (see CEPAL, Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1978).' ' ' -
/from the 
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from the rich bauxite resources. In this new period of political independence, 
the relationship between the Guyanese government and the TNCs, principally ALCAf 
1/ 
was determined as much by political factors as by economic constraints, — 
ALCAN recognized first the new political "climate" and development needs of 
the country and realized that considerable pressure would be put on expansion 
of its local investment. After a series of discussions concerning the 
conditions under which such expansion could take place, the government announcec 
that ALCAN had agreed to build a local aluminium smelter using electricity 
generated from a new hydroelectric plant, should such a venture be judged 
economically feasible. In August, 1968, a United Nations sponsored report 
was released stating that the project was both economically and technically 
feasible, ALCAN claimed, however, that it had not been shown that aluminium 
could be produced at competitive world prices and rejected the construction 
of the smelter. This decision stired up strong feelings against the TNCs •  
throughout the country. 
The issue of the role of ALCAN's DEilBA in Guyana became one of the most 
important factors of the new nation state political consensus. There were two 
principal political parties in the country at that time and the country was 
divided between many social groupings with great differences of income and 
j 
There is a large literature oh the negotiations between the two parties. 
Among those consulted for this study are: N, Girvan, "Making the Rules 
of the Game: Company-Country Agreements in the Bauxite Industry", Social 
and Economic Studies, September, 1968; N. Girvan, "Corporate Imperialism 
in the Caribbean Bauxite Industry", in Girvan (ed) Corporate Imperialism: 
Conflict and Expropriation, 1976; C.H. Grant, "Political Sequel to ALCAN 
Nationalization",Social^and Economic Studies; Litvak and Maule, 
"Nationalization in the Bauxite Industry", International Affairs, January, 
1975} Litvak and Maule "Forced Divestment in the Caribbean", International 
Journal, Summer, 1977; and M. Morris, et.al., "The Politics of 
Nationalization, Guyana vrs ALCAN" in Sauvant and Lavipour (eds.), 
/social status. 
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v social -status. But the question' on which all agreed was that : the national-
.Control over DEMBA was. necessary. ̂  The universality .of,-this perception 
throughout the country determined the range of bargaining options for the 
government¡and became an important factor of its negotiating.capacity and 
a tool of-.pressure in the negotiations with TNCs, as well. • .. 
ii) The negotiation .process •-:. , . 
Formal discussions between Guyana and ALCAN began in December 1S70 
and continued through February,-1971. Early moves by the Guyanese government 
and the response by ALCAN formerly limited-the flexibility of both parties, 
indicating clearly the gap in basic positions. The Prime Minister delivered 
a public address to: the nation just before formal.talks began, in . which . 
he outlined the four main objectives of the government. These included 
. igovejmment's majority, participation and operational „control of DEMBA, 
compensation, of the,transfered assets of the .corporation based on officially 
declared book-value, payments for the.purchase of equity from future after-tax 
profits-and.-agreement , that the results, of renegotiation would take effect 
as of January 1, 1971. . Furthermore, in a letter sent to the company the same 
day the government stated'that the m§in changes in government-TNC relationship, 
declared publicly, were non-negotiable. " : . . 
-In the-formal negotiations, the government's non-negotiable proposals 
necessarily governed its position to ALCAN1s counter proposals. ALCAN made 
a number of. proposals for the expansion , of the, calcined bauxite activities 
bearing in mind Guyana's almost .world monopoly control in this commodity. 
Nevertheless-̂ , the. TNC had called for,.,the government ,-to finance this expansion 
through a. new;joint venture;company, with government and TNC participation. 
Negotiations ;centered around the organization of such a company and its control. 
In this ALCAN insisted on maintaing 51°/o participation in the ownership of the 
company.. The last proposal of ALCAN, before the break-down of negotiations, 
did conceed 51°/o participation to Guyana, but still retained operational 
/control in 
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control in the 'hands of ALCAN. On February 23, the F"rime Minister terminated 
negotiation with ALCAN and'announced the government is decision to nationalize 
DEMBA. : • i. . 
From the overview, outlined above, it is clear that the nationalization 
of DEMBA imposed by the government*'corresponded to the political conditions 
of the country and was not negotiable. On the other hand, this was not the 
case of the terms of nationalization and, particularly, the amount and 
conditions of. compensation and future linkages between the two parties. 
Since Guyana needed both the TNCs support for the marketing of bauxite' *and 
private and public financial resources from industrialized countries for-v, 
her development needs, the Guyanese government had to agree on a compensation 
formula acceptable to ALCAN. 
Before the nationalization, the government had insisted that compensation 
be based on the official book value of the corporation (used for tax purposes) 
and be paid from future after-tax profits. ALCAN-would have had accepted 
such stipulations under the conditions of a joint venture, but not as a 
compensation formula for nationalized-assets. Out of -toncem for the impact 
such development would have on other holdings of the TNC elsewhere -in 
developing countries, ALCAN began insisting on much greater compensation, A 
rigorous schedule of compensation payments and á denial of co-operation for the 
operatiorl- and marketing activities of the nationalized industry caused it, 
and the country in general, significant difficulties. Thus they became the 
major counter-strategy of the foreign company. 
Following this strategy ALCAN tried also to get support from the Western 
Hemisphere home countries of TNCs. The United States government in fact 
expressed its disapproval of the Guyanese government compensation program by 
abstaining in a vote on a 5 ) 5 . 4 million World Bank loan for the country, 
lib was concerned not only with the future fate of U.S. company, Reynolds 
/in Guyana, 
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in Guyana, but also wanted to give -support-to a "reasonable compensation 
formula" for nationalization, bearing in. mind the demonstration effect of the 
Guyanese case for other developing countries. 
In the final agreement between the government and ALCAN, signed in July, 
1971, DEMBA's gross value of assets for the purpose of compensation was 
estimated at US$80 million. That formula was a "medium" compromise between 
USf)46 million, official book value, backed as a basis for compensation by the 
government, and US$> 114 million required by ALCAN as "commercial value" of the 
nationalized assets. "=• Payment for the compensation was to be made out of 
government revenue funds, rather than out of future profits of the company 
(as required originally by the government). 
An important conclusion emerging from the analysis of the conflict between 
Guyana and ALCAN is that short-term economic factors are in certain political 
conditions less important determinants of the process of negotiation. In order 
to understand the capacity to negotiate of both the government and the TNCss 
it is necessary to evaluate all the factors of their actions—both economic 
and political. It must be recognized that non-economic factors may drastically 
limit the freedom to negotiate of both parties. Therefore policies designed 
to increase the bargaining capacity ot the government must be formulated 
within the broadest possible examination of the conditions of the country and 
the TNCs retaliation capacity in counter-strategies, including possible 
support by industrialized home-countries and their „private and public 
institutions. Some of these issues will be reviewed in the next section. 
\J For- greater detail on compensation problems, see, N„Girvan, Expropriating 
the multinational corporation: criteria for compensation; Conference on 
. - multinational corporations • in Africa, U. N. , African Institute for Economic 
. . Development, and Planning, Dakar, September, 1974. 
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4.' ^rt-fcferm'^ of-'the newr agreements and , : ' 
' m pplicies An Guyana and Jamaica, -
Different policy approaches to the negotiations with the TNCs and their 
results have been described above. The examination of the economic impact 
of recent governmental policies and agreements with TNCs is difficult and 
necessarily tentative. First, if a new policy or agreement were to lead to 
an immediate reduction in economic benefits for the country, such reduction 
may well be accepted by the government as a short-term cost of obtaining 
more permanent political and economic goals, reflected in the nation's 
sovereignty over her main economic resources. Fundamental alterations in 
the industrial structure and the distribution of the means of production 
necessarily require a transition period. At this point of time the long 
run impact of the new arrangements with TNCs cannot be evaluated and only the 
magnitude of short-time effects can be indicated. 
Secondly, the period after 1970 was characterized by the beginning 
of the energy crisis and world economic recession with retraction in levels 
of international trade. All these factors had an impact on economic 
activity in the Caribbean region and must be kept in mind throughout 
this section, where only the level of output and structural changes in 
exports in the post-neogtiation period will be evaluated. 
a) Changes of bauxite output 
In both Guyana and Jamaica, the level of bauxite output fell.in the 
post-negotiation period. Bauxite production in Guyana fell by 1.7% yearly 
between 1970 and 1977. In the same period Jamaica suffered a reduction 
by yearly 0. 7%,. falling the output particularly in 1975 and 1976 (by 
24. 5% and 10.9%), but recovering the growth rate in 1977 (see table 40). 
The bauxite production of all ISA countries increased in the 1970-1977 




GUYANA AND JAMAICA; BAUXITE PRODUCTION ( 1960-197?) . 
• 
a) Production in thousand metric tons, and, percentage 







' Guyana •Jamaica 
Tons Tona % 
1960 2.510,8 ,, 15.8 . 5.837,0 ; 36,7 
1965 2.918,7 12.8, 8.651,0 37.9 
1970 ; 4.417,2' 1 11.0 ' 12.009,7 • 30.0 
1971 4« 233,6 9i 4 • • 12.543,4 • 27.8 
1972 3.668,4 7.? 12.988,8 27.2 
1973 3.621,4 7.0 13.489,5 260 2 
1974 .. .. 3.048,4 5» 1 15.328,4 25,7 
1975 3.559,0 6.5 , 11.570,0 21.2 
1976 ; 1 3„ 134-, 0 5.6 ' • 10.311,0 17.6 
197? 3,915,0 • 6. 2 ... - -1.J1« 433,0 18.2 












Source: /IBRD, "Market Structure of, Bauxite/Alumina/Aluminium: Prospects for. 
.Developing Countries" Commodity, Paper N°24, (3/77) and CEPAL 
Economic Surveys, various issues. 
a/ International Bauxite Association (IBA) countries include: Australia, 
Dominican Republic/ Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Jamaicâ  
Sierra Leone, Suriname and Yugoslavia. * 
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trend of diminishing share of the. two Caribbean couhtries of the total 
IBA output had been accelerated: in the tase of. Guyana from 16% in 1960 
to 11% in 1970 and further to 6% in 1977* In the case of Jamaica the 
respective shares were 39% in 1S60, 30% in 1970, 26%'in 1973 (before the 
new tax policy) ahd 18% in 1S76 (see again table 40). 
The data seem to suggest that the aluminium transnationals continued 
and even reinforced the strategy pursued since early 1960s, of 
diversification of their sources of bauxite in order to reducie their 
vulnerability to the political risk in the Caribbean countries. Although' 
the reduction in bauxite production in both Caribbean countries in the 
post-negotiation period is hardly comparable, particularly for different 
time span examined here (1971-1977 for Guyana and only 1975-1977 for 
Jamaica), it can be: supposed, that the TNCs reaction and counter-strategies 
had been stronger in the Guyanese case, where the resource ownership 
monopolium of TNC had been questionned, with all demonstration effect 
1/ 
implications. — Furthermore, and as mentioned above, the internal 
economic and social problems of the first, country should be kept in.mind, 
including the organization and management of a new and large public sector, 2/ 
wage and other social problems of its employees, etc. " An other factor, 
had been the conflict with Reynolds, following that with ALCAN, leading the 
\J A regression analysis of.both countries shares in IBA total production 
during the 1960-1976 period demonstrated that, in comparison; with the 
historical 1960s trend projected, to 1970s, Guyana may have lost—over 
the 1971-1976 post-negotiation period—some 10 million ton 
production (that is more than double of the 1970 high levfel), meanwhile 
the reduction of Jamaican production, in 1975-1976, almost corresponded 
to the historical trend of 1960s. 
2/ For example, the 1977 Minimum Wage Agreement between the government and 
public sector employees (mining, sugar and rice industries) contained 
provisions for a 3 years increase in the minimum wage amounting to 260% of 
the prevailing rate being this settlement dependent on a corresponding 
increase in productivity. As the increase in productivity in 1977-1978 wa; 
negligible the wage hikes created substantial inflationary pressures. 
/first case 
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first case to paralization of production* , A certain appreciation of the 
leverage of external pressures can be obtained by analyzing structural changes 
in export orientation of both countries. 
b)"" "Changes in bauxite" and alumina exports "'"""* "* 
Tables 41 and 42 characterize the shift in trade direction of bauxite 
•and alumina occured between 1969 and 1976 in Guyana and Jamaica. In order 
to avoid difficulties of adjusting for inflation, only volume is examined. 
In both countries the fall in exports was accompanied by diversification of 
export markets. •'• 
In .Qjyana, exports of.metalic dried bauxite decreased, in the, period, 
under examination and at an annual average rate, by 8.5°/o and those of calcined 
bauxite and alumina by 2. 3/o (see table 41). At the same time, the share of 
European consumers increased from 23% to«43% (with average annual growth 
rate of 6%) in the case of calcined bauxite and to 13% for metalic .bauxite 
(in 1969 the European market did not exist for this commodity). The share 
of United States market stayed at the same-level in the case of calcined,, 
bauxite (33/o) and increased strongly in metalic bauxite (from 18% to >54%).' 
Japanese imports of calcined bauxite rose by 5.5% yearly doubling their 
participation in the total export volume,from 3% to S% The negative shift 
in export orientation corresponded to Canadian and Latin American markets; 
With respect to Canada, imports of metalic bauxite had.been falling yearly by 
17% decreasing its share in overall'Guyanese exports'almost b^ a half, from 
62% to 32% Canadian imports of calcined; bauxite ceased completely. The 
decrease in the share of Latin American markets requires more detailed analysis 
for it is related to transit-exports (particularly Trinidad and Tobago) and 
the cycle of contractual arrengements (Venezuela). 
/Table 41 
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' • •" v • Table 41 ; - '' '•• 
GUYANA: EXPORT VOLUME OF BAUXITE AND ALUMINA BY DESTINATION (1969-1975) 
Alumina 










Metalic dried bauxite 






Percentage of total 
commodity exports ' 
1969 1976 
100. 0 100,0 






































Notes: - indicates amount too small to measure. 
a Exports either increased from or fell to zero. 
Source: Economic Surveys of CEPAL,.various issues. 
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.... . „ . Table 42 . .. . 
-JAMAICA: E)\PORT VOLUME OF BAUXITE AND ALUitlNA BY DESTINATION 
..,., ...AND COMMODITY 
Percentage of total Av/erage annuai 
commodity exports 
1959 1975 Growth rate s'1969 - 1975 
Bauxite r 100.0 100o 0 . -5.9 
U.S. A. 100.0 . 100.0 -5.9 
Alumina 100.0 100.0 •« .r 1T If—ft 10.3 
U. S. A. 13.9 29.9, 23.0 
Canada, 44.5 . 4. 1 -23..0 
Europe 37.3 52.5 15.8 
Venezuela - . .0.6 a 
Socialist countries ., — 8.5 a 
Notes; See Table 41. 
Source; Same as in table1:4-1. • 
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Finally, the most dramatic shift occured in external sales of alumina, —' 
where the Canadian and United States markets disappeared:in 1976 (accounting 
jointly for 39°/o in 1969) and the share of Europe increased from 61% to 94%. 
, Furthermore, a new market for this commodity appeared in Venezuela (5% share 
in 1976) replacing the previous imports' of metalic dried bauxite by that country. 
In Jamaica, there had been no change in export orientation of bauxite, 
U.S. market maintaining its monopsonistic position. On the other hand, alumina 
exports (which accounted, in 1978, for 54% of total export value in comparison 
with 23% for bauxite and 11% for sugar) shifted strongly to European and 
United States marketsp from 37% to 52% and from 14% to 30% of total Jamaican 
alumina exports, respectively, replacing to a high degree the almost disappearing 
Canadian market, which decreased its participation from 44% to only 4%, A new 
market for alumina had been gained in 1975 in socialist countries (U.S.S.R.), th 
stability of which requires a more detailed analysis. In any case, the potentia 
consumption capacity of this market, and of the Japanese one, offers further 
-possibilities of export diversification in the two areas (see table 43)# 
As to developing countries, a seven year contract vorth.of U.S.£200 million 
for exports of 1 million tons of alumina to Venezuela had been signed and a 
first shipment of 25.000 tons effected in 1978. Another long term alumina 
contract is underway with Algeria. 
As in the previous analysis of changes in bauxite production in the 
post-negotiation period, in Guyana and Jamaica, the evaluation of export 
levels and structure is faced by severe limitations. They consist in 
relatively short and different post-negotiation periods under examination for 
each of both countries, conjunctural changes in the vorld demand in a 
recession cycle, difficulties in evaluating the leverege of domestic production 
> i O ' i i m « » i r w n mi • i> i i i i f i w — n 
\j It should be kept in mind that alumina represented in 1977 only 14% of 
total Guyanese exports, meanwhile the share of dried and calcined bauxite 




PROJECTED GROWTH ON ALUMINIUM CONSUMPTION BY MAIN'DEVELOPED AREAS 
1970 - 1980 1980 - 1985 
North'America' " '' '5.5' " ''4.5 
Eûrope 'é.'3 5,6 
Japan - ~ • ' g > 0 . 10ig 
Total developed countries ''*""' ' 6.0 6.3 
Socialist Countries 3.9 • . 5sg 
Total 'world a/ '"'"' ' 6,1 " 6.1 
Source; IBRD, "Market Structure of Bauxite/Alumina/Aluminium: Prospects 
for Developing Countries", Commodity Paper N° 24 (3/77). 
a/ Excluding developing countries. 
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and marketing setbacks, etc. Keeping in mind these "caveat", some 
preliminary hypothesis can be ventured! 
First, the decrease in bauxite and alumina exports in both countries 
was obviously related to the negative reaction and counter-strategies of TNCs 
in the negotiation, and post negotiation^period. This seems to be particularly 
true in the case of Canadian ALCAN, which shifted its input sourcing from the 
uncertain Caribbean markets to resources in countries of less political risk. 
Second, the same conclusion does not seem to apply to the U.S. aluminium 
companies, which increased their imports of Guyanese metalic bauxite, 
maintained the sourcing of calcined bauxite of the same origin and their 
monopsonistic position in Jamaican bauxite market arid, finally, expanded 
considerably their imports of altimlna from Jamaica. These differences 
in TNCs reactions and strategies could have reflected, on the one hand, the 
.above, analyzed harshness of the conflict with ALCAN. in. Guyana and, on the 
other hand, competitive attitudes among the aluminium TNCs, trying some 
of them to fill'the vacuum in developing countries markets deserted by 
companies in conflict. 
Third, and most important, Guyana and Jamaica began to react to the 
TNCs traditional, and in time of conflict reinforced, strategy of resource 
diversification, vdth their own national efforts in market diversification. 
This has been corroborated by the sharp increase of the role of European 
and Japanese markets in the export reorientation of both Caribbean countries 
and relates obviously with potential capacities of more independent 
Latin American, other developing regions and socialist countries markets. 
Finally,marketing strategies of bauxite exporting developing countries, 
aimed at decreasing the oligopolistic domination and resulting dependence 
on one or few TNCs and exploiting the inter-company competition, represent 
without any doubt one of the most important factors of their negotiating % 
capacity vis^a-vis transnational corporations. For this reason they require a 
more detailed study in future research activities. 
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